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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we use laboratory experiments to study otherwise unobservable interac-
tions in the labor market. The key advantage of laboratory experiments is the ability to control
conditions more tightly than in any other context, so it plays a distinctive role in serving as the
first link in a longer chain running from standard theory to actual outcome in the real world.
Our experiments can even provide valuable information on how people behave in situations
where existing theory provides little or no guide to what should happen.
In our first experiment, we study the impact of specific incentive schemes on people’s behav-
ior by systematically varying them. We create an experimental labor market where “workers”
can join “companies” that pay them according to different compensation schemes: (a) piece
rate, (b) revenue sharing, (c) individual tournament, and (d) team tournament. In order to
disentangle incentive and self-sorting effects, our experiment forces all workers to initially com-
plete real-effort tasks paid by four given incentives respectively, and then use compensating
differentials to elicit their preferences for different incentives. Therefore, based on the lab data
from our sample of Chinese university students, we are able to study their productivity response
to various incentives as well as their preferences for different types of compensation.
When we analyze individual productivity under four incentives, we find that: (1) com-
pared to the baseline performance paid by piece rate, under three team-based incentives, more
competitive incentive generates higher performance improvement. (2) Feedback about rela-
tive performance reduces the performance differences between three team-based incentives. (3)
Regardless of incentives and feedback information, an additional compensation in terms of
sign-up bonus brings a positive and significant effect on individual performance. In addition,
by eliciting subjects’ preferences for different compensation schemes, we build a mapping from
individual characteristics to their self-sorting outcome as follows: (1) Subjects with high rela-
tive performance always prefer individual tournament to other two team-based incentives. (2)
xii
Risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose individual tournament if knowing the information
about their relative performance. (3) Cooperative incentives attract more women than men,
which is partially explained by gender-specific social preferences. (4) Compared to children
with siblings, only children are less cooperative but more competitive. (5) In the absence
of feedback, overconfident subjects are more likely to enter into individual tournament than
those under-confident subjects with the same ability. Interestingly, the provision of information
about their relative performance eliminates the impact of biased self-assessment. As a result,
the feedback helps reduce the gender gap in competition as well as the difference between only
child and child with siblings.
In a different study, we design a new laboratory experiment to investigate the ways that trust
between strangers evolves in a setting where noisy feedback regarding mutual trustworthiness
is present. We use a two-player sequential trust game where each trustor receives a sequence of
noisy binary signals that reveal the trustworthiness type of the trustee. As a result, we track
the evolution of trustors’ individual beliefs about trustworthiness types of trustees to document
that subjects process information in an asymmetric way compared to a perfect Bayesian: they
react more to negative feedback rather than positive. We show that our empirical results arise
naturally in a theoretical model where there exists a complementary relationship between initial
trust and optimally biased Bayesian information processing. Hence, we theoretically predict
that greater initial trust must be counter-balanced by more asymmetric belief updating. We
then use a novel method to demonstrate this hypothesis in the following-up experiment. We
match participants from two different universities (in Hong Kong and Beijing, respectively)
and prime them on the social identity of their counterparts. Consequently, by the introduction
of social identity, we find that both initial trust level and asymmetry of belief updating are
stronger for in-group matches than out-group matches, which is consistent with our theoretical
prediction.
1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. The current chapter presents a general
introduction to the chapters that follow, and provides an outline for the organization of the
dissertation. While the general theme of this dissertation is using laboratory experiments
to study otherwise unobservable labor market interactions, each chapter is meant to stand
alone by addressing a specific issue. We begin in the next chapter by using a laboratory
experiment to study the interaction between incentive schemes and work organization in the
modern workplace. Three aspects of the important findings from this labor market experiment
are presented in Chapter 2, 3 and 4, respectively. And then, Chapter 5 discusses a new
laboratory experiment, which is designed to investigate the ways that trust between strangers
evolves in a setting where noisy feedback regarding mutual trustworthiness is present. Finally
in Chapter 6, we provide a summary and several general conclusions.
Recent labor market research suggests that workers of similar ability might behave quite
differently under different incentives. For example, some workers might reduce effort when
working in a team because of the “free-riding” opportunity. Some might dislike competition
and relative performance pay because they find it stressful. Although many authors (Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007; Wozniak et al. 2010) have stressed the importance of non-cognitive char-
acteristics such as risk preference and self-confidence on labor market outcomes, only very few
studies (e.g. Dohmen and Falk 2011) use incentivized elicitation methods to measure those
characteristics. In our first labor market experiment, we use a rich battery of diagnostic games
to elicit individual characteristics including risk attitude, social preference and self-confidence.
Hence, Chapter 2 provides the description of how we use experimental methods to elicit those
characteristics, and then summarizes the important findings from our subject pool of 411
Chinese university students. First of all, it is shown that there are significant gender differ-
2ences on those non-cognitive characteristics: On average, men are less risk averse and more
over-confident than women; regarding the social preference, men are more likely to be either
perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless, whereas women tend to be equalitarian who prefer to share
evenly1. Moreover, thanks to the uniqueness of our subject pool, we obtain intriguing findings
about the behavior of only children participants in our sample in China. For instance, only
children are less risk-averse and also less over-confident than the children with siblings; how-
ever, there is no significant difference in social preference between only children and children
with siblings, which provides experimental evidence against the stereotype that only children
are more likely to be selfish.
Next, in order to investigate individual response to different incentives, we create an ex-
perimental labor market where “workers” can join “companies” that pay them according to
different compensation schemes. Since the modern workplace puts an ever greater emphasis on
teamwork, we systematically study the impact of different team-based incentives. In addition
to the baseline incentive, i.e. “piece rate” compensation scheme for individual-based working
environment, the following three representative team-based incentives are designed to highlight
the tradeoff between cooperation and competition: (1) “revenue sharing” where all earnings are
equally shared among team members; (2) “individual tournament” where only the highest per-
former in the team can earn a prize; and (3) “team tournament” where teams should compete
first, and then prizes are shared within the winning team. In particular, the last team-based
incentive, i.e. “team tournament”, is defined as a hybrid of “individual tournament” and “rev-
enue sharing”, which are two contrasting “corporate cultures” one that focuses on competition
and one that emphasizes collaboration.
Moreover, self-sorting might amplify the effect of an incentive scheme. In the presence
of worker self-sorting, it is possible that workers with different individual characteristics feel
attracted by different pay schemes and then systematically self-select into particular firms
and organizations (Dohmen and Falk 2011). Therefore, in order to disentangle incentive and
sorting effects, our experiment forces all workers to initially complete four real-effort tasks paid
1Our finding is consistent with the conclusion of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), in which the authors
conduct a dictator game with varying income and prices. The sample of that experimental study consists of 47
female subjects and 95 male subjects from University of Wisconsin and Iowa State University in United States.
3by piece rate, revenue sharing, individual tournament, and team tournament, respectively, and
then elicits their preferences for different incentives through a self-selection process. Using our
experimental data, we are able to study individual productivity response to various incentives
as well as their preferences for different types of compensation.
In Chapter 3, we aim to explore the most efficient way(s) to improve workers’ productivity
by considering three potential influence factors at the same time, that is: team-based incentives,
feedback about relative performance, and compensating differential in terms of extra sign-up
bonus. As a result, we find that: (1) compared to the baseline performance paid by piece rate,
under three team-based incentives, more competitive incentive generates higher performance
improvement. (2) Feedback about relative performance reduces the performance differences
between three team-based incentives. (3) Regardless of incentives and feedback, the extra sign-
up bonus brings a positive and significant effect on individual performance. Hence, we suggest
that compared with designing a distinctive incentive scheme and feedback treatment for each
heterogeneous worker, it should be much more feasible and convenient for companies to set a
flexible sign-up bonus policy while holding other elements of workplace environment fixed.
Chapter 4 studies sorting into four given incentives based on individual characteristics. An
innovation in the design for this self-sorting task is that we ask subjects to not only rank
those four payment schemes from most preferred to least preferred, but we also elicit their
compensating differentials between any two consecutive incentives. More importantly, instead
of asking several hypothetical evaluation questions in an open-ended format, the elicitation of
compensating differential in our experiment adopts a variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
(BDM) mechanism that is incentive-compatible. To the best of our knowledge, this experiment
is the first one to implement such a mechanism in a laboratory experiment to price the cost
of a mismatch between a worker and a company. As a result, the lab data from our sample
of Chinese university students clearly show the relationship between their stated-preferences
and individual characteristics, and the main findings include (1) Subjects with high relative
performance always prefer individual tournament to other two team-based incentives; (2) Risk-
averse subjects are less likely to choose individual tournament if knowing the information
about their relative performance; (3) Cooperative incentives attract more women than men,
4which is partially explained by gender-specific social preferences; (4) Compared to children with
siblings, only children are less cooperative but more competitive; (5) In the absence of feedback,
overconfident subjects are more likely to enter into individual tournament than those under-
confident subjects with the same ability. Interestingly, the provision of information about their
relative performance eliminates the impact of biased self-assessment. As a result, the feedback
helps reduce the gender gap in competition as well as the difference between only child and
child with siblings2.
Regarding the outcome in our incentive experiment, it’s noticeable that majority of subjects
are often reluctant to choose cooperative incentives. A possible reason for this is the lack of trust
that other team members will exert maximum effort. Another reason is the lack of information
about the type of partner. Since this lack of trust is pervasive in many labor market interactions,
it is worthwhile to explore the evolution of trust in a more general setting. Hence, in Chapter
5, we study how trust between strangers evolves in a setting with noisy feedback about the
trustworthiness of others. In our second laboratory experiment, the design uses a two-player
sequential trust game where each trustor receives a sequence of noisy binary signals that reveal
the trustworthiness type of the trustee. As a result, we track the evolution of trustors’ individual
beliefs about trustworthiness types of trustees to document that subjects process information
in an asymmetric way compared to a perfect Bayesian: they react more to negative feedback
rather than positive. Trust is therefore much easier to lose than to gain. Next, we show that
our empirical results arise naturally in a theoretical model where individuals optimally manage
their trust in others with noisy feedback. We discuss whether trustors should use Bayesian
updating to calculate their trust levels or whether they should process information in a biased
manner. The conclusion suggests that there exists a complementary relationship between initial
trust and optimally biased Bayesian information processing. Hence, we theoretically predict
that greater initial trust must be counter-balanced by more asymmetric belief updating. We
then use a novel method to demonstrate this hypothesis in the following-up experiment. We
match participants from two different universities (in Hong Kong and Beijing, respectively)
2This result is similar to the findings in the experimental study of Wozniak et al. (2010), where feedback
information about relative performance helps all subjects move towards more optimal choices and then the
gender gap in competitiveness is reduced.
5and prime them on the social identity of their counterparts. Consequently, by the introduction
of social identity, we find that both initial trust level and asymmetry of belief updating are
stronger for in-group matches than out-group matches, which is consistent with our theoretical
prediction.
Finally, in Chapter 6, a summary and some general conclusions are presented. In order to
explore the interaction between incentive schemes and work organization, our first experiment
applies simple but efficient experimental methods to elicit individual response to different team-
based incentives. To the best of our knowledge, this design is the first one to implement
the “compensating differential” in a laboratory experiment to price the cost of a mismatch
between a worker and a company. Moreover, thanks to the uniqueness of our subject pool in
China, we obtain intriguing findings about the behavior of only children participants in our
labor market experiment. In our second study, we investigate the evolution of trust between
strangers by both experimental method and theoretical model. As a consequence, we reject
the behavioral predictions based on standard Bayesian rule and verify that individuals follow
an optimally biased information processing rule to update their trust beliefs. Besides, this
study also contributes to social identity research by highlighting the impact of social identity
on individual initial trust as well as trust updating.
6CHAPTER 2. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS FOR ELICITATION OF
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
Abstract
Although many labor economists have stressed the importance of non-cognitive character-
istics on labor market outcomes, only very few studies use incentivized elicitation methods
to measure them. Hence, in this laboratory experiment, we use a rich battery of diagnostic
games to elicit several non-cognitive characteristics including risk attitude, social preference
and self-confidence. From our experimental data, we can verify that there are remarkable gen-
der gaps on those non-cognitive characteristics: on average, men are less risk averse and more
over-confident than women; regarding the social preference, men are more likely to be either
perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless, whereas women tend to be equalitarian who prefer to share
evenly. Moreover, thanks to the uniqueness of our subject pool in China, we also find some
differences between only children and children with siblings: only children are less risk-averse
and also less over-confident than the children with siblings; however, there is no significant dif-
ference in social preference between two groups, which provides experimental evidence against
the stereotype that only children are more likely to be selfish.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, laboratory experiments have become a popular method of re-
search to examine individual behavior and social preferences in labor markets (see a literature
review in Charness and Kuhn 2011). The key advantage of laboratory experiments is re-
searchers can control the environment under which individuals make their decisions and allow
causal inferences by exogenously varying one parameter while holding all others constant.
7Another major advantage of laboratory experiments derives from the convenience of elicit-
ing endogenous determinants of individual differences which are unobservable in the real world.
For instance, although many labor economists have stressed the importance of non-cognitive
characteristics such as risk attitude, social preference and self-confidence on labor market out-
comes, it is very difficult to measure them by field data. On the contrary, by using a rich battery
of diagnostic games to elicit those individual characteristics in a laboratory experiment, our
study obtains intriguing findings about the subject pool of 411 Chinese university students.
We verify that there are remarkable gender gaps on individual characteristics: on average, men
are less risk averse and more over-confident than women; regarding the social preference, men
are more likely to be either perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless, whereas women tend to be
equalitarian who prefer to share evenly1. Moreover, thanks to the uniqueness of our sample
in China, we also find some differences between only children and children with siblings: only
children are less risk-averse and also less over-confident than the children with siblings; how-
ever, there is no significant difference in social preference between two groups, which provides
experimental evidence against the stereotype that only children are more likely to be selfish.
Finally, the experimental data elicited by incentivized methods should be more convincing
than the self-reported data from traditional surveys. Different from the way of only asking
several hypothetical questions, laboratory experiments always provide participants with real
monetary rewards based on their response to decision-making questions. Therefore, compared
with answering survey, people are more likely to take the questions seriously and tell truth in
the laboratory experiments. Now, there is a new research strand combines incentive-compatible
experimental measures with survey methods (Fehr et al. 2003; Ermisch et al. 2009; Dohmen
et al. 2010). For example, the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), the new household
panel Understanding Society in the United Kingdom, and the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP), both add experimental sessions into a traditional questionnaire to collect more specific
individual characteristics in addition to the basic individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics
used in representative surveys.
1Our finding is consistent with the conclusion of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), in which the authors
conduct a dictator game with varying income and prices. The sample of that experimental study consists of 47
female subjects and 95 male subjects from University of Wisconsin and Iowa State University in United States.
8In order to systematically investigate the impacts of individual characteristics on workers’
response to different team-based incentives in our experimental labor market, before the work-
ers enter into the hiring process, we first arrange a diagnostic stage to elicit their individual
characteristics including: risk attitude, social preference, ability for a specific “real effort” task
and their self-assessment about the relative performance compared with other team members.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the description of how
we use experimental methods to elicit four individual characteristics one by one. And then, we
summarize the important findings in section 3. Finally, in section 4, some concluding remarks
are presented.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Four Tasks to Elicit Individual Characteristics
2.2.1.1 Task 1: Elicit Risk Preference
This task uses lottery choices to elicit people’s risk preference. In fact, there is an influential
and large body of research in experimental economics measures risk aversion (e.g. Tversky and
Kahneman 1992; Barsky et al. 1997; Andersen et al. 2008). In many experiments in this
literature, economists infer risk preferences from lists of binary lottery choices. Hence, in our
experimental design, we elicited subjects’ risk attitudes by this commonly used method. In
Task 1, each subject was asked to answer 10 binary choices questions as shown in Figure 2.1.
In each binary choice, subjects need to decide whether they prefer a safe option or playing
a lottery. The safe option is always the same in each question, which is 20 Chinese Yuan as the
fixed payoff. However, the lotteries vary and the risk of lottery option decreases from question
to question. In other words, the probability of winning 40 Chinese Yuan increases from 10%
to 100% in the end.
Now suppose a subject has consistent risk preference on lotteries, s/he will prefer the safe
option to the lotteries above a certain risk level, and then switch to preferring the lottery option
in all subsequent choice questions. Therefore, the switching point of winning 40 Chinese Yuan
in a lottery indicates the subject’s risk attitude. That is, the higher this switching point is, the
9Figure 2.1 Binary choices between a fixed payoff and a lottery to elicit risk preference
more risk-averse s/he is.
More importantly, instead of using hypothetical gambles to measure risk aversion, our
experiment used actual decision-making questions with real payoff. In other words, according
to subjects’ final decisions in 10 binary choices, we would randomly select one choice out of ten
to calculate their payoffs in Task 1. For instance, if Choice 2 is randomly selected to calculate
the payoff, then the subject would receive 20 Yuan if s/he selected the fixed payment; if s/he
selected the lottery option of winning 40 Yuan with 20% probability, then her/his payoff would
depend on the realized outcome of such a lottery, which could be either 40 Yuan or 0 Yuan in
the end.
2.2.1.2 Task 2: Elicit Social Preference
In order to better understand the heterogeneity in individual preferences for equitable out-
comes or social welfare, we elicited subjects’ social preferences by a dictator game. In this
dictator game, each participant was randomly matched with another participant in the lab
room, playing the role of a dictator or a receiver. As a dictator, s/he could get 30 Chinese
Yuan as endowment at the beginning of the game, and could either keep all money or send
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some amount to another person, i.e. the receiver. On the other hand, as a receiver, s/he had no
endowment, but could receive something if the dictator passed money to her/him. Moreover,
whatever amount the dictator decided to send, the money was doubled by the experimenter
and then added to the receiver’s payoff. In order to classify each subject, everyone had to play
the role of dictator and decide how much sent to the receiver from an endowment of 30 Chinese
Yuan. After all transfer choices made, subjects were randomly matched in pairs and two roles
within each pair were assigned by a random draw to determine their final payments in this
task.
From the individual choices in this dictator game, we are able to distinguish three types of
social preferences. First, the subjects with “selfish” preference, who sent an amount of money
less than 10 Chinese Yuan to the receiver so that s/he would have a payoff higher than the
receiver; Second, the subjects with “inequality-averse” or “fair” preference, who sent 10 Chinese
Yuan to the receiver to make an equal income distribution in the end; Third, the subjects with
“altruistic” preference, who sent an amount more than 10 Yuan so that the dictator would
earn less than the receiver. Actually, the dictator’s behavior of sacrificing her/himself to make
other people better off might because they have increasing utility in others’ payoffs (Andreoni
1990; Andreoni and Miller 2002), or they want to maximize total social welfare (Charness and
Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004).
2.2.1.3 Task 3: Elicit Individual Ability
We implemented a “real effort” work in our experiment to elicit individual ability for this
specific puzzle-solving task, which means subjects really had to work and were to some extent
uncertain about their own productivity as well as the productivity of others. This is a realistic
feature of most work tasks and leaves room for eliciting self-assessment about their relative
performance in the next diagnostic task. Hence, in Task 3, all subjects were required to solve
letter-puzzles as many as possible in 3 minutes. As a task, solving letter-puzzles is well suited
for our purposes because it requires no previous knowledge, is easy to explain, and guarantees
a sufficient degree of heterogeneity in productivity. Figure 2.2 provides an example of letter-
puzzle used in our experiment.
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Figure 2.2 Puzzle-solving game to elicit individual ability for this task
The square with letters on the right differs from the square of letters on the left in two
letters. Subjects had to find those letters and click on them to solve the puzzle. Whenever
they clicked a letter other than those two letters, the remaining time was reduced by 1 second.
Hence, people had to be more cautious and should try to only click letters that differ. Within
a 3-minute period, each subject was asked to solve as many puzzles as possible, and s/he could
increase her/his payoff by a high productivityBefore the task started formally, subjects had
three practice examples to familiarize themselves with this letter-puzzle, in which no payment
was involved.. A clock on the screen informed how many seconds they had used.
Once this task finished, all subjects were informed of their own performance, but nothing
about the performance of others. The pay scheme in this task was “piece rate”, i.e. subjects
would receive 1 Chinese Yuan for each solved puzzle. The main reason for choosing “piece
rate” as the monetary incentive is because it is a compensation scheme based on individual
absolute performance only. Therefore, by excluding the impacts from other people, the piece
rate scheme is a good proxy for subjects’ real abilities irrespective of any team-based incentives.
Besides, it is also an intrinsic motivation for everyone to exert effort in the task: the better
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someone performed, the more s/he would earn.
2.2.1.4 Task 4: Elicit Self-confidence
According to outcome in Task 3, this new task was designed to elicit subjects’ self-assessments
about their relative performance in the previous puzzle-solving task. That is, each subject was
asked to estimate the probability that her/his performance was better than a randomly se-
lected other player in the lab room. And, subjects could increase their earnings by submitting
a good estimate. We used a novel crossover mechanism to elicit their self-confidence about the
relative performance. In fact, Mobius et al. (2011) is the first paper to implement this crossover
mechanism in an experiment. The crossover mechanism has one main advantage over the oth-
erwise popular quadratic scoring rule that most experimental papers use, i.e. it works for a
wide class of preferences: it is well known that the quadratic scoring rule only produces truth-
ful reports if subjects are risk-neutral. If subjects are risk-averse, quadratic scoring induces
biased reports. In contrast, the crossover mechanism only requires that subjects’ preferences
are monotonic in the following sense: among the class of lotteries that pay off x > 0 with
probability q and 0 with probability 1−q, subjects strictly prefer those with higher q. Truthful
reporting of subjective beliefs is then a strictly dominant strategy. Monotonicity holds for
all von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences as well as many non-standard preferences such as
Prospect theory.
In the experimental instruction, we presented this mechanism in a simple narrative form.
We told subjects that they were paired with a “helper robot” who would also take the puzzle-
solving task and who had a certain fixed probability q of winning against a randomly selected
player. This probability was between 0 and 100% but unknown to the subject. Subjects were
told that they could have their winnings based on their robot’s performance rather than their
own, and asked to indicate a threshold level of q above which they preferred to use the robot’s
performance. As a consequence, when the helper robot’s winning probability was higher than
the subject’s indicated threshold, the robot’s performance would be used to compete with
the subject’s opponent; otherwise, subject’s own performance would be used against her/his
selected opponent. In the end, only if the subject’s or the helper robot’s performance was
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better than the performance of the other selected player, 10 Chinese Yuan could be added to
the individual earnings. Therefore, subjects should maximize their probability of earning an
extra 10 Chinese Yuan by choosing the threshold as their own subjective probability of being
better than some other player.
2.2.2 Subject Pool
In 2011, we conducted this laboratory experiment at Central University of Finance and
Economics in Beijing, China. We had 411 complete observations, including 184 males and 227
females, and all of them were university students. The summary statistics of our subject pool
is presented in Table 2.1. There were 213 only children (and 198 children with siblings) in
our subject pool. Because majority of the participants i.e. 70% were graduate students, the
average college year was above 4 and the average age was 23.03 correspondingly. Only 2% of
the participants were married. Finally, the average level of GPA was 3.30 (on a 4.0 scale) with
a standard deviation of 0.35. It is worth noting that subjects’ grades were self-reported, so
we cannot guarantee the accuracy of this information and treat it as a quite limited index to
personal academic performance.
Table 2.1 Summary statistics of subject pool in the labor market experiment
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 0.55 0.5 0 1
Only Child 0.52 0.5 0 1
College Year 4.62 1.39 1 9
Age 23.03 2.35 17 38
Married 0.02 0.15 0 1
GPA 3.3 0.35 2 3.95
Notes:
“Female” = 1 if the subject is a female, otherwise = 0;
“Only Child” = 1 if the subject is the only child in family, otherwise = 0;
“College Year” =1 for freshmen, = 2 for sophomores, = 3 for juniors, = 4 for seniors,
= 5 for 1st year masters, = 6 for 2nd year masters, = 7 for 3rd year masters,
= 8 for 1st year PhDs, = 9 for 2nd year PhDs;
“Married” =1 if the subject is married, otherwise = 0;
“GPA” is the academic score measured on a 4.0 scale.
14
2.3 Results
Since we designed four tasks to elicit four individual characteristics respectively, we plan to
report our findings related to each task one by one.
2.3.1 Risk Preference in Task 1
For each subject having monotonous preference, given a binary choice between a safe option
of fixed 20 Yuan and a lottery of winning 40 Yuan with probability x%, the minimum level
of the winning probability x% that makes the subject prefer lottery to safe option indicates
her/his risk attitude. That is, the higher this threshold x is, the more risk-averse the subject is.
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of individual preference for risk within the overall population,
then Figure 2.4 indicates the gender difference on risk preference, and finally Figure 2.5 makes
the comparison between only children and children with siblings.
Moreover, we divide subjects with different risk attitudes into three types: risk-loving if
subject has a threshold of winning probability lower than 50%; risk-neutral if the threshold is
equal to 50%; and risk-averse if the threshold is higher than 50%. Accordingly, we summarize
the proportion of those three types in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.3 Distribution of risk preferences in the overall sample
From the results in three figures and Table 2.2, we find the majority of subjects are risk-
averse. Meanwhile, consistent with the previous studies on gender difference (e.g. Dohmen
and Falk 2011), male is less risk-averse than female since the difference in the mean of risk
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Figure 2.4 Distribution of risk preferences – male vs. female
Figure 2.5 Distribution of risk preferences – child with siblings vs. only child
threshold between two groups is significant at p = 0.013. Similarly, by the comparison between
only children and children with siblings, we also find a statistically significant difference (at p =
0.099) in their risk preferences, that is, only children are less risk-averse than the counterpart. It
is worth noting that our finding about only child is just opposite to the conclusion in the latest
paper on China’s One-Child policy, i.e. Cameron et al. (2013), where the authors document
that only child is more risk-averse than the child with siblings.
Furthermore, we suspect the difference of risk attitude between only child and child with
siblings is embedded in One-Child policy, which is unique in China. There are some minor
exceptions in China’s One-Child policy. For example, the policy is stricter for urban residents
than for rural residents. Parents in rural areas are allowed to have another kid if the first baby
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics of risk attitude and proportions of three types
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Risk- Risk- Risk-
loving neutral averse
Total 411 65.38 15.26 10 100 7.3% 14.35% 78.35%
Male 184 63.32 15.38 10 100 6.52% 17.93% 75.55%
Female 227 67.05 14.98 20 100 7.93% 11.45% 80.62%
Child with Siblings 198 66.67 15.11 10 100 6.06% 12.63% 81.31%
Only Child 213 64.18 15.32 10 100 8.45% 15.96% 75.59%
is a girl. In contrast, parents living in the urban areas, especially those working in state owned
enterprises, schools, hospitals, government and other private firms are not allowed to have the
second kid. Violation will result in large amount of fines, loss of jobs and criticism. Therefore,
such “biased” policy results in lower cost of “illegal” baby in rural areas than in urban areas.
This leads to the fact that only child is more likely to live in urban areas and child with siblings
live in rural areas.
Unfortunately, we could not observe the residence for all 411 observations. Only the sample
of experiment sessions in December 2011 has rural urban origin information, resulting in a
rather limited sample of 125 observations2. Based on this smaller sample, the correlation
between dummy variable “urban” and “only child” is 0.617, which provides a strong evidence
of the favor toward rural residents in the policy. Because growing environment in rural and
urban area is different too, if rural kids are more likely to be risk-averse than urban kids, we
could also observe only child are less risk-averse.
The regression on risk-aversion is reported in Table 2.3. From the results in the first two
columns, the marginal effects of gender and only child status are significantly different from
zero, consistent with the comparisons in Table 2.2. However, the effect of only child status
becomes insignificant when adding the residence information in the last column. Instead, we
find that urban participants are significantly less risk-averse than participants who grow up in
rural areas. Besides, due to the reduced sample size in the second column, the standard errors
are all increased. Therefore, it suggests that the difference in risk preference between only child
2There are 51 male and 74 female subjects in the limited sample. Moreover, 57 subjects are children with
siblings, and 68 are only children
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and child with siblings might be partially driven by their different places of residence.
Table 2.3 Regression for risk preference
Risk aversion (1) (2) (3)
Female 3.793** 4.442* 5.486**
(1.501) (2.591) (2.610)
Only child -2.575* -8.414*** -4.226
(1.493) (2.557) (3.260)
Urban -7.155**
(3.524)
Constant 64.620*** 67.470*** 69.550***
(1.346) (2.519) (2.691)
Observations 411 125 125
R-squared 0.022 0.11 0.14
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
2.3.2 Social Preference in Task 2
In the dictator game of Task 2, each subject was required to decide her/his transfer amount
to a receiver assuming s/he played the role of a dictator. As a result, Figure 2.6 shows the
overall distribution of transfer amounts from dictators, and then Figure 2.7 and 2.8 report the
differences between male and female, only child and child with siblings, respectively.
As mentioned before, subjects are classified into three types of social preference based on
their transfer decisions. First, a subject is defined as a “selfish” type if s/he sent an amount of
money less than 10 Chinese Yuan to a receiver so that s/he would earn more than the receiver;
Second, a subject is defined as a “fair” type if s/he sent 10 Chinese Yuan and share an equal
income with the receiver in the end; Third, a subject is defined as an “altruistic” type if her/his
transfer amount was more than 10 Chinese Yuan. Accordingly, we report the proportion of
those three types in Table 2.4.
For the overall population, over half of the subjects had the social preference of fair type
so that the proportion of inequality-averse subjects (i.e. fair type) was significantly more than
other two types. Moreover, there were only 52 subjects (i.e. 12.65%) kept all endowments
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Figure 2.6 Distribution of social preferences in the overall sample
Figure 2.7 Distribution of social preferences – male vs. female
for themselves and passed nothing to their receivers in the dictator game. It implies that
the absolutely self-interested individuals are quite rare in the real world, and provides a solid
evidence to support the existence of other-regarding preferences.
As shown in Figure 2.7 as well as Table 2.4, 58.59% of female subjects had the social
preference of fair type, whereas only 42.39% of male subjects were fair type. Moreover, the
proportion of having altruistic social preference in male subjects (26.09%) was remarkably larger
than the proportion in female (13.66%). Hence, we can conclude that our female participants
cared more about the equalization in welfare distribution. This finding is consistent with the
conclusion of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), in which the authors conduct a dictator game
with varying income and prices, and then they find that men are more likely to be either
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Figure 2.8 Distribution of social preferences – child with siblings vs. only child
perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless, whereas women tend to be equalitarian who prefer to
share evenly.
Regarding the comparison between only children and children with siblings, there was no
evidence to indicate any significant difference in their social preferences. In fact, Figure 2.8
presents almost the same distribution of transfer amounts for both groups of only children and
children with siblings. And, the mean of transfer amount by only children was not significantly
different from the mean of transfer amount by children with siblings (p = 0.788). Hence,
contrary to what we expected, only children participants in our sample didn’t behave more
selfishly than children with siblings.
In addition, the regression on social preference is reported in Table 2.5.3 From the results
of Probit model in those three columns, only “female” has a significant effect on the probability
of being inequality-averse (i.e. having “fair” type of social preference), whereas both only child
status and rural urban origin information have insignificant impacts.
2.3.3 Individual Ability in Task 3
As shown in Figure 2.9, the distribution of individual productivity seems to be a normal
distribution in the overall population. Specifically, it has a mean of 12.36 and a standard
deviation of 2.71 (see Table 2.6).
3The dependent variable is the dummy of “inequality-aversion”, which is equal to 1 if the subject prefers
fairness so that s/he decided to send 10 Chinese Yuan to the receiver in the dictator game; and equal to 0
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Table 2.4 Summary statistics of transfer amount and proportions of three social preferences
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Selfish Fair Altruistic
Total 411 10.83 7.97 0 30 29.44% 51.34% 19.22%
Male 184 11.94 9.43 0 30 31.52% 42.39% 26.09%
Female 227 9.93 6.44 0 30 27.75% 58.59% 13.66%
Child with Siblings 198 10.94 8.24 0 30 28.79% 51.52% 19.69%
Only Child 213 10.73 7.73 0 30 30.05% 51.17% 18.78%
Table 2.5 Regression for social preference
Inequality aversion (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.409*** 0.318* 0.351*
(0.125) (0.231) (0.236)
Only child -0.018 -0.065 0.061
(0.125) (0.227) (0.294)
Urban -0.214
(0.316)
Constant -0.183 -0.184 -0.124
(0.112) (0.223) (0.241)
Observations 411 125 125
Log likelihood -279.367 -85.561 -85.332
The regression model is Probit model.
Dependent variable is “inequality aversion”.
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Table 2.6 Summary statistics of individual performance in the puzzle-solving task
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total 411 12.36 2.71 5 21
Male 184 11.98 2.79 5 20
Female 227 12.67 2.61 6 21
Child with Siblings 198 11.72 2.5 6 19
Only Child 213 12.96 2.76 5 21
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Figure 2.9 Distribution of puzzle-solving performance in the overall sample
Figure 2.10 Distribution of puzzle-solving performance – male vs. female
However, if we consider male and female separately, then there was a significant gender
difference on performance in this puzzle-solving task. That is, the average number of puzzle
solved was 11.98 for male, which was significantly lower than the average performance of female
(i.e. 12.67) at p = 0.005. Although we didn’t expect such a gender difference in performance
under this gender-neutral task, the fact shows that women might have better quick observation
skills and/or because those female students took the experiment more seriously than the male
participants and then put more effort during the task.
In addition, there was also a significant performance difference between only children and
children with siblings. According to the intra-household allocation model of Becker and Tomes
otherwise.
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Figure 2.11 Distribution of puzzle-solving performance – child with siblings vs. only child
(1976), parents choose to allocate more resources to the more able child so as to maximize the
lifetime income of all children. However, compared with larger family, parents of only child
do not face such a resource allocation problem within the household. Therefore, labor market
outcomes for only children are presumably ceteris paribus better than children with siblings.
For instance, children in larger families are found to have lower levels of educational attainment
(Steelman et al. 2002); and only children are verified to be more able than children with siblings
at a math task (i.e. adding up five two-digit numbers) in the behavioral experiment of Cameron
et al. (2013).
The regression results are reported in Table 2.7. In the first column, the marginal effects
of gender and only child status on the individual performance in the puzzle-solving task are
significantly positive, which is consistent with the comparisons in Table 2.6. However, when
considering the smaller sample including residence information, the performance difference
between different groups becomes insignificant.
2.3.4 Self-confidence in Task 4
Based on elicited self-assessment about their relative performance in the puzzle-solving
task, we define a new variable “confidence bias” to measure the distance between subjects’
self-assessments and their true percentile rankings. Hence, based on the value of “confidence
bias”, we can classify subjects into three types: an “under-confident” type if s/he has a negative
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Table 2.7 Regression for puzzle-solving performance
Puzzle-solving performance (1) (2) (3)
Female 0.657** -0.013 -0.091
(0.260) (0.469) (0.479)
Only child 1.230*** 0.993 0.682
(0.259) (0.463) (0.599)
Urban 0.532
(0.647)
Constant 11.360*** 12.040*** 11.890***
(0.234) (0.456) (0.494)
Observations 411 125 125
R-squared 0.067 0.037 0.042
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
confidence bias; an “unbiased” type if her/his self-assessment is exactly the same as the true
relative performance; and an “over-confident” type if her/his confidence bias is larger than
zero.
In fact, according to the performance distribution within the overall population, the mean of
actual percentile rankings should be a number around 50. However, since majority of subjects
(i.e. 69.34%) were overconfident about their relative performance, the average self-assessment
(i.e. 60.78) was significantly larger than the mean of actual percentile (i.e. 44.87). Actually,
many social psychologists have pointed out that people always tend to be overconfident about
themselves and systematically rate their own ability as “above average”. Take one classic
example, 88% of US drivers consider themselves safer than the median driver (Svenson 1981).
Similar to the results in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), we find that both men and women
were over-confident, but men were more overconfident about their relative performance than
women (p = 0.017).
In addition, compared to those only children, children with siblings were more over-confident
about their relative performance, and the difference between two groups was statistically signifi-
cant (p = 0.000). Again, our finding is different from the results in Cameron et al. (2013), where
the authors documented that the difference of self-confidence between Chinese only children
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Figure 2.12 Distribution of confidence bias in the overall sample
Figure 2.13 Distribution of confidence bias – male vs. female
and children with siblings is not significant.
Finally, we make regression analysis to investigate the determinants of self-confidence. We
select “confidence bias” as the dependent variable, and then exam the effects of individual
performance in puzzle-solving task, gender, only child status, rural/urban residence and GPA
score. As a result, in Table 2.9, the level of confidence bias is negatively related to their
performance in the task, which means the subjects with low performance are more likely to
over-estimate their relative performance than the subjects with high performance. In addition
to their performance in this specific task, subjects’ confidence levels are also related to their
GPA scores. As the index of students’ overall academic performance, a higher GPA score
provides the subjects with more confidence about themselves, which also leads a tendency to
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Figure 2.14 Distribution of confidence bias – child with siblings vs. only child
over-estimate their performance in the puzzle-solving task. Therefore, according to the negative
relationship between task performance and over-confidence level, since the average puzzle-
solving performance of women and only children are higher than their counterparts, then both
women and only children are observed to be less over-confidence. However, after controlling
the effect of performance difference, only the dummy of “female” still has a significant marginal
effect on the confidence bias.
Table 2.8 Summary statistics of self-confidence and proportions of two types of bias
Obs. Actual Self Confidence Under- Over-
Percentile Assessment Bias confident confident
Total 411 44.87 60.78 15.91* 29.20% 69.34%
(29.85) (18.49) (26.68)
Male 184 42.54 61.94 19.40* 25.00% 75.00%
(29.2) (19.63) (26.3)
Female 227 46.75 59.84 13.09* 32.60% 64.76%
(30.31) (17.49) (26.71)
Child with Siblings 198 38.45 59.22 20.77* 23.74% 74.24%
(28.02) (18.40) (26.19)
Only Child 213 50.84 62.23 11.39* 34.27% 64.79%
(30.32) (18.50) (26.41)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses;
∗ indicates the value is significantly different from zero at p < 0.001.
26
Table 2.9 Regression for self-confidence bias
Confidence bias (1) (2) (3)
Puzzle-solving performance -6.556*** -7.419*** -7.422***
(0.371) (0.670) (0.674)
GPA score 5.865** 10.170** 10.200**
(2.903) (5.041) (5.084)
Female -2.839* -10.090*** -10.140***
(2.034) (3.554) (3.653)
Only child -1.129 -1.322 -1.498
(1.995) (3.488) (4.472)
Urban 0.307
(4.831)
Constant 79.750*** 83.220*** 83.070***
(10.340) (18.280) (18.490)
Observations 411 125 125
R-squared 0.462 0.537 0.537
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
2.4 Conclusions
From our experimental data, we can verify that there are significant gender differences on
those non-cognitive characteristics: on average, men are less risk-averse and more over-confident
than women; regarding the social preference, men are more likely to be either perfectly selfish or
perfectly selfless, whereas women tend to be equalitarian who prefer to share evenly. Meanwhile,
we also obtain some intriguing findings about only children participants in our sample of Chinese
university students. For instance, only children are less risk-averse and also less over-confident
than the children with siblings; however, there is no significant difference in social preference
between two groups, which provides experimental evidence against the stereotype that only
children are more likely to be selfish.
More importantly, what do our results mean in terms of the way people behave outside the
experimental setting? Previous studies have shown that individual behavior in the lab correlates
with behavior elsewhere. For example, prosocial behavior in the lab was associated with more
charitable giving in the field (Benz and Meier 2008); decisions made in experimental lotteries
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were correlated with real life financial decisions (Castillo et al. 2010). Hence, the difference of
those individual characteristics between women and men probably result in a gender gap in
their occupational choices. And, our study also suggests that China’s One-Child policy should
have important impacts on the labor market because of the characteristics differences between
only children and others.
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CHAPTER 3. WHAT MATTERS FOR PRODUCTIVITY? THE ROLE
OF INCENTIVE, INFORMATION AND SIGNUP BONUS
Abstract
People with similar abilities might perform quite differently in the workplace. We study
this question through an experimental labor market in which we vary the incentive scheme,
the information about relative performance, and also the additional compensation in terms of
sign-up bonus. We create a laboratory experiment where “workers” can join “companies” that
pay them according to different incentive schemes: (a) piece rate; (b) revenue sharing where
all earnings are equally shared among team members; (c) individual tournament where only
the highest performer in the team can earn a prize; and (d) team tournament where teams
should compete first, and then prizes are shared within the winning team. As a result, we
find that: (1) Compared to the baseline performance paid by piece rate, under three team-
based incentives, more competitive incentive generates higher performance improvement. (2)
Feedback about relative performance reduces the performance differences between three team-
based incentives. (3) Regardless of incentives and feedback, the extra sign-up bonus brings a
positive and significant effect on individual performance.
3.1 Introduction
The modern workplace puts an ever greater emphasis on teamwork: employees work in
virtual teams with colleagues, suppliers, clients, and even competitors. They work in ad hoc
combinations, and the interaction between incentive scheme and work organization has become
increasingly prominent. Hence, in order to investigate the differences between individual-based
scheme and team-based institutional structures in a controlled laboratory environment, we
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create an experimental labor market where “workers” can join “companies” that pay them
according to different compensation schemes: (a) piece rate, (b) revenue sharing, (c) individual
tournament, and (d) team tournament. First of all, we select the piece rate as our baseline
pecuniary incentive for individual-based working, and subsequently design three representative
team-based incentive systems to highlight the tradeoff between cooperation and competition.
The first team-based incentive is “revenue sharing”, which focuses on collaboration within the
team, so this payment scheme requires people to work together and all earnings are equally
shared among team members; oppositely, in order to emphasize the competition within the
team, the second team-based incentive is defined as “individual tournament”, which compels
everyone to compete with others in the same team and only offers a prize to the best performer in
the end. However, in the real world, cooperation and competition always exist on a continuum,
and few of the workplaces are wholly cooperative or wholly competitive. Hence, as the third
team-based incentive, we create a hybrid of “revenue sharing” and “individual tournament”,
i.e. “team tournament”. This incentive requires teams to first compete with each other, and
then a reward will be split among the members of winning team.
In this chapter, we aim to figure out the most efficient way(s) to improve workers’ perfor-
mance by considering three potential influence factors at the same time, that is: team-based
incentive in terms of cooperation and/or competition, feedback about relative performance,
and an extra pay from sign-up bonus. In other words, the purpose of this chapter can be
summarized by three research questions as follows:
First, do people vary their performance a lot in response to different team-based incen-
tives? If so, which incentive is most effective for increasing productivity, and which individual
characteristics affect their productivity response to various types of compensation?
Second, does feedback about relative performance matter? In particular, regarding the
team-based incentives that determine the workers’ payoffs by their relative performance in a
team, do workers change their performance significantly if knowing more information about
their relative performance?
Third, in addition to a certain incentive per se, how does an extra compensation in terms
of sign-up bonus influence individual performance?
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Overall, our design is somewhat close to the approach used by Dohmen and Falk (2011),
but also differentiates in several aspects. In particular, Dohmen and Falk (2011) didn’t make
a within-subjects comparison of individual performance between different incentives but only
had a between-subjects comparison of individual performance when all subjects worked under
their most preferred incentives. On the contrary, in order to disentangle the exogenous incentive
effect and the endogenous self-sorting effect on individual performance, our experiment adopts a
within-subjects design that forces all workers to complete four real-effort tasks paid by different
incentives respectively. As a result, in the absence of self-selection, the average performance
achieved the highest level under individual tournament. Moreover, compared with the baseline
performance paid by piece rate, the order of performance improvement under three team-
based incentives is consistent with the rank of their competitiveness; i.e. the more competitive
the incentive is, the higher the improvement is generated. Furthermore, if introducing an
additional compensation in terms of prepaid sign-up bonus, then no matter which incentive
scheme is provided, subjects remarkably increase their performance in response to this extra
pay of sign-up bonus. And, we verify that such a positive effect of sign-up bonus on individual
performance dominates the effect of incentive per se.
In addition, we also study how subjects respond to information about their relative perfor-
mance under those team-based incentives. Our findings show that the provision of feedback
information lessens the performance differences between three team-based incentives so that
the average performance under individual tournament is no longer better than the average
performance under any other incentives.
Last but not least, our experiment uses a rich battery of diagnostic games to elicit several
non-cognitive characteristics such as risk attitude, social preference and self-confidence before
subjects start the real-effort tasks. Although many authors (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007;
Wozniak et al. 2010) have stressed the importance of those non-cognitive characteristics on
labor market outcomes, only very few studies (e.g. Dohmen and Falk 2011) use incentivized
elicitation methods to measure them. As a result, lab data from our sample of 411 Chinese uni-
versity students verifies that subjects of similar ability perform quite differently under the same
incentive, because individual characteristics such as risk attitude and self-confidence influence
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their productivity in a systematic way. For instance, without feedback information, those risk-
loving and over-confident subjects tend to make less effort under any team-based incentives;
however, the effects of both risk attitude and self-confidence on individual performance become
insignificant after subjects receive feedback about their relative performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review.
Section 3 describes our experimental design. The results are given in section 4. Finally, in
section 5, further discussions and some concluding remarks are presented.
3.2 Literature Review
Recent labor market research suggests that workers of similar ability might behave quite
differently in the workplace. Hence, with the help of a well-controlled environment in the
laboratory, there are a lot of experiments designed to investigate the individual productivity
differences between various incentive schemes. For example, Gibbons (1987), Booth and Frank
(1999) and Lazear (2000) focus on the performance variance under piece rate scheme. Another
frequently used incentive format is competition within a team. Rank-order tournaments may
motivate employees to work harder (Bull et al. 1987; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2003). But
it may also be demoralizing and create an excessively stressful workplace, which may hinder
overall performance (see Lazear 1989). For the contrasting incentive in terms of collaboration,
what happens under a revenue sharing is also studied (e.g. Nalbantian and Schotter 1997;
Gachter and Fehr 1999). Overall, those papers examine the effective incentive(s) that can
encourage workers to exsert maximum effort and also discuss the mechanism design to make
an optimal contract between employees and employers. In our study, various incentives based
on individual, team and relative performance are compared. Similar to the results in the
previous literature (e.g. van Dijk et al. 20011), we also find that compared with piece rate
or any cooperative incentives, individual tournament is the most effective way to stimulate
individual productivity in a competitive environment. Meanwhile, the “free-riding” problem in
1The results in van Dijk et al. (2001) show that individual and team payment induced the same effort levels.
In team production free-riding occurred, but it was compensated by many subjects providing more effort than
in case of individual pay. Effort was higher, but more variable in tournaments, while in case of varying abilities
workers with relatively low ability worked very hard and drove up effort of the others.
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the teamwork is not as severe as we expect.
In addition to incentive scheme per se, feedback about relative performance has been found
to influence behavior even when conventional economic analysis says it should not matter. In
fact, social psychologists have documented many non-monetary effects of relative performance
feedback such as social pressure, fear of informal sanctions, and shame (e.g. Kluger and Denisi
1996). Economists have recently started to formally model how peer effects interact with mon-
etary incentives (see Krakel 2008). Moreover, in the laboratory experiments, Falk and Ichino
(2006), Mas and Moretti (2009) show that allowing people to observe each other’s performance
has a positive peer effect on an employee’s performance although her/his payment is indepen-
dent of the others’ performance2. But there are also some papers have considered the influence
of competitors’ ability on own effort in a competition setting (e.g. Eriksson et al. 2009; Free-
man and Gelber 2010; Wozniak et al. 2010). Therefore, in order to investigate how information
interacts with incentives especially how relative performance feedback affect individuals pro-
ductivity response to various team-based incentive, we apply a horizontal comparison between
two groups, of which one half subjects receive the feedback of their relative performance after
they finish their productivity test, and the other half never receive any feedback information
during the experiment.
Last but not least, although the policy of sign-up bonus is very prevalent in the real world,
economists have paid little academic attention to this issue. So far as I know, there are only a
few papers on this topic. In Van Wesep (2009), the author provides a theoretical explanation
for the claim that “the bonus is a way for high quality firms to differentiate themselves from
low quality firms, attract the best employees and induce them to work hard”. And, Arya et al.
(2003) studies various employee incentives in a principle-agent model and then suggests that
the sign-up bonus is a useful instrument for mitigating hold-up problems. Different from those
theoretical studies, our experimental research is much more straightforward to verify the role
of sign-up bonus on employee behavior.
2Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009) both use a flat way pay scheme in their laboratory
experiments.
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3.3 Experimental Design
3.3.1 Procedure of the Lab Experiment
In order to study how incentive, feedback and sign-up bonus differently affect individual
performance, we implemented an experiment which consists of 8 tasks and is divided into
3 stages: Stage 1 includes the first four tasks that are designed to elicit each subject’s risk
preference (in Task 1), social preference (in Task 2), baseline productivity in a puzzle-solving
task paid by piece rate (in Task 3) and then the self-assessment about her/his relative per-
formance (in Task 4). After the first four diagnostic tasks complete, subjects were randomly
assigned into two different treatment groups: half subjects were given detailed feedback about
their relative performance in Task 3 of puzzle-solving game, and the other half never knew
any relative performance feedback during the whole experiment. Next, the following Stage
2 consists of Task 5, 6 and 7: by those three tasks, we observed individual performances in
similar puzzle-solving games but paid by three different team-based incentives, i.e. revenue
sharing, individual tournament and team tournament. And then, during Stage 3, all subjects
completed the last puzzle-solving task i.e. Task 8 which was paid by a certain incentive plus an
extra sign-up bonus. Finally, when all tasks ended, a simple questionnaire was used to gather
individuals’ socio-demographic information including gender, age, marital status, major fields
of study, grades, etc.
Subjects were only given a brief introduction of the experiment at the very beginning, so
they knew that they had to complete several tasks but did not know what those tasks would
look like. Just before starting each task, subjects were informed of the rules for that task.
Besides, subjects were told that their final earnings from the experiment would be the payment
for one randomly selected task out of eight, plus a show up fee of 10 Chinese Yuan.
3.3.1.1 Stage 1 (Task 1 – 4): Elicitation for Individual Characteristics
Task 1: Elicit Risk Preference This task used lottery choices to elicit individual risk
preference. Subjects were asked to answer 10 binary choices questions.
In each binary choice, subjects need to decide whether they prefer a safe option or playing
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a lottery. The safe option is always the same in each question, which is 20 Chinese Yuan as the
fixed payoff. However, the lotteries vary and the risk of lottery option decreases from question
to question. In other words, the probability of winning 40 Chinese Yuan increases from 10%
to 100% in the end.
Now suppose a subject has consistent risk preference on lotteries, s/he will prefer the safe
option to the lotteries above a certain risk level, and then switch to preferring the lottery option
in all subsequent choice questions. Therefore, the switching point of winning 40 Chinese Yuan
in a lottery indicates the subject’s risk attitude. That is, the higher this switching point is, the
more risk-averse s/he is.
Task 2: Elicit Social Preference Subjects’ social preferences were elicited by a dictator
game. In this dictator game, each participant was randomly matched with another participant
in the lab room, playing the role of a dictator or a receiver. As a dictator, s/he could get 30
Chinese Yuan as endowment at the beginning of the game, and could either keep all money
or send some amount to another person, i.e. the receiver. On the other hand, as a receiver,
s/he had no endowment, but could receive something if the dictator passed money to her/him.
Moreover, whatever amount the dictator decided to send, the money was doubled by the
experimenter and then added to the receiver’s payoff. In order to classify each subject, everyone
had to play the role of dictator and decide how much sent to the receiver from an endowment of
30 Chinese Yuan. After all transfer choices made, subjects were randomly matched in pairs and
two roles within each pair were assigned by a random draw to determine their final payments
in this task.
From the individual choices in this dictator game, we are able to identify the social prefer-
ence for each subject. According to the game rule, if and only if the dictator sent 10 Chinese
Yuan to the receiver, then both players could have 20 Chinese Yuan equally. Otherwise, the re-
ceiver obtained less than the dictator if the transfer amount was lower than 10 Yuan whereas the
receiver got more than the dictator if the transfer amount was higher than 10 Yuan. Therefore,
based on each dictator’s wealth distribution between the receiver and her/himself, we define the
“inequity aversion” as the social preference for fairness and resistance to incidental inequalities,
which is equal to 1 if the dictator sends 10 Chinese Yuan and equal to 0 otherwise.
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Task 3: Elicit Performance under Piece Rate The result in this task was an indi-
vidual productivity indicator measuring subjects’ performance independent of any team-based
incentives. Therefore, all subjects were required to solve letter-puzzles in 3 minutes and paid
by piece rate.
In each puzzle, two similar squares of letters are presented at the same time, but the square
of letters on the right differs from the square of letters on the left in two letters. Subjects had
to find those letters and click on them to solve the puzzle. Whenever they clicked a letter other
than those two letters, the remaining time was reduced by 1 second. Hence, people had to be
more cautious and should try to only click letters that differ. Within a 3-minute period, each
subject was asked to solve as many puzzles as possible, and s/he could increase her/his payoff
by a high productivityBefore the task started formally, subjects had three practice examples
to familiarize themselves with this letter-puzzle, in which no payment was involved.. A clock
on the screen informed how many seconds they had used.
Once this task finished, all subjects were informed of their own performance, but nothing
about the performance of others. The pay scheme in this task was “piece rate”, i.e. subjects
would receive 1 Chinese Yuan for each solved puzzle. The reasons for choosing piece rate as
the monetary incentive in Task 3 include: piece rate contract is a good proxy for subjects’ pro-
ductivity since it is a compensation scheme based on individual absolute performance only and
excludes the competition and/or cooperation with others. Besides, it is an intrinsic motivation
for everyone to exert maximum effort and elicit their real ability levels: the better someone
performed, the more s/he would earn. More importantly, as mentioned before, our study
emphasizes the differences between individual-based incentive and team-based incentives. In
the following tasks, we will introduce three different incentives related to relative performance
and team pay. Hence, the performance in piece rate can be treated as a benchmark under
individual-based incentive and then compared with those three team-based incentives later.
Task 4: Elicit Self-confidence This is a task for eliciting self-assessment about their rela-
tive performance. Each subject was asked to estimate the probability that her/his performance
in the previous puzzle-solving task paid by piece rate (Task 3) was better than a randomly se-
lected other player in the lab room. In fact, subjects could increase their earnings by submitting
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a good estimate. We used a novel crossover mechanism to elicit their self-confidence.3 In the
experimental instruction, we presented this mechanism in a simple narrative form. We told
subjects that they were paired with a “helper robot” who would also take the puzzle-solving
task and who had a certain fixed probability q of winning against a randomly selected player.
This probability was between 0 and 100% but unknown to the subject. Subjects were told that
they could have their winnings based on their robot’s performance rather than their own, and
asked to indicate a threshold level of q above which they preferred to use the robot’s perfor-
mance. As a consequence, when the helper robot’s winning probability was higher than the
subject’s indicated threshold, the robot’s performance would be used to compete with the sub-
ject’s opponent; otherwise, subject’s own performance would be used against her/his selected
opponent. In the end, only if the subject’s or the helper robot’s performance was better than
the performance of the other selected player, 10 Chinese Yuan could be added to the individual
earnings. Therefore, subjects should maximize their probability of earning an extra 10 Chinese
Yuan by choosing the threshold as their own subjective probability of being better than some
other player.
Provision of Relative Performance Feedback When the first four diagnostic tasks
ended, participants were randomly assigned into two different treatment groups: half subjects
were given the list of all subjects’ performance in the puzzle-solving task (Task 3), and then they
were clear about how well they did in that piece rate task compared with other players (see an
example of feedback information in Figure /refmgraph3.1). In contrast, another half subjects
were not provided with any information about their relative performance in Task 3. According
to the comparison between these two treatment groups, it allows us to systematically examine
the effects of feedback on individual productivity response to the following three team-based
incentives.
3Mobius et al. (2011) is the first paper to implement the crossover mechanism in an experiment. The
crossover mechanism has one main advantage over the otherwise popular quadratic scoring rule which most
experimental papers use, i.e. it works for a wide class of preferences: it is well known that the quadratic
scoring rule only produces truthful reports if subjects are risk-neutral. If subjects are risk-averse, quadratic
scoring induces biased reports. In contrast, the crossover mechanism only requires that subjects’ preferences are
monotonic in the following sense: among the class of lotteries that pay off x > 0 with probability q and 0 with
probability 1 − q, subjects strictly prefer those with higher q. Truthful reporting of subjective beliefs is then a
strictly dominant strategy. Monotonicity holds for all von-Neumann-Morgenstern preferences as well as many
non-standard preferences such as Prospect theory.
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Figure 3.1 Feedback about relative performance in the puzzle-solving task
3.3.1.2 Stage 2 (Task 5 – 7): Performance under Three Team-based Incentives
During the second stage, subjects were asked to do three more tasks. In those three tasks,
everyone had to complete letter-puzzles similar to Task 3 and also needed to solve problems
as many as possible in 3 minutes. The only difference is the payment scheme: from Task 5 to
Task 7, three distinct team-based incentives were introduced to subjects. More specifically, in
our experimental labor market, each subject was assigned to be an employee of a “company”
that specialized in solving puzzles. In addition, there were three companies and each company
consisted of two teams of two employees but compensated employees differently.
Performance under “Revenue Sharing” The first company paid its employees through
“revenue sharing” scheme. Each team of two employees would receive 1 Chinese Yuan for every
puzzle that two team members solved in 3 minutes. And then, the earnings would be divided
equally between two members of each team.
Performance under “Individual Tournament” The second company paid its workers
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through “individual tournament” scheme. The employee would only be paid if s/he solved
more puzzles than her/his teammate in 3 minutes and could receive 2 Chinese Yuan for every
solved puzzle. Otherwise, s/he would earn nothing.
Performance under “Team Tournament” The third company paid its workers through
“team tournament” scheme. The employee would only be paid if her/his team solved more
puzzles than the other team in 3 minutes. In this case, the winning team would receive 2
Chinese Yuan for every puzzle that both team members solved in 3 minutes. And then, the
reward for the winning team would be divided equally between the two members.
Apparently, the subject’s final payment in any of those three schemes is not only depending
on an individual absolute performance, but also related to other teammates’ performance at
the same time. In addition, it is important and necessary for us to consider the order effects
of incentives’ arrangement in the experimental design. If all subjects are given the same order
of incentives rather than in different orders, it cannot disentangle potential order effects from
incentive effects on individual performance. Such order effects include a positive learning effect
that subjects perform better once they familiarize the task after initial rounds and also a
negative time effect that people behave worse due to fatigue after repeated tasks. Therefore, in
Stage 2, we randomly assigned the order of three team-based incentives for each subject, which
helped us control for the order effects on individual performance.
3.3.1.3 Stage 3 (Task 8): Performance Paid by Additional Sign-up Bonus
Again, subjects were required to solve puzzles as many as possible within 3 minutes. How-
ever, different from the previous stages, the system assigned a certain incentive as well as a
prepaid sign-up bonus for every subject in last task. The sign-up bonus was a random integer
between 0 and 10, and all workers were informed of the given incentive and sign-up bonus
before the task.4
4According to our design, before starting Task 8, we elicited participants’ preferences for given incentives
through a self-sorting process. In particular, we asked subjects to not only rank those four payment schemes, that
is: (1) piece rate, (2) revenue sharing, (3) individual tournament, and (4) team tournament, from most preferred
to least preferred, but also state their compensating differentials between any two consecutive incentives. And
then, based on individual stated-preferences, the system would automatically determine an incentive scheme as
well as an contingent compensation of extra sign-up bonus for each subject.
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Therefore, based on individual performance in the last puzzle-solving task, each worker’s
payoff was calculated by the assigned incentive scheme plus the sign-up bonus. In particular,
if someone would be paid by a team-based incentive in this task, her/his co-workers would
be randomly selected among the players in the lab room; however, the performance of other
three co-workers in the same company were their past performance when they worked for this
company in a previous round of Stage 2.
3.3.1.4 Follow-up Questionnaire
In the end, after eight tasks finished, subjects had to complete a questionnaire for personal
data on socioeconomic characteristics (including gender, age, marital status), on educational
achievement (major fields of study, GPA, score of university-entrance examination) and feed-
back about this experiment experience (the clearness of the instruction, the length of the
experiment, the difficulty of the tasks).
All in all, the flowchart of the whole experimental design is described in Figure 3.2 .
3.3.2 Subject Pool
In 2011, we conducted this experiment at Central University of Finance and Economics in
Beijing, China. We had 411 complete observations, including 184 males and 227 females, and
all of them were university students. In addition, there were 213 only children (and 198 children
with siblings) in our subject pool. Because majority of the participants i.e. 70% were graduate
students, the average college year was above 4 and the average age was 23.03 correspondingly.
Only 2% of the participants were married. Finally, the average level of GPA was 3.3 (on a 4.0
scale) with a standard deviation of 0.35. However, since subjects’ grades were self-reported,
we cannot guarantee the accuracy of this information and treat it as a quite limited index to
personal academic performance.
A total of 21 experiment sessions took place in the same computer lab at the university, and
the average size of those sessions was 19.57 participants (with a standard deviation of 6.62).
Each session lasted, on average about 50 minutes. Final payments for subjects were based on
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one randomly selected task out of eight tasks, plus a fixed show-up fee of 10 Yuan. The average
payment was 30.85 Yuan.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Performance Differences
Since this experiment aims to discuss the impacts of three factors on individual performance,
that is: incentive, information about relative performance and extra sign-up bonus. Therefore,
according to our design, we have 4×2×2 = 16 treatments, in the form of x−y−z, where x =PR
(Piece Rate), RS (Revenue Sharing), IT (Individual Tournament), TT (Team Tournament);
y =NF (No Feedback), F (Feedback); and z =NB (No Bonus), B (Bonus). As a result, Table 3.1
summarizes the average performance in different treatments.
We first consider the performance data without feedback and sign-up bonus. As compared
with the baseline output paid by piece rate scheme, the incentive of revenue sharing does not
affect the average performance (p =0.625), whereas both competitive schemes have positive
effects on performance improvement, which are statistically significant at p =0.010 under in-
dividual tournament and p =0.043 under team tournament. Besides, although the average
performance under individual tournament is somewhat higher than the average performance
under team tournament, the difference is not significant (p =0.603).
Secondly, the feedback information has significant impact on the performance paid by rev-
enue sharing. Compared with the data in the absence of feedback, providing subjects with
full information about their relative performance does not affect their productivity sorting in
those three team-based incentives. However, when comparing to the baseline output paid by
piece rate, all three team-based schemes have positive effects on performance, which are sta-
tistically significant at p =0.023 under revenue sharing, p =0.009 under individual tournament
and p =0.026 under team tournament. Besides, although the average performance under indi-
vidual tournament is somewhat higher than the average performance under team tournament,
the difference is not significant (p =0.603). Meanwhile, the performance differences between
those three team-based incentives become insignificant. Hence, we can conclude that feedback
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics of performance in different treatments
Treatment Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PR-NF-NB 209 12.51 2.61 6 19
RS-NF-NB 209 12.60 2.65 3 19
IT-NF-NB 209 12.97 2.92 3 21
TT-NF-NB 209 12.87 2.74 3 21
PR-F-NB 202 12.21 2.80 5 21
RS-F-NB 202 12.62 2.60 7 20
IT-F-NB 202 12.71 2.72 6 20
TT-F-NB 202 12.64 2.78 6 21
PR-NF-B 69 14.70 2.41 8 21
RS-NF-B 30 13.37 2.66 7 18
IT-NF-B 63 14.98 2.90 8 21
TT-NF-B 47 15.00 2.48 8 20
PR-F-B 64 13.83 2.86 5 18
RS-F-B 48 13.54 2.62 7 18
IT-F-B 51 15.86 2.26 9 24
TT-F-B 39 14.56 2.52 9 21
Notes:
The first four treatments compare four incentives
while holding “No Feedback” and “No Bonus”;
The second four treatments compare four incentives
while holding “Feedback” and “No Bonus”;
The third four treatments compare four incentives
while holding “No Feedback” and “Bonus”;
The last four treatments compare four incentives
while holding “Feedback” and “Bonus”.
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information promotes better performance under team revenue sharing, while it cannot improve
performance in both competitive incentives.
Finally, the extra sign-up bonus brings a positive and significant effect on individual perfor-
mance regardless of incentive and feedback treatments. By controlling the incentive scheme and
feedback, the results of pairwise comparison in Table 3.2 below shows that all the within-pair
differences are significantly positive.
Table 3.2 Summary statistics of within-pair performance comparison
Treatment Obs. Average Performance Within-pair Differences
NB B
PR-NF 69 12.22 14.70 2.48*
(2.48) (2.41) (0.27)
RS-NF 30 11.73 13.37 1.63*
(3.15) (2.66) (0.45)
IT-NF 63 13.62 14.98 1.37*
(2.90) (2.90) (0.35)
TT-NF 47 13.23 15.00 1.77*
(2.81) (2.48) (0.36)
PR-F 64 11.78 13.83 2.05*
(2.64) (2.86) (0.34)
RS-F 48 12.19 13.54 1.35*
(2.97) (2.62) (0.37)
IT-F 51 13.61 15.86 2.25*
(2.38) (2.26) (0.28)
TT-F 39 13.08 14.56 1.49*
(2.43) (2.52) (0.40)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses;
∗ indicates the value is significantly different from zero at p < 0.01.
In addition to those three influence factors that are targeted, it’s very important us to con-
sider the time effects on individual performance during the experiment. Recall the procedure,
the puzzle task in Stage 1 is paid by piece rate task, and then three more puzzle tasks are
paid by three different team-based incentives in Stage 2. However, the orderings of those three
team-based incentives are randomly assigned. For instance, the incentive used in Task 5 was
possibly any one out of those three team-based incentives. So, this design allows us to control
and exam the time effect on individual performance. As indicated in Table /reftable3.3, during
43
stage 2, there is a clear time trend on the performance irrespective of specified team-based
incentives and/or the provision of feedback information: First of all, the learning effect helps
subjects to improve their performances from Task 5 to Task 6, which are statistically significant
at p =0.000 in both “No Feedback” and “Feedback” treatments and p =0.043 with “Feedback”
treatment, respectively. Afterwards, a negative effect from fatigue decreases the average per-
formance in the last task of Stage 2 (i.e. Task 7), and the reductions are significantly from zero
at p =0.000 in both “No Feedback” and “Feedback” treatments. Moreover, the difference be-
tween Task 5 and Task 7 is not significant in “No Feedback” treatment (p =0.206) but becomes
statistically significant at p =0.002 in “Feedback” treatment.
Table 3.3 Summary statistics of within-pair performance comparison between consecutive
tasks in Stage 2
No Feedback Feedback
Task Obs. Average Within-pair Obs. Average Within-pair
Performance Difference Performance Difference
Task 5 209 12.37 – 202 12.39 –
(1st task in Stage 2) (2.39) (2.29)
Task 6 209 13.86 1.49* 202 13.65 1.27*
(2nd task in Stage 2) (3.16) (2.39) (3.12) (2.75)
Task 7 209 12.2 -1.66* 202 11.94 -1.72*
(3rd task in Stage 2) (2.39) (2.57) (2.3) (2.61)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses;
∗ indicates the value is significantly different from zero at p < 0.01.
3.4.1.1 Regression Analysis
Now, we continue to probe the effects of three factors by regression models. Based on the
data collected from Stage 1 and 2, in the absence of sign-up bonus, we discuss the incentive
effects and feedback effect, respectively.
In the first fixed-effect model, we focus on the incentive effects of different team-based
payments.
Y˙ij = δj + αi + εij (3.1)
where Y˙ij = Yij − Yi0 represents the change in individual i’s performance from Yi0 paid by
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piece rate to the output of Yij in a team-based incentive j (j = 1 for revenue sharing, j = 2 for
individual tournament and j = 3 for team tournament); δj captures the observable incentive
effect; αi is the unobservable incentive-invariant individual effect, εij denotes the residual error.
In addition, considering the time effects on individual performance during Stage 2, we create
dummy variables to identify the order effect which is independent of the incentive. So we have
the second fixed-effect model as follows:
Y˙ij = δj + β
′Dij + αi + εij (3.2)
where Dij = (1, 0, 0) if the incentive j is the 1st task in Stage 2; Dij = (0, 1, 0) if the
incentive j is the 2nd task in Stage 2; and Dij = (0, 0, 1) if the incentive j is the 3rd task in
Stage 2.
Alternatively, instead of fixed-effect model, we define the individual effect as αi = γ
′xi, so
we have the following specification model:
Y˙ij = δj + β
′Dij + γ′xi + εij (3.3)
where xi is the vector of individual attributes, including individual ability, overconfidence,
risk attitude, social preference, gender, only child and GPA score. All the explanatory variables
regarding individual characteristics are described in Table 3.4.
The regression results are reported in Table 3.5. The key finding is that the individual
performance is highest under the most competitive incentive, i.e. individual tournament. The
regression coefficients in the first three columns for “No Feedback” treatment show a strong dif-
ference between the individual tournament and other two team-based incentives: as compared
with the baseline performance under piece rate, only the incentive of individual tournament
has a significantly positive effect to improve performance. Meanwhile, the coefficients in the
last three columns indicate that providing more information about relative performance does
not improve individual performance under team-based incentives. Instead, the feedback makes
the performance differences between three team-based incentives close to zero, which means
the significant advantage of individual tournament disappears once introducing the feedback
information.
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Table 3.4 Individual characteristics related to performance under different incentives
Variable Range Description Mean
Individual ability {5, 6, . . . , 21} Baseline performance in 12.36
puzzle-solving task paid by (2.71)
piece rate.
Confidence bias [-100%, 100%] Difference between self- 0.16
assessment and actual relative (0.27)
performance.
Risk aversion {10%, 20%, . . . , 100%} Minimum probability of 0.65
winning $40 that makes lottery (0.15)
is preferred to fixed $20.
Inequality aversion {0, 1} =1 if the dictator equally shares 0.51
payoff with the receiver in (0.50)
dictator game.
Female {0, 1} =1 if a female; 0.55
and (0.50)
=0 if a male.
Only child {0, 1} =1 if an only child; 0.52
and (0.50)
=0 if a child with siblings.
GPA [0, 4] Grade-Point-Average is the 3.30
most common method to (0.35)
evaluate academic performance.
Note:
The first four variables are elicited by experimental methods during stage 1;
The rest three variables are elicited by self-report questionnaire during follow-up stage;
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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The only difference between Model 1 and 2 is that we added the order effects of three
tasks during Stage 2. Consistent with the findings in Table 3.3, the coefficients for those time
dummy variables verifies an increase trend at beginning and then followed with a reduction on
performance. However, the increase is significant in either “No Feedback” or “Feedback” case,
while the reduction is only significant in the case with feedback information.
To check the robustness of the results in fixed-effect model(s), we also examine other spec-
ifications. Since our experiment has used a rich battery of diagnostic games to elicit several
non-cognitive characteristics in stage 1 and also collected more individual information from
the follow-up questionnaire, it is quite convenient for us to replace the unobservable value of
individual-effect with a multi-dimensional vector of elicited individual attributes. When we
run the GLS regression model by adding several individual characteristics, there is no impact
on all other existing coefficients. So, compared with the outcome of the fixed-effect model,
the incentive effects as well as the time effects remain the same. Besides, we find the perfor-
mance differences due to heterogeneity in personal characteristics: in the absence of feedback
information, those risk-loving and over-confident subjects tend to make less effort responding
to team-based incentives, whereas the effects of both risk attitude and self-confidence on in-
dividual performance become insignificant after subjects receive feedback about their relative
performance; on the other hand, thanks to the provision of feedback information, the female
subjects are more likely to improve their performance than males under team-based incentives,
although the performance difference between them is not significant without feedback.
Furthermore, in order to eliminate the time effects on task performance, we run the regres-
sions by using the subsample of Task 5 only. Since Task 5 is the first task in Stage 2, and the
payment scheme used in this task is possibly any one out of those three team-based incentives.
The results are reported in Table 3.6. It turns out that all standard errors are increased because
of the reduced sample size. But we can find that values of coefficients and their significance
levels are quite similar to the regression in Table 3.5. We hence keep our previous conclusion
through this robustness check of subsample regression.
At the beginning of Stage 3, the sign-up bonus policy was introduced into our experimental
labor market. As a consequence, the outcomes in Table 2 and 3 have demonstrated the remark-
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Table 3.5 Regression for performance improvement during three tasks of Stage 2
Performance improvement No Feedback Feedback
(Y˙ij = Yij − Yi0) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
RS (δ1) – – – – – –
IT (δ2 − δ1) 0.368** 0.352** 0.352** 0.094 0.162 0.162
(0.182) (0.159) (0.159) (0.196) (0.175) (0.175)
TT (δ3 − δ1) 0.268 0.198 0.198 0.025 0.024 0.024
(0.182) (0.159) (0.159) (0.196) (0.175) (0.175)
Orderdummy1 – – – –
Orderdummy2 1.491*** 1.491*** 1.277*** 1.277***
(0.159) (0.159) (0.175) (0.175)
Orderdummy3 -0.164 -0.164 -0.446** -0.446**
(0.159) (0.159) (0.175) (0.175)
Individual ability (Yi0) -0.510*** -0.505***
(0.066) (0.055)
Confidence bias -0.011* 0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
Risk aversion 0.014* 0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Inequality aversion 0.144 -0.183
(0.249) (0.233)
Female 0.026 0.406*
(0.255) (0.245)
Only child 0.230 0.359
(0.249) (0.236)
GPA score 0.130 0.208
(0.351) (0.358)
Constant 0.086 -0.328** 4.702*** 0.411*** 0.111 4.769***
(0.129) (0.145) (1.433) (0.138) (0.158) (1.405)
Observations 627 627 627 606 606 606
R-squared 0.010 0.249 0.282 0.010 0.208 0.356
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3.6 Regression for performance improvement in first task of Stage 2
Performance improvement (Y˙ij = Yij − Yi0) No Feedback Feedback
RS (δ1) – – – –
IT (δ2 − δ1) 0.909** 1.055*** 0.475 0.671
(0.395) (0.337) (0.394) (0.311)
TT (δ3 − δ1) 0.234 0.29 -0.299 -0.050
(0.399) (0.341) (0.425) (0.335)
Individual ability Yi0 -0.605*** -0.568***
(0.076) (0.062)
Confidence bias -0.013* -0.002
(0.007) (0.006)
Risk aversion 0.014 0.009
(0.009) (0.009)
Inequality aversion 0.130 -0.137
(0.285) (0.266)
Female 0.154 0.584**
(0.295) (0.277)
Only child 0.157 0.504*
(0.287) (0.268)
GPA score -0.177 -0.180
(0.405) (0.406)
Constant -0.529* 6.601*** 0.085 6.467***
(0.280) (1.632) (0.282) (1.600)
Observations 209 209 202 202
R-squared 0.027 0.342 0.018 0.432
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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able increase in performance after receiving an extra compensation. Although the additional
bonus varied across subjects because the sign-up bonus is a random integer between 0 and
10, subjects performed better on average with a bonus. Moreover, by the specification in the
following model, we can clearly identify the marginal effect of one Chinese Yuan.
Y¨ij = θ0 + θy · Yij + θb · bi + ij (3.4)
where Y¨ij = Y
′
ij − Yij represents the change in individual i’s performance from first-round
output Yij paid by incentive j without extra bonus to the second-round output of Y
′
ij in the
same incentive j but with a signup bonus bi; ij is the error term.
Table 3.7 shows the estimated regression coefficient and standard errors form this analysis
on sign-up bonus. Irrespective of a particular incentive and/or feedback information, the sign-
up bonus has a positive and highly significant effect on performance improvement in the final
task. More specifically, an extra compensation of 10 Chinese Yuan could stimulate subjects
to complete 0.8 puzzles more in “No Feedback” treatment, and 1 puzzle more in “Feedback”
treatment. Furthermore, to probe the robustness of this result, we added incentive dummies
to the regression. The impact of sign-up bonus is still positive in either “No Feedback” case
or “Feedback” case, although the coefficient becomes smaller when controlling each specific
incentive effect on performance.
Although the neoclassical economics suggests that the prepaid compensation in terms of
sign-up bonus should have no effect on individual performance afterwards, recent discoveries in
behavioral economics have led scholars to question this theoretical prediction. We use insights
gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research, i.e. “gift exchange”5, in an
attempt to explain the performance improvement in response to extra sign-up bonus. In fact, a
vast body of literature has stressed the importance of gift exchange for mitigating moral-hazard
problems of incomplete contracts: since employees repay a gift in the form of higher wages by
providing higher efforts, employers can expect the productivity-enhancing outcome by adopting
the “gift” treatment. For instance, in Gneezy and List (2006), the authors conducted two field
5The notion of gift exchange was first proposed by Adams (1963), who posited that in social exchange between
two agents the ratio of the perceived value of the inputs (e.g., wage) to the perceived value of outputs (e.g.,
resulting from the employee’s effort) would be equivalent.
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Table 3.7 Regression for performance improvement in final task with sign-up bonus
Performance Improvement (Y¨ij = Y
′
ij − Yij) No Feedback Feedback
Sign-up bonus (bi) 0.080* 0.079* 0.104** 0.083*
(0.047) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
Baseline performance (Yij) -0.468*** -0.471*** -0.412*** -0.449***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058)
PR dummy – –
RS dummy -1.074** -0.538
(0.467) (0.413)
IT dummy -0.44 0.912**
(0.379) (0.425)
TT dummy -0.253 -0.064
(0.407) (0.448)
Constant 7.350*** 7.744*** 6.431*** 6.929***
(0.712) (0.729) (0.779) (0.782)
Observations 209 209 202 202
R-squared 0.279 0.298 0.216 0.258
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
experiments to examine the effects of gift exchange. As a result, their field evidence suggests
that worker effort in the first few hours on the job is considerably higher in the “gift” treatment
than in the “nongift” treatment. After the initial few hours, however, no difference in outcomes
is observed, and overall the gift treatment yielded inferior aggregate outcomes for the employer.
In our experiment, compared with “nongift” treatment without extra sign-up bonus, the
individual perforamance in the “gift” treatment with prepaid bonus successfully induce em-
ployees to work harder. However, the limitation of this experimental design is we can only
prove the effectiveness of sign-up bonus policy in the short run; after an immediate positive
reaction to this incentive, the higher productivity in response to a gift of sign-up bonus might
diminish over time. Hence, in the future work, it is important for us to verify the duration of
sign-up bonus effect on individual performance to generalize the results of this study in field
experiments.
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3.5 Conclusions
So far, from our experimental labor market in the well-controlled laboratory environment,
we have found the answers for three questions addressed at the very beginning.
Consistent with the findings in previous related studies, we also see that competitive incen-
tive is more effective than corporative incentive to stimulate workers’ performance. Meanwhile,
the provision of feedback about relative performance reduces the performance differences be-
tween different team-based incentives, especially lessens the advantage of competitiveness on
performance improvement.
More importantly, we have a surprising result from a quite simple compensation method,
that is, an additional prepaid sign-up bonus can raise workers’ productivity remarkably. Our
data also suggest that the effect of sign-up bonus dominates both incentive effect and infor-
mation effect. In other word, the negative influence on productivity from a certain incentive
and/or feedback information can be easily offset by a higher sign-up bonus.
In practice, companies always strive for the efficient way to encourage their employees work
hard. Because we have shown that some non-cognitive characteristics such as risk attitude and
self-confidence influence individual performance in a systematic way, then subjects of similar
ability might respond quite differently to the same incentive and feedback information. There-
fore, compared with designing a distinctive incentive scheme and feedback treatment for each
heterogeneous worker, it’s much more feasible and convenient for companies to set a flexible
sign-up bonus policy while holding other elements of workplace environment fixed.
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CHAPTER 4. HOW TO ATTRACT TALENT? STATED
PREFERENCES FOR DIFFERENT INCENTIVES FROM RANKING
AND COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIAL
Abstract
In order to study whether and how people with heterogonous individual characteristics self-
select into various incentives differently, we design a lab experiment where “workers” can join
“companies” that pay them by different incentive schemes: (a) piece rate; (b) revenue sharing;
(c) individual tournament; and (d) team tournament. An innovation in this experiment is that
we ask subjects to not only rank those four incentives, but also elicit compensating differentials
between any two consecutive incentives, which allows us to price the cost of a mismatch between
a worker and a company. Lab data from our sample of 411 Chinese university students shows
the following: (1) Subjects with high relative performance always prefer individual tournament
to other two team-based incentives. (2) Risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose individual
tournament if knowing the information about their relative performance. (3) Cooperative
incentives attract more women than men, which is partially explained by gender-specific social
preferences. (4) Compared to children with siblings, only children are less cooperative but more
competitive. (5) In the absence of feedback, overconfident subjects are more likely to enter into
individual tournament than those under-confident subjects with the same ability. Interestingly,
the provision of information about their relative performance eliminates the impact of biased
self-assessment. As a result, the feedback helps reduce the gender gap in competition as well
as the difference between only child and child with siblings.
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4.1 Introduction
Now, more than ever, companies depend on talent. But talented employees are becoming
a rare commodity in the labor market, so company’s success depends crucially on attracting
and retaining the right people in place by proper incentives. In fact, numerous companies
seek to win the so-called “war for talent” by continually trying more effective compensa-
tion schemes. For example, in January 2011, Dan Finnigan, who is the CEO of Jobvite,1
wrote an article entitled “how to win the war for the most talented employees”, in which he
stated flatly: “Nowhere is this clearer than in the San Francisco Bay and other pockets of
innovation across the country like Austin, Texas. Last month, the news was dominated by
the story that Google offered 10% pay increases and holiday bonuses of $1,000 for every em-
ployee. Google’s arming up for this targeted’ war for talent as new startups continually try
to poach talent from top companies– taking a page out of Google’s playbook from five years
ago” (http://mashable.com/2011/01/03/find-talented-employees/). Hence, it is worthwhile for
us to explore which incentive is more attractive to talent in our experimental labor market.
The modern workplace puts an ever greater emphasis on teamwork. Therefore, in addition
to the baseline incentive, i.e. piece-rate compensation scheme for individual-based working
environment, the following three representative team-based incentives are designed to highlight
the tradeoff between cooperation and competition: (1) revenue sharing where all earnings are
equally shared among team members; (2) individual tournament where only the best performer
in the team can earn a prize; and (3) team tournament where teams should compete first, and
then the reward is shared within the winning team. In particular, the last team-based incentive,
i.e. “team tournament”, is defined as a hybrid of “individual tournament” and “team revenue-
sharing”, which are two contrasting “corporate cultures” one that focuses on competition and
one that emphasizes collaboration.
According to our design, we elicit individual preferences for different incentives by a sorting
procedure. An innovation in our design is that we ask subjects to not only rank those four
payment schemes, that is: (1) piece rate, (2) revenue sharing, (3) individual tournament, and
1Jobvite is the recruiting platform for the social web that companies use to find and hire people.
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(4) team tournament, from most preferred to least preferred, but also elicit their compensating
differentials between any two consecutive incentives. To the best of our knowledge, this paper
is the first one to implement such a mechanism in a laboratory experiment to price the cost of
a mismatch between a worker and a company.
Furthermore, since we allow the self-selection across various compensation schemes, it’s pos-
sible that workers with different individual characteristics feel attracted by different incentives.
In fact, recent labor market research has suggested that workers of similar ability might behave
quite differently in the workplace. For example, some workers with high ability might not be
willing to work in a team because of the “free-riding” problem. Some might dislike competition
and relative performance pay because they find it stressful. Although many authors (Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007; Wozniak, Harbaugh and Mayr 2010) have stressed the importance of
non-cognitive characteristics such as risk preference and self-confidence on labor market out-
comes, only very few studies (e.g. Dohmen and Falk 2011) use incentivized elicitation methods
to measure them. Therefore, in our experiment, we use a rich battery of diagnostic games to
elicit individual characteristics including risk attitude, social preference and self-confidence.
As a result, we clearly show the relationship between the self-selection and individual char-
acteristics, and the main findings include: (1) More able subjects are more willing to accept
individual tournament because they have higher probability of winning in the competition. (2)
Risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose individual tournament than other incentives after
they receive the information about their relative performance. (3) Subjects who strongly prefer
fairness are more willing to accept cooperative incentives including team revenue-sharing and
team-tournament. As a consequence, cooperation incentives attract more women than men,
which is partially driven by gender-specific social preferences. (4) Only children participants
of our sample in China behave significantly more competitive than children with siblings. By
contrast, in the latest paper on China’s One-Child policy (Cameron et al. 2013), the authors
conclude that only children are less competitive than the counterpart. (5) We verify that the
provision of feedback about relative performance can adjust individuals’ biased self-beliefs and
then influence their sorting in the end. Consistent with the findings in Wozniak, Harbaugh and
Mayr (2010), the feedback about relative performance encourages under-confident subjects with
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high ability to enter into individual tournament, and moves overconfident subjects with low
ability towards less competitive incentive schemes. In one word, the feedback information leads
all subjects to more optimal choices and helps reduce the gender gap as well as the difference
between only child and child with siblings in competitiveness.
More importantly, thanks to our design for the compensating differentials, we are able
to answer how much the additional compensation is needed to motivate any particular type
of worker to accept a less preferred incentive, rather than her/his favorite one. Compared
with the contingent choice/ranking models, which use best choice or ranking data to predict
the probability that subjects choose a particular incentive among various options, our data
on compensating differentials are more informative so that it allows us to estimate personal
evaluations for different incentives in dollars.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review.
Section 3 describes the experimental design. The results are given in section 4. Finally, in
section 5, further discussions and some concluding remarks are provided.
4.2 Literature Review
This research is related to several strands of literature. First, our experiment is a study
of incentives in a laboratory experiment, especially for the interaction between different com-
pensation schemes and heterogeneous individuals. Due to the labor mobility, each worker has
freedom to move from one company to another, and such a movement is referred to the con-
sequence of self-sorting, i.e., the possibility that workers of similar ability feel attracted by
different incentive schemes (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Wozniak et al. 2010; Dohmen and
Falk 2011). For example, the experimental findings in Dohmen and Falk (2011) indicate that,
in addition to observable personal productivity and gender, some unobservable individual char-
acteristics such as relative self-assessment, willingness to take risks affect the sorting decision in
a systematic way. Our design is somewhat similar to the approach used by Dohmen and Falk
(2011), but also differentiates in several aspects. In particular, Dohmen and Falk (2011) didn’t
test the performance before self-sorting but only have the results of individual productivity
when all subjects work under their most preferred incentives. On the contrary, in order to
57
disentangle the exogenous incentive effect and the endogenous self-sorting effect on individual
performance, we add a stage before self-selection that forces all subjects to initially complete
several real-effort tasks paid by four different incentives one by one. As a result, we identify
the subjects’ preferences by controlling their productivity variances under different incentives.
Second, our experiment ties into the literature on social preferences. Many experimental
economists have claimed that a satisfactory understanding of workings under competition and
cooperation is impeded by self-interest hypothesis. They have gathered overwhelming evidence
that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that a substantial fraction
of the people exhibit social preferences (Fehr and Falk 2002; Fehr et al. 2007; Englmaier and
Wambach 2010). While extensive findings indicate that individuals take account of the effect
of their actions on others during laboratory games, but whether and how individuals exhibit
social preferences in the workplace is largely unknown. So, in this paper, we investigate how the
social preferences shape the individual behavior under certain team-based incentives. In the
first step, we apply a diagnostic task, i.e. a dictator game to elicit subjects’ social preferences.
Next, we observe individual preferences under three distinct team-based incentives as well
as the baseline payment of piece rate. In light of our findings, the heterogeneous preference
for different incentives is closely related to individual social preference. For instance, in our
experiment, the fact of cooperation incentives attracting more women than men is partially
explained by gender-specific social preferences, because majority of female subjects are fair
type who like equal pay within the team.
Third, our experiment is related to the literature on mechanism design for reducing gender
difference in competitiveness. With very few exceptions2, many experiments report a significant
gender difference in performance under individual tournament (Gneezy et al. 2003; Gneezy and
Rustichini 2004; Paserman 2007), and also in the willingness to enter a tournament (Niederle
and Vesterlund 2007; Gneezy et al. 2009). For the sake of equality in the labor market, it’s
worthwhile to explore approaches that narrow the gender gap. On one hand, by introducing
the element of cooperation into competition, Dargnies (2009) as well as Healy and Pate (2011)
2In Zhang (2011), by using a sample of ethnically diverse middle and high school students in China, the Han
Chinese exhibited no gender differences in competitive inclination.
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show that the gender gap in competitive inclination is reduced a lot when the subjects com-
pete in teams. So, in order to investigate the gender-specific preferences for competition and
cooperation, we classify three team-based incentives as follows: the “team revenue-sharing”
which denotes the wholly cooperative incentive; the “individual tournament” which implies
the pure competition in the workplace; and the combination of cooperation and competition
i.e. the “team tournament”. Our findings verify that, by controlling the performance, females
are more likely to choose two cooperative incentives rather than the individual tournament.
Moreover, according to diagnostic results for non-cognitive characteristics, it suggests that such
a gender difference in willingness to accept cooperation is partially driven by their different so-
cial preferences but not the similar risk preferences between males and females. On the other
hand, Wozniak et al. (2010) find that, with lack of actual feedback information, high ability
subjects are more reluctant to enter tournament than expected value maximization would re-
quire and this effect is larger for high ability females. By contrast, too many low ability types
enter competitive environments, and this effect is larger for males. The main reason for such a
gender gap is that males are substantially more overconfident about their relative performance
than females. Therefore, the provision of relative performance feedback helps to eliminate the
gender gap by correcting individuals’ wrong beliefs. In this paper, we also examine the effect
of feedback by providing a detailed distribution of all subjects’ performance before the stage of
self-selection. However, different from the method used in Wozniak et al. (2010), we do not ap-
ply a within-subjects comparison that identifies the treatment effect by eliciting their preference
twice before and after feedback disclosure; instead, we design a between subjects comparison,
that is, one half subjects receive feedback after they finish their productivity test, and the other
half never receive any feedback about their relative performance during the experiment.
4.3 Experimental Design
4.3.1 Procedure of the Lab Experiment
In order to study how individual characteristics and performance feedback affect their pref-
erences for different compensation schemes, we implemented an experiment which consists of 8
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tasks and is divided into 3 stages: Stage 1 includes the first four tasks that are designed to elicit
each subject’s risk preference, social preference, productivity in a puzzle-solving game and self-
assessment about the relative performance, respectively. After the first four diagnostic tasks
complete, subjects were randomly assigned into two different treatment groups: half subjects
were given detailed feedback about their relative performance in Task 3 of puzzle-solving game,
and the other half never knew any relative performance feedback during the whole experiment.
Next, the following Stage 2 consists of Task 5, 6 and 7: by those three tasks, we observed
individual performances in similar puzzle-solving games but paid by three different team-based
incentives, i.e. revenue sharing, individual tournament and team tournament. And then, in
Stage 3, based on individual stated-preferences for different incentives, all subjects completed
the last puzzle-solving game i.e. Task 8 which was paid by a certain incentive plus an additional
compensation in terms of prepaid sign-up bonus. More specifically, before starting Task 8, we
elicited participants’ preferences for given incentives through a self-sorting process. In partic-
ular, we asked subjects to not only rank those four payment schemes, that is: (1) piece rate,
(2) revenue sharing, (3) individual tournament, and (4) team tournament, from most preferred
to least preferred, but also state their compensating differentials between any two consecutive
incentives. And then, the system would automatically determine an incentive scheme as well
as an contingent compensation of extra sign-up bonus for each subject.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the sorting method we used to elicit subjects’ preferences for different
incentives. “team tournament company” adopts the incentive of “team tournament”, “single
contractor” adopts the incentive of “piece rate”, “tournament company” adopts the incentive
of “individual tournament”; and “team payment company” adopts the incentive of “revenue
sharing”.
If someone chose to be paid by piece rate scheme, then s/he would work as “single contrac-
tor” instead of working as an employee of a company. On the other hand, if someone chose
to work for one of those three companies adopting team-based incentives described in Stage 2,
her/his co-workers would be randomly selected among the players in the lab room; however, the
performances of other three co-workers in the same company were their past performance when
they worked for this company in a previous round of Stage 2. Using others’ past performances
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Figure 4.1 Sorting procedure to elicit individual preferences for different incentives
has several advantages: it avoids a potential source of error through biased beliefs about other
participants’ choices; furthermore, the choice of team pay does not affect the payment of any
other participant, so it can rule out the possibility that someone may reluctant to choose a
team-based incentive which imposes an externality on others.
In addition to asking subjects rank four incentives from most preferred to least preferred,
we also elicited compensating differentials between any two consecutive options. We designed
an incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit individuals’ compensation demand to accept a less
preferred option, and then we were able to use those valuations to price the cost of a mismatch
between a company and a worker.
A variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism was used to encourage sub-
jects tell truth when they answered those compensating differential questions. In fact, we intro-
duced a “sign-up bonus” scheme as follows: The system automatically generates four random
integers between 0 and 10, and then assigns each incentive a number as its prepaid signup-
bonus. If the worker is matched with a particular incentive for Task 8, then her/his payoff in
this final task will be the payment calculated by the incentive scheme plus the corresponding
sign-up bonus.
Based on subjects’ ranking and compensating differentials, our computer system applies
the following rules to determine the matched incentive and sign-up bonus for each worker
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through three rounds of pairwise comparison between consecutively ranked incentives: In the
first round of pairwise comparison, the system compares the two signup-bonuses of worker’s
first best choice and the second best, if the difference is not less than the minimum of the
individual required compensating differential, then the system will remain the second best
choice and delete the first one; otherwise, the system will keep the first but delete the second
choice. Next, in the second round of pairwise comparison, the system continues to compare
the signup-bonuses of the third best choice and the “survival” incentive from the first round
comparison. Again, if the difference is not less than the minimum of the required compensating
differential between those two incentives, the system will keep the third best choice rather than
the other one; otherwise, the system will remain the “survival” incentive from the first round
comparison. Finally, the system ends with the third round of pairwise comparison. Similar to
the previous rounds, compared with the sign-up bonus associated with the dominant incentive
in the second round of comparison, if the bonus difference between the fourth choice and its
counterpart is not less than the minimum of individual required compensating differential, then
the system will send worker to her/his fourth choice; otherwise, the system will send worker
to the “survival” incentive from the second round of comparison. Therefore, by a sequence of
three rounds pairwise comparison, according to each worker’s stated compensating differentials
for different incentives, the system is able to determine the best “compensation package” i.e.
a certain incentive scheme with a prepaid sign-up bonus for her/him. All in all, this rule can
be regarded as a variant of BDM method, in which the dominant strategy of each subject
is “telling truth”, and people will suffer a loss if they wrongly self-report their compensating
differentials.
We then take an example to explain how this mechanism works. Given someone’s rankings
and compensating differentials as follows: team tournament  piece rate (2 Chinese Yuan) 
individual tournament (3 Chinese Yuan)  revenue sharing (4 Chinese Yuan), the numbers in
parentheses denote extra bonus required to switch from more preferred option to less preferred
option. Meanwhile, suppose the system has randomly assigned four integers between 0 and 10
to those four incentives, respectively: team tournament with 4 Chinese Yuan, piece rate with 3
Chinese Yuan, individual tournament with 9 Chinese Yuan, and revenue sharing with 5 Chinese
62
Yuan. So, in the first round of pairwise comparison, the difference of sign-up bonus between
first best choice “team tournament” and second choice “piece rate” is equal to -1 (= 3 − 4),
which is smaller than the minimum of required additional compensation (i.e. 2 Chinese Yuan).
As a result, “team tournament” survives in the first round. And then, the system continues
to compare “team tournament” with the third choice “individual tournament”. The bonus
difference between those two incentives is 5 (= 9 − 4), and it just achieves the minimum of
required compensating differential that makes the subject would like to accept the less preferred
incentive of individual tournament rather than the more preferred choice of team tournament
(i.e. 2 + 3 = 5 Chinese Yuan). Therefore, the system will keep “individual tournament” and
delete “team tournament” in the second round of comparison. In the end, comparing the
sign-up bonus of “individual tournament” and the fourth choice of “revenue sharing”, we have
the difference that equals -4 (= 5 − 9), and this value is definitely less than the minimum
of compensating differentials between those two incentives (i.e. 4 Chinese Yuan). So, the
incentive of “individual tournament” survives in the last round. As a consequence, the system
will inform this subject that s/he will be paid by “individual tournament” with a sign-up bonus
of 9 Chinese Yuan before s/he starts the last puzzle-solving game in Task 8.
Finally, when all eight tasks ends, a simple questionnaire was used to gather personal
demographic data including gender, age, marital status, major fields of study, grades, etc.
4.3.2 Subject Pool
The experiment was implemented at Central University of Finance and Economics in Bei-
jing, China. We had 411 complete observations, including 184 males and 227 females, and all
of them were university students. In addition, there were 213 only children (and 198 children
with siblings) in our subject pool. Because majority of the participants i.e. 70% were graduate
students, the average college year was above 4 and the average age was 23.03 correspondingly.
Only 2% of the participants were married. Finally, the average level of GPA was 3.3 (on a 4.0
scale) with a standard deviation of 0.35. However, since subjects’ grades were self-reported,
we cannot guarantee the accuracy of this information and treat it as a quite limited index to
personal academic performance.
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A total of 21 experiment sessions took place in the same computer lab at the university, and
the average size of those sessions was 19.57 participants (with a standard deviation of 6.62).
Each session lasted, on average about 50 minutes. Final payments for subjects were based on
one randomly selected task out of eight tasks, plus a fixed show-up fee of 10 Yuan. The average
payment was 30.85 Yuan.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Ranking for Different Incentives
According to the results in self-sorting, the rank distribution across four incentives is sum-
marized in Table4.1. From the outcomes in this table, it’s clear that the scheme of piece rate
is the most popular incentive by majority. Actually, it’s rational for people to select piece
rate that avoids the uncertainty and risk of team pay. Meanwhile, the provision of feedback
has little effect on individual preference for the piece rate because it is an individual-based
incentive which is irrelevant to any relative performance. However, once the information about
the relative performance is released, the individual stated preferences for other three team-
based incentives did change significantly. In particular, there is a remarkable increase in the
percentage of subjects chose revenue sharing as the favorite while a dramatic reduction in the
percentage chose individual tournament. One reasonable explanation for this change is that
providing feedback about relative performance encourages under-confident subjects with high
ability to enter into individual tournament, and moves overconfident subjects with low ability
towards less competitive incentive scheme.
Model Specification of Ranking Data
We use regression analysis to probe the ranking diversity under different incentives driven
by individual heterogeneity, so we develop a rank-ordered logit model with full ranking data to
derive the specification as follows:
Uij = δj + β · Yij + γ′jxi + εij (4.1)
An individual, labeled i, faces a choice among four alternative incentives. The decision
maker would obtain a certain level of utility from each incentive, so the utility that individual i
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Table 4.1 Ranking for four incentives
No Feedback Feedback
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Piece 33% 36% 22% 9% 38% 29% 28% 5%
Rate
Revenue 11% 22% 27% 40% 20% 29% 19% 32%
Sharing
Individual 36% 20% 19% 25% 25% 18% 16% 41%
Tournament
Team 20% 22% 32% 26% 17% 24% 37% 22%
Tournament
Note: “Rank 1” is the most preferred choice, and “Rank 4” is the least preferred one.
The value in each cell denotes the proportion of subjects.
obtains from incentive j is Uij , where j = 0 denotes piece rate, j = 1 denotes revenue sharing,
j = 2 denotes individual tournament, and j = 3 denotes team tournament. In addition,
δj denotes the incentive-specific constant, Yij represents individual i’s performance paid by
incentive j, xi is the vector of individual attributes including overconfidence, risk attitude,
social preference, etc. In the end, εij denotes the error term.
After knowing individuals’ ranking results, we are able to investigate the relative effect of
differing explanatory variables (including incentive and individual attributes) on the different
ranking outcomes.
In particular, the probability that individual i prefer to choose incentive j rather than
incentive k is:
Pr(j  k) = Pr(Uij > Uik) = Pr(εik − εij < (δj − δk) + β · (Yij − Yik) + (γj − γk)′xi) (4.2)
Since there are at most three incentive-specific values can be identified with four alternatives
in total, here we treat j = 0 i.e. piece rate as the baseline and then make the baseline values
normalized to zero. Hence,
Pr(j  k) = Pr(ε˜ik − ε˜ij < (δ˜j − δ˜k) + β · (Y˜ij − Y˜ik) + (γ˜j − γ˜k)′xi (4.3)
where ε˜ij = εij − εi0; δ˜j = δj − δ0; Y˜ij = Yij − Yi0 and γ˜j = γj − γj .
Furthermore, we use ri = (r
1
i , r
2
i , r
3
i , r
4
i ) to index the individual i’s ranking. For example,
if individual i ranks the four incentive from most preferred to least preferred as follows: team
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tournament  piece rate  individual tournament  revenue sharing, then we have r1i = 3, r2i =
0, r3i = 2, r
4
i = 1 .
Hence, given a certain ranking vector ri, the probability that individual i prefers incentive
rni to incentive r
n
i , r
n+1
i , . . . , r
4
i is equal to:
Frni = Pr(r
n
i  rn+1i , rni  rn+2i , . . . , rni  r4i ) = Pr(Uirni > Uirn+1i , Uirni > Uirn+2i , . . . , Uirni > Uir4i )
(4.4)
Moreover, we define the probability of observing i’s ranking ri as follows:
Fri = Pr(r
1
i  r2i  r3i  r4i ) = Pr(Uir1i > Uir2i > Uir3i > Uir4i ) (4.5)
Suppose individual preferences satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) prop-
erty, and it implies that the conditional distribution of the utility of each choice is independent
of the ranking of other choices. As a result, the probability assigned to a specific ranking of
choices is equal to the product of standard logit probabilities, i.e.
Fri =
3∏
n=1
Frni (4.6)
According to the specification model of rank-ordered logit model, we run the regression.
First, all explanatory variables included in the vector of individual attributes xi are described
in Table 4.2. And then, the estimated coefficients and standard errors are reported in Table 4.3.
The coefficients returned from a logistic regression model in Table 4.3 are log-odds ratios.
Since we have treated the incentive of piece rate as our baseline, the values of those coefficients
tell us, with a one-unit change in the independent variable, how the log-odds of a certain team-
based incentive being preferred to piece rate will change in response. Increasing the log-odds
means increasing the probability that someone would like to choose the team-based incentive
rather than the baseline of piece rate, and vice-versa decreasing the log-odds means decreasing
such a probability. Therefore, the sign of a coefficient indicates the direction of its relationship
between an independent variable and the probability of the certain team-based incentive.
Firstly, according to the regression results in the first column, in this simple analysis which
only focuses on the incentive-specific effect but ignores the influences of heterogeneous indi-
vidual attributes on self-sorting, we find that the probability of a team-based incentive being
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Table 4.2 Individual characteristics related to preferences for different incentives
Variable Range Description Mean
Relative performance [0%, 100%] Percentile rank for individual 12.36
performance in puzzle-solving (2.71)
task paid by piece rate.
Confidence bias [-100%, 100%] Difference between self- 0.16
assessment and actual relative (0.27)
performance.
Risk aversion {10%, 20%, . . . , 100%} Minimum probability of 0.65
winning $40 that makes lottery (0.15)
is preferred to fixed $20.
Inequality aversion {0, 1} =1 if the dictator equally shares 0.51
payoff with the receiver in (0.50)
dictator game.
Female {0, 1} =1 if a female; 0.55
and (0.50)
=0 if a male.
Only child {0, 1} =1 if an only child; 0.52
and (0.50)
=0 if a child with siblings.
GPA [0, 4] Grade-Point-Average is the 3.30
most common method to (0.35)
evaluate academic performance.
Note:
The first four variables are elicited by experimental methods during stage 1;
The rest three variables are elicited by self-report questionnaire during follow-up stage;
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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preferred to the piece rate scheme will decrease if the incentive is revenue sharing because it has
a negative coefficient -0.883. Moreover, as compared with the revenue sharing, the probability
that someone prefers individual tournament to piece rate will be higher because the differential
intercept coefficient for the incentive “individual tournament” is positive (0.529). Similarly,
the positive of differential intercept coefficient for the incentive “team tournament” (i.e. 0.261)
also implies team tournament is more likely to be preferred than the revenue sharing during
the self-sorting process, but it’s still less preferred than the incentive of individual tournament
since its coefficient is significantly lower at p =0.035. On the other hand, the provision of feed-
back information reduce the differences between those three team-based incentives because the
two differential intercept coefficient become smaller as well as statistically insignificant different
from zero. Meanwhile, compared with the baseline option of piece rate, any team-based incen-
tive is less likely to be chosen because of the negative coefficient -0.684. Hence, the regression
results are consistent with the ranking data shown in Table 4.1.
Secondly, we add more individual characteristics into the regression model. As a result, we
verified that some non-cognitive characteristics such as overconfidence, risk aversion and social
preference affect individual self-sorting in a systematic way. Overall, most of the coefficients
shown in Table 4.3 have the expected signs: (1) Regardless of receiving the feedback information
or not, able subjects with high relative performance are always more likely to choose individual
tournament than other two less competitive incentives of team pay. (2) Over-confident subjects
would more likely to select individual tournament because they wrongly believe that they have
high probability to win in the competition, but the provision of feedback can effectively correct
their biased beliefs so that both overconfident and under-confident people will select the proper
incentive irrespective of their initial self-confidence levels. (3) Providing the information about
relative performance helps reduce the uncertainty in the team work, so the differences of final
payoff between those three team-based incentives can be clarified by workers. As a result,
individual risk attitude as well as social preference has a significant impact on self-sorting.
The more risk averse the worker is, the less likely s/he would prefer individual tournament
and/or team tournament due to the risk of failure in competition. Furthermore, because both
individual and team tournaments generate unequal outcomes, then subjects having inequality
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aversion derive disutility from unequal outcomes so that they are definitely less likely to accept
those competitive incentives; on the other hand, the revenue sharing scheme is more attractive
to the inequality averse subjects than to those who don’t care about the fairness. (4) Regarding
the gender difference, compared with men, women is more likely to accept the cooperation in
team revenue whereas shy away from individual competition without feedback. However, more
information about relative performance successfully reduces the gender gap. (5) Only children
and children with siblings state quite different preferences for those team-based incentives. In
the absence of feedback, only children are less likely to choose cooperation in revenue sharing
but more likely to prefer competition under individual tournament. In China, only children and
children with siblings grow up in considerably different social and economic environments, so
they might have distinctive personalities that differentiate their behaviors in the labor market.
Although we have already controlled the risk aversion and social preference, there still exists
some unobservable characteristics make those two groups different. Fortunately, the feedback
mechanism allows us to lessen the gap between only children and children with siblings in our
experiment. So, it indicates the difference should be caused by the uncertainty of team pay,
and then the provision of symmetric information can lead two groups behave the same in the
end.
4.4.2 Compensating Differentials Between Team-based Incentives and Piece Rate
As we have mentioned, the coefficients from ranking model are not informative enough, be-
cause the scale of the utility function cannot be identified. Hence, by ranking data alone, it is
impossible to estimate the individual valuations for different incentives in terms of money. And
then, thanks to a novel contingent evaluation method used in our experiment, it is convenient
for us to measure the utility difference between any two options in a monetary unit. According
to the survey design, by eliciting the differentials of sign-up bonus between each two consec-
utively ranked incentives, we are able to figure out the compensating differential between any
two incentives in pair. For example, if someone stated her/his rankings and additional compen-
sations as follows: team tournament  piece rate (5 Chinese Yuan)  individual tournament (2
Chinese Yuan)  revenue sharing (3 Chinese Yuan), the numbers in parentheses denote extra
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Table 4.3 Rank-ordered logit model
No Feedback Feedback
Revenue Sharing -0.883*** -1.603 -0.684*** -2.644
(δ˜1) (0.126) (1.410) (0.126) (1.536)
Individual Tournament 0.529*** -1.794 -0.198 -0.292
(δ˜2 − δ˜1) (0.130) (1.440) (0.134) (1.612)
Team Tournament 0.261** -0.808 0.036 1.249
(δ˜3 − δ˜1) (0.124) (1.359) (0.124) (1.502)
Performance difference 0.068** 0.041
(β) (0.032) (0.031)
Relative performance 0.007 -0.016**
(γ˜relative1 ) (0.007) (0.007)
Relative performance*IT 0.029*** 0.034***
(γ˜relative2 − γ˜relative1 ) (0.008) (0.008)
Relative performance*TT -0.001 0.003
(γ˜relative3 − γ˜relative1 ) -0.007 -0.007
Confidence bias 0.006 -0.004
(γ˜confidence1 ) (0.008) (0.008)
Confidence bias*IT 0.024*** -0.006
(γ˜confidence2 − γ˜confidence1 ) (0.009) (0.009)
Confidence bias*TT -0.007 -0.005
(γ˜confidence3 − γ˜confidence1 ) (0.008) (0.008)
Risk aversion -0.013 -0.004
(γ˜risk1 ) (0.009) (0.009)
Risk aversion*IT -0.007 -0.019*
(γ˜risk2 − γ˜risk1 ) (0.009) (0.010)
Risk aversion*TT 0.002 -0.016*
(γ˜risk3 − γ˜risk1 ) (0.008) (0.009)
Inequality Aversion 0.181 0.690**
(γ˜inequal1 ) (0.271) (0.271)
Inequality Aversion*IT -0.545* -1.128***
(γ˜inequal2 − γ˜inequal1 ) (0.285) (0.297)
Inequality Aversion*TT -0.31 -0.970***
(γ˜inequal3 − γ˜inequal1 ) (0.263) (0.268)
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Table 4.3 (Continued)
Rank-ordered logit model
No Feedback Feedback
Female 0.526* 0.300
(γ˜female1 ) (0.281) (0.287)
Female*IT -1.007*** -0.565*
(γ˜female2 − γ˜female1 ) (0.294) (0.311)
Female*TT -0.345 0.124
(γ˜female3 − γ˜female1 ) (0.274) (0.281)
Only child -0.604** 0.244
(γ˜onlychild1 ) (0.27) (0.273)
Only child*IT 0.448* 0.045
(γ˜onlychild2 − γ˜onlychild1 ) (0.279) (0.297)
Only child*TT -0.128 0.416
(γ˜onlychild3 − γ˜onlychild1 ) (0.262) (0.271)
GPA 0.304 0.689
(γ˜gpa1 ) (0.395) (0.425)
GPA*IT 0.525 0.25
(γ˜gpa2 − γ˜gpa1 ) (0.392) (0.458)
GPA*TT 0.449 -0.001
(γ˜gpa3 − γ˜gpa1 ) (0.379) (0.421)
Observations 836 836 808 808
Number of groups 209 209 202 202
Log likelihood -636.821 -604.315 -615.126 -557.175
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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bonus required to switch from more preferred option to less preferred option. In this case, all
compensating differentials between any two incentives can be obtained by simple calculation of
addition and/or subtraction. Suppose we take piece rate as the baseline, then the differentials
required to accept other three incentives instead of piece rate payment are: team tournament
requires 0 − 5 = −5 Chinese Yuan, individual tournament requires 2 Chinese Yuan, and rev-
enue sharing needs 2+3 = 5 Chinese Yuan. Notice that a negative differential means the given
incentive “team tournament” is preferred to piece rate by this subject, so s/he is willing to give
up some money to ensure her/his preferred incentive instead of the less preferred option of piece
rate; in contrast, a positive differential means the incentive “individual tournament/revenue
sharing” is less preferred to the piece rate scheme, so the subject require more sign-up bonus
as the additional compensation for accepting her/his less preferred incentive.
In Table 4.4, we report the summary statistics of compensating differentials between the
baseline incentive (i.e. piece rate) and other three team-based incentives, respectively. The fact
of all compensating differentials having positive means indicates the baseline of piece rate should
the most popular so that subjects require higher sign-up bonus for accept those team-based
incentives.
Without feedback information, the contingent evaluations for three team-based incentives
are significantly different from each other. Firstly, among three team-based incentive, indi-
vidual tournament is most popular with the least compensating differential; Secondly, it is
followed by the incentive of team tournament, and the within-pair difference between team and
individual tournament equals 1.94 (with std. dev. of 0.79), which is significantly larger than
zero at p =0.007; Thirdly, as the least preferred incentive, revenue sharing has the highest com-
pensating differentials, and then the within-pair difference between revenue sharing and team
tournament equals 1.01 (with std. dev. of 0.65), which is significantly positive at p =0.059.
In addition, the feedback information has remarkable impact on the evaluations for team-
based incentives. The significant change happens on the compensating differential for individual
tournament, a dramatic increase in the compensating differential after receiving feedback, which
also leads individual tournament becomes the least preferred option among three team-based
incentives. The difference of compensating differential for individual tournament between two
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treatment groups equals 2.55 (with std. dev. 1.04), which is significantly positive at p =0.007.
But the difference for other two incentives between “No feedback” treatment and “Feedback”
treatment are insignificant. Meanwhile, the provision of information also reduces the difference
between any two team-based incentives so that all within-pair differences are not significantly
different from zero.
Table 4.4 Summary statistics of compensating differentials
No Feedback Feedback
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue 209 4.35 7.87 -19 24 202 3.39 8.99 -25 30
Sharing
Individual 209 1.40 10.11 -29 30 202 3.95 10.93 -30 30
Tournament
Team 209 3.34 9.62 -23 25 202 3.26 9.91 -30 30
Tournament
Model Specification of Compensating Differentials
We then specify a regression model to probe the individual heterogeneity in compensating
differentials. Given that Uij = δj + β · Yij + γ′jxi + εij , and take j = 0 piece rate scheme as the
baseline, then for ∀j 6= 0, the compensating differential CDij that make individual i is willing
to accept incentive j instead of piece rate scheme is equal to:
CDij = Ui0 − Uij = −(δ˜j + β · Y˜ij + γ˜′jxi + ε˜ij) (4.7)
The regression results are reported in Table 4.5. If different methods (i.e. ranking and
compensating differential) are used to quantify the same thing, they should yield the same
outcome, which means there exists equality between preferences derived from rank-ordered
logit model and the model on compensating differentials. It is worth noting that an increase in
the probability of being preferred implies a decrease in the demand for additional compensation,
hence the sign of coefficients in these two models should be exactly opposite with each other.
As a result, we do find the consistency between two specification models.
In the first column i.e. regression model (i), when we only discuss the incentive-specific
effect while neglecting the influences of heterogeneous individual attributes on compensating
differentials, we can conclude that any team-based incentive is less attractive than the baseline
73
Table 4.5 GLS model of compensating differentials
No Feedback Feedback
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Revenue sharing 4.354*** 10.080* 8.117 3.391*** 7.008 5.624
(δ˜1) (0.640) (6.118) (6.683) (0.702) (6.868) (7.527)
Individual tournament -2.957*** 4.024 9.998 0.554 19.190** 10.16
(δ˜2 − δ˜1) (0.760) (7.230) (7.851) (0.803) (7.543) (8.286)
Team tournament -1.014 4.226 2.712 -0.134 7.555 -0.816
(δ˜3 − δ˜1) (0.760) (7.232) (7.849) (0.803) (7.543) (8.286)
Performance difference -0.208 -0.277* -0.208 -0.203
(β) (0.162) (0.161) (0.164) (0.163)
Relative performance 0.001 -0.016 0.045* 0.057*
(γ˜relative1 ) (0.023) (0.037) (0.024) (0.037)
Relative performance*IT -0.056** -0.165*** -0.192*** -0.159***
(γ˜relative2 − γ˜relative1 ) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.040)
Relative performance*TT -0.036 -0.001 -0.033 -0.015
(γ˜relative3 − γ˜relative1 ) (0.026) (0.042) (0.025) (0.040)
Confidence bias -0.018 0.014
(γ˜confidence1 ) (0.039) (0.041)
Confidence bias*IT -0.150*** 0.041
(γ˜confidence2 − γ˜confidence1 ) (0.046) (0.045)
Confidence bias*TT 0.049 0.02
(γ˜confidence3 − γ˜confidence1 ) (0.046) (0.045)
Risk aversion 0.053 0.034
(γ˜risk1 ) (0.041) (0.045)
Risk aversion*IT 0.033 0.088*
(γ˜risk2 − γ˜risk1 ) (0.049) (0.050)
Risk aversion*TT -0.01 0.091*
(γ˜risk3 − γ˜risk1 ) (0.049) (0.050)
Inequality aversion -0.695 -2.458*
(γ˜inequal1 ) (1.306) (1.349)
Inequality aversion*IT 0.939 4.116***
(γ˜inequal2 − γ˜inequal1 ) (1.533) (1.488)
Inequality aversion*TT 0.778 3.728**
(γ˜inequal3 − γ˜inequal1 ) (1.533) (1.488)
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
GLS model of compensating differentials
No Feedback Feedback
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Female -0.694 -0.884 -1.87 -1.583
(γ˜female1 ) (1.330) (1.345) (1.402) (1.415)
Female*IT 4.675*** 3.598** 4.537*** 3.642**
(γ˜female2 − γ˜female1 ) (1.571) (1.580) (1.543) (1.561)
Female*TT 0.369 0.568 -0.114 -1.008
(γ˜female3 − γ˜female1 ) (1.572) (1.580) (1.544) (1.562)
Only child 2.186* 2.289* -1.354 -1.18
(γ˜onlychild1 ) (1.309) (1.300) (1.375) (1.364)
Only child*IT -2.718* -2.422* 0.189 0.262
(γ˜onlychild2 − γ˜onlychild1 ) (1.547) (1.527) (1.512) (1.502)
Only child*TT 0.492 0.532 -1.497 -1.443
(γ˜onlychild3 − γ˜onlychild1 ) (1.549) (1.530) (1.517) (1.508)
GPA -1.987 -1.97 -1.167 -1.364
(γ˜gpa1 ) (1.842) (1.846) (2.082) (2.067)
GPA*IT -1.651 -1.869 -3.921* -4.045*
(γ˜gpa2 − γ˜gpa1 ) (2.176) (2.170) (2.293) (2.282)
GPA*TT -1.21 -1.451 -1.676 -1.716
(γ˜gpa3 − γ˜gpa1 ) (2.176) (2.169) (2.293) (2.283)
Observations 627 627 627 606 606 606
R-squared 0.017 0.062 0.101 0.001 0.102 0.137
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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of piece rate scheme. In the absence of feedback information, on average, the “revenue sharing”
company should pay 4.354 Chinese Yuan to attract one “single contractor” to join the company.
By contrast, the two companies with competitive incentives pay less for additional compensa-
tion: the “individual tournament” company should pay 4.354− 2.957 = 1.397 Chinese Yuan to
attract a “single contractor”, and the “team tournament” needs to pay 4.354− 1.014 = 3.340
Chinese Yuan as the extra sign-up bonus. The compensating differentials between team-based
incentives and piece rate are significantly positive. Meanwhile, among three incentives, the
difference between the most popular incentive “individual tournament” and the least popular
incentive “revenue sharing” is also statistically significant. On the contrary, providing workers
with feedback about their relative performance change the compensating differentials. Although
each team-based incentive still has to pay a positive compensation to the “single contractor”
(i.e. on average, the company “revenue sharing” needs to pay 3.391 Chinese Yuan; the company
“individual tournament” should pay 3.391 + 0.554 = 3.945 Chinese Yuan; and the company
“team tournament” should pay 3.391 − 0.134 = 3.257 Chinese Yuan), the differences between
any two team-based incentives shrink to insignificant levels.
Next, in model (ii) and (iii), we probe the effects of some important individual attributes
on the stated-preferences for incentives. The key difference between those two models is:
besides control variables (i.e. performance difference, relative performance, gender, only child,
GPA) included in model (ii), we add more non-cognitive characters such as overconfidence, risk
aversion and social preference in the regression model (iii). As a result, we investigate how
those individual attributes affect the compensating differentials in a systematic way.
Effect of Performance Difference
It is rational for the subject to require less compensation for a certain team-based incentive if
s/he performs quite well under that incentive. Since s/he can get a higher expected payoff with
the performance increasing, the compensating differential between a team-base incentive and
the baseline of piece rate is negatively related to the performance difference between those two
incentives. Nevertheless, the marginal effect of one unit change in the performance difference
is quiet small and insignificant except for the case in regression (iii) with “No Feedback”
treatment.
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Effect of Relative Performance
Different from the individual-based incentive “piece rate”, those three team-based incentives
determine the final payment based on workers’ relative performance within the team. Hence,
in order to maximize the expected payoffs, subjects with high relative performance are more
likely to accept the individual tournament due to a high winning probability in the competition.
On the contrary, able subjects probably more reluctant to accept the revenue sharing because
of the free riding problem. From the results in model (iii), under “Feedback” treatment, 1%
increase in the relative performance indicates an additional of 0.057 Chinese Yuan required
by the “single contractor” to enter into the company “revenue sharing”; whereas the same
1% increase in the relative performance brings a decrease in compensating differential between
individual tournament and the baseline of piece rate, that is, −0.159 + 0.057 = −0.102 Chinese
Yuan.
Effect of Overconfidence
Consistent with the findings in Wozniak et al. (2010), when no feedback is provided, over-
confident subjects are more likely to choose individual tournament than other less competitive
incentives. From our regression results on compensating differentials, in the case without
feedback, the marginal effect of the overconfidence is significantly higher in the individual tour-
nament than in the revenue sharing. Hence, as compared with the compensating differential
for revenue sharing, the individual tournament can save 0.150 Chinese Yuan for every 1% in-
crease in the level of over-confidence. In fact, the majority of subjects are overconfident (see
Table 3), so the individual tournament becomes much more attractive than revenue sharing if
people make decision based on their biased beliefs. However, the provision of feedback helps all
subjects to update their biased beliefs so that they state their contingent evaluations based on
their actual relative only, and then the impact of self-assessment (i.e. overconfidence) become
very small and insignificant.
Effect of Risk Aversion
Overall, the risk aversion has positive coefficients for all three team-based incentives, which
means the more risk-averse subjects are less likely to accept any team-based incentive instead
of the baseline of piece rate. Thanks to the uncertainty from the teammate and/or opponent’s
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performance, people might consider those team-based schemes to be more risker options. There-
fore, as the degree of risk-aversion increases, the attractiveness of team-based incentives falls
down so that a higher compensating differential is required. Moreover, compared with the
coefficients without feedback, the marginal effect of risk aversion on compensating differentials
is magnified with the provision of feedback. In particular, we have a clear evidence to show
that more risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose competitive incentive schemes (i.e. in-
dividual tournament and team tournament) as compared with revenue sharing. For instance,
after receiving feedback information, given the degree of risk aversion increases by 10%, then
the “single contractor” would require 0.034 ∗ 10 = 0.34 Chinese Yuan as the additional com-
pensation to join the company “revenue sharing”. Meanwhile, in addition to the extra bonus of
0.34 Chinese Yuan, the company “individual tournament” needs to pay more 0.088 ∗ 10 = 0.88
Chinese Yuan to poach this employee from the company “revenue sharing”, whereas “team
tournament” should increase its compensation by 0.091 ∗ 10 = 0.91 Chinese Yuan to poach the
same person from “revenue sharing”.
Effect of Social Preference
One of the most exciting findings in this experiment is that we verified the impact of
“inequality aversion” on individual preferences for different team-based incentives. Since both
individual and team tournaments generate unequal outcomes while revenue sharing guarantee a
fair distribution, the subjects of inequality averse type require more compensating differential to
accept the tournaments but ask for less to enter into the “revenue sharing” company. Similar
to the changes in coefficients for risk aversion, the marginal effects of inequality preference
are also amplified by providing the feedback information. Compared with the results in “No
Feedback” treatment, the coefficients keep the same signs but enlarge the size at significant
level. More specifically, as compared with a subject who doesn’t care the equality of team
pay, a “single contractor” who prefers fairness would like to require 2.458 Chinese Yuan less to
join the company “revenue sharing”. Conversely, the company “individual tournament” needs
to pay more 4.116 Chinese Yuan to hire an inequality-averse employee rather than someone
doesn’t care about the equality distribution. Similarly, the company “team tournament” should
also increase its compensation by 3.728 Chinese Yuan to attract an inequality-averse worker.
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Effect of Gender
Consistent with the previous studies on gender difference in competition, our results also
verified that females require more compensating differentials for accepting a competitive incen-
tive. Moreover, during the first stage of diagnostic games for individual characteristics, it is
shown that women are more risk-averse but less confident than men, so women should be reluc-
tant to enter into competition. Also, the unequal outcome in tournament brings a disutility to
each inequality-averse subject, so women are more likely to accept the revenue sharing incentive
rather than the individual tournament due to their gender-specific preference for fairness.
In the absence of feedback, when we run a regression without controlling those non-cognitive
characteristics in model (ii), female require 0.694 Chinese Yuan less than male to accept the
cooperation in “revenue sharing” company while ask for a higher compensating differential
(−0.694+4.675 = 3.981 Chinese Yuan) to enter into the competition of “individual tournament”
company. And then, after we control three non-cognitive characteristics (i.e. overconfidence,
risk attitude and social preference) in the regression model (iii), the difference between only
children and children with siblings still exist, although the marginal effect of gender dummy
become smaller. So, it indicates that the gender gaps in cooperation and competition should be
partially driven by the different risk attitudes, social preferences and self-confidences between
female and male. However, besides those three non-cognitive characteristics we elicited in
our, the two groups probably have other intrinsic difference related to their heterogeneous
preferences for team-based incentives.
In addition, we also find that providing more information doesn’t help to reduce the gender
gap. After controlling three non-cognitive characteristics (i.e. overconfidence, risk attitude
and social preference) in the regression model (iii), females require 1.583 Chinese Yuan less
than males to accept the cooperation in “revenue sharing” whereas ask for a higher compen-
sating differential (−1.583 + 3.642 = 2.059 Yuan) to enter into the competition of “individual
tournament”.
Effect of Only Child
During the first stage of diagnostic games for individual characteristics, we have some sig-
nificant differences between only children and children with siblings: only children are less
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risk-averse but also less over-confident than the children with siblings; however, there is no sig-
nificant difference in social preference between two groups, which provides evidence against the
stereotype that only children are always more selfish than children with siblings. Therefore, we
expected the two groups would have quite different preferences for those team-based incentives
due to the heterogeneity in their non-cognitive characteristics.
In the absence of feedback, when we run a regression without controlling those non-cognitive
characteristics in model (ii), compared to children with siblings, only children require a higher
compensating differentials (i.e. 2.186 Chinese Yuan) to accept the cooperation in “revenue
sharing” company while a smaller compensating differential (2.186 − 2.718 = −0.532 Chinese
Yuan) to enter into the competition of “individual tournament” company. On one hand, only
children are often viewed as disadvantaged as a result of sibling deprivation, which may lead
to their being less cooperative, and less likely to get along with peers (Blake 1981). On the
other hand, because only children are more risk-loving but less confident at the same time,
their preference for the individual tournament would take account of the positive effect from
their risk attitude as well as the negative effect from their lower confident in the competition.
Therefore, in the following step, we control three non-cognitive characteristics (i.e. over-
confidence, risk attitude and social preference). As a result, the difference between only chil-
dren and children with siblings still exist and the relevant coefficients have little changes. It
implies there should be some unobservable difference between the two groups except three
non-cognitive characteristics we elicited in our experiment that influence their preferences for
team-based incentives. However, it is worth noting that the introduction of feedback about
relative performance effectively reduces the difference between only children and others. So it
suggests the hidden factor in the black box should be some non-cognitive characteristics related
to information processing in uncertain environments.
Price the Cost of Mismatch
Without the extra sign-up bonus, everyone will definitely self-sort into her/his best choice.
However, the compensating differentials generates the possibility that someone may accept a
certain less preferred choice with a relatively high sign-up bonus and even be better off than
taking her/his most preferred incentive but with a low sign-up bonus. In other words, since all
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subjects evaluate their utility differences between incentives in money, the cost of any mismatch
between a company and a worker can be priced based on their contingent evaluation in terms
of compensating differentials. Now, suppose those three team-based companies want to hire a
talented employee who has the following characteristics: female, only child, the performance
is quite stable and unchanged across different incentives (i.e. Y˜ij = 0), relative performance is
at least above 80%, with a little overconfidence around 20%, she is risk-neutral and inequality
averse, GPA achieves 3.5 points. From the regression results in model (iii), without feedback
information, the company of “revenue sharing” should pay an amount of 2.942 Chinese Yuan
(i.e. 8.117+(−0.277)∗0+(−0.016)∗80+(−0.018)∗20+(0.053)∗50+(−0.695)∗1+(−0.884)∗
1+2.289∗1+(−1.970)∗3.5) as the compensating differential to attract this “single contractor”
join the company. And then, the difference of compensating differential between “revenue
sharing” and “individual tournament” is equal to -4.306 Chinese Yuan (i.e. 9.998 + (−0.277) ∗
0+(−0.165)∗80+(−0.150)∗20+(0.033)∗50+(0.939)∗1+(3.598)∗1+(−2.422)∗1+(−1.869)∗1,
which means the individual tournament is very attractive to this employee so that she would
like to give up 4.306 Chinese Yuan to switch from the company of “revenue sharing”.
4.5 Conclusions
The main purpose of this study is to build a mapping from the vector of individual charac-
teristics to their stated preferences for different team-based incentives. As a consequence, our
findings from the lab data have several important implications in the real world.
First of all, when designing incentive system, organizations and companies should take into
account of the interaction between incentives and individual self-sorting. We have verified that
workers with different characteristics do not only make different productivity response to various
compensation schemes, but also have heterogeneous preferences for those incentives. Hence, in
order to achieve particular targeted composition of the workforce, different companies can offer
different incentives to get the right people on the right job. Besides, since it’s very difficult
to elicit those non-cognitive characteristics during the process of recruitment in practice, the
incentive design should be very useful to serve as a screening device.
In addition, without enough information, there are numerous subjects wrongly believe
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their relative performance and then make improper decision depending on their biased self-
assessment. By contrast, providing feedback about relative performance moves those subjects
towards better choices of incentive. It hence suggests the feedback mechanism plays an impor-
tant role in the work organization under team-based incentives.
More importantly, as an innovation in our experiment, the compensating differential pro-
vides an effective way to price the cost of a mismatch between a worker and a company.
Therefore, compared with designing a distinctive incentive scheme and feedback treatment for
each heterogeneous worker, it’s much more feasible and convenient for companies to set a flex-
ible sign-up bonus policy to attract any talent they want. Nevertheless, we have to admit
that the contingent evaluations in terms of sign-up bonus might be restricted to our particular
experiment setting and subject pool, but it is still worthwhile to conduct a pilot test that can
obtain useful information for the future generalized study.
Besides, our findings about gender effect on stated-preferences shed light on the explanation
for gender difference in career choice, and ultimately for the existence of the gender wage gap.
In the previous literature, it suggests that the gender gap in competition is driven by gender-
specific risk preferences and/or different self-confidence levels. However, in our study, we further
verify that the social preference of “inequality aversion” also plays an important role in shaping
gender-specific preferences for different team-based incentives.
Finally, between the groups of only children and children with siblings, we observe a sub-
stantial divergence in their preferences for different team-based incentives and then a dramatic
change after knowing feedback about relative performance. It’s well-known that the Chinese
government launched One-Child policy in 1979. Many people criticize this policy because it
may negatively influence children personalities and ultimately shape their preferences when
they grow up and enter into the labor market. Now, according to our results in the experi-
ment, it suggests that only children and children with siblings indeed behave quite differently
due to their distinct personalities. However, it is shown that the symmetric information helps
reduce the gap between two groups, but the causal factors are still hidden in the black box.
Therefore, the further investigation on the issue of only children should be a challenging work
for improving the labor market in China.
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CHAPTER 5. TRUST BETWEEN STRANGERS: BELIEF UPDATING
FROM NOISY FEEDBACK
Abstract
We study how trust between strangers evolves in a setting with noisy feedback about the
trustworthiness of others. We first design a laboratory experiment using a two-player sequen-
tial trust game where each trustor receives a sequence of noisy binary signals that reveal the
trustworthiness type of the trustee. As a result, we track the evolution of trustors’ beliefs
about trustworthiness types of trustees to document that subjects process information in an
asymmetric way compared to a perfect Bayesian: they react more to negative signals rather
than positive. Trust is therefore much easier to lose than to gain. Next, we show that our em-
pirical results arise naturally in a theoretical model where individuals optimally manage their
trust in others with noisy feedback. We discuss whether trustors should use Bayesian updating
to calculate their trust levels or whether they should process information in a biased manner.
The conclusion suggests that there exists a complementary relationship between initial trust
and optimally biased Bayesian information processing. Hence, we theoretically predict that
greater initial trust must be counter-balanced by more asymmetric belief updating. We then
use a novel method to demonstrate this hypothesis in the following-up experiment. We match
participants from two different universities (in Hong Kong and Beijing, respectively) and prime
them on the social identity of their counterparts. Consequently, by the introduction of social
identity, we find that both initial trust level and asymmetry of belief updating are stronger for
in-group matches than out-group matches, which is consistent with our theoretical prediction.
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5.1 Introduction
It is the mutual interest that activates human associations together, and then it is the mutual
trust that holds human cooperation successfully. Hence, trusting others and reciprocating that
trust with trustworthy actions are the essential aspects of our everyday lives. However, the
trust should be specified by particular situations, for instance, the trust between strangers, or
trust between friends. In Porta et al. (1997), the authors argued that “trust should be more
essential for ensuring cooperation between strangers”, “than for supporting cooperation among
people who interact frequently and repeatedly”.1 The problem of how impersonal trust can
build and persist is intertwined with the transient and anonymous social exchanges which are
the foundations of free market economies and successful political systems (Aghion et al. 2010;
Cook 2001; Johnson and Mislin 2009).
To investigate the trust between strangers, we select the “trust game” (Guth el al. 1997;
Bohnet and Huck 2004; Cox 2004; Malhotra 2004) to conduct our experimental study in a
game theoretic context. The trust game is an interaction between two players, a “trustor” and
a “trustee”.2 For the trustor, choosing to cooperate indicates her/him to incur a potential cost
to benefit the trustee, thus s/he will do so only if s/he believes the opportunity of being repaid
by the trustee exceeds the risk of being betrayed. In such a case, the trust can be defined
as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another (Rousseau et al. 1998)”. Specifically, the
positive expectations might vary across individuals with different trust levels. So, in order to
measure the differences among individual trust levels accurately, we define the degree of trust
as trustors’ beliefs about trustworthiness types of trustees.3 In our design, we use an incentive-
1Consider the case of interaction between friends, the cooperation could be persisted by the reputation and
ample opportunities for future punishment, instead of being supported by the pure trust alone. In contrast,
when we enter into a relation (commercial, political, etc.) with some person, group or organization with which
we do not have personal experience before, it requires impersonal trust, that is, trust built without personal
history and repeated interactions.
2As shown is Figure 5.1, the trustor (i.e. Player A) starts by deciding between non-cooperation (“A1”) and
cooperation (“A2”), whereas the trustee (i.e. Player B) can only react in case of cooperation by either dividing
the rewards equally (“B1”) or exploiting the trustor (“B2”).
3We simply identity types of trustees by their actions in the trust game: a trustee is a “trustworthy” type if
s/he responds to trustor’s trust with a strategy of “B1”; on the other hand, a trustee is a “untrustworthy” type
if s/he reacts with a strategy of “B2”.
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compatible way to elicit subjects’ trust beliefs on others in a carefully controlled experimental
environment, and then the experimental data exhibit a range of distinctive trust levels between
0 and 1 across subjects.4
Figure 5.1 Two-player sequential trust game
In addition, we propose that adding information to this trust game should fundamentally
alter the trust and cooperation between players. However, the assumption that there is no noise
at all in the feedback seems to be too strong in most real world applications. In this paper we
therefore investigate the information processing when the assumption of no noise is dropped.
We designed a noisy feedback mechanism and then allowed trustors to obtain signals which
could reveal trustees’ actual trustworthiness types to some extent. Our findings show how
trustors update their trust beliefs by noisy feedback about trustees to make better decisions,
both in terms of experimental outcomes and in terms of theoretical predictions.
The first contribution of this study is that we do not only reject the perfect Bayesian
updating of individual trust on others5, but also show exactly in which ways it fails using
experimental data on changes in trustors’ beliefs. According to our experimental design, the
4Actually, in this two-player sequential trust game, we apply the strategy method so that all subjects need to
state contingent choices for every decision node they may face before being matched in pair. Hence, by eliciting
every subject’s individual choices as both a trustor and a trustee, we find that individual own trustworthiness is
positively correlated to her/his initial trust belief about the trustworthiness of others.
5There is a large and growing body of psychological research suggests that the way people process information
often departs systematically from perfect Bayesian updating.
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trustees are defined by two types: the trustworthiness equals 1 if the trustee repays trustor’s
trust in the trust game; whereas the trustworthiness equals 0 if the trustee betrays trustor’s
trust. And then, during the feedback stage, we send trustors a sequence of four noisy binary
signals to reveal the trustworthiness of the trustee with a correct probability of 2/3. Hence, no
matter the trustee is actually trustworthy or not, it’s possible to return either a positive signal
that s/he is trustworthy or a negative signal that s/he is untrustworthy. The main finding is
that trustors respond different feedback in an asymmetric manner: they respond less to positive
signals than to negative ones, which implies that trust is hard to gain but easy to lose.
The second contribution is that we develop a theoretical model to explain the asymmetry
evolution of trust which we observed in our laboratory experiment. We show that our empirical
results arise naturally in a simple model where individuals optimally manage their trust in
others with noisy feedback. First of all, we claim an important assumption for our theory that
everyone starts with cooperation and trusting others in the absence of feedback. To support
this assumption, we find convincing evidence from the evolutionary biology research (Nowak
2006; Manapat et al. 2012; Rand et al. 2012) as well as our experimental data in the trust
game. Those biologists verified that cooperation with trust is our instinct as human-beings
through natural selection. On the other hand, in our trust game, the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium predicts non-cooperation (“A1”, “B2”) although this is payoff-dominated by fair
cooperation (“A2”, “B1”). But different from the rationally self-interested behaviors, there
still exists a substantial proportion i.e. 27% of trustors who decided to cooperate based on the
initial trust belief of 0.55 on average, which suggests that humans are indeed hard-wired to trust
and cooperate to some extent. Next, given that Nature pushes us towards trusting each other
at the very beginning, by adding more noisy information about others, we theoretically analyze
whether and how people favor “rational” withdrawal from trust by reflection and prospective
reasoning. In other words, people intuitively tend to trust with high initial beliefs, but in
order to improve the efficiency of “correct” cooperation with trustworthy partners only, the
asymmetric non-Bayesian updating is demonstrated as a counterbalance to generate optimal
trust levels in the end.
Finally, in recognition of the complementary relationship between initial beliefs and up-
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dating process, we theoretically predict that the higher the initial trust belief is, the more
asymmetric updating occurs with noisy feedback. And then, we use a novel way to examine
this hypothesis in our following-up experiment, which also contributes to research on how so-
cial identity affects individual trust updating. We first match participants from two different
universities in Hong Kong and Beijing respectively, and then prime them on the social identity
of their counterpart.6 Thus, by the introduction of social identity information, we should be
able to artificially sort trustors’ initial beliefs into two different ranges. That is, trustors are
expected to show higher initial trust for an in-group partner than an out-group partner (Tajfel
and Turner, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 19867; Bernhard et al. 2006; Goette et al. 20068; Eckel
and Grossman 2005; Chen and Li 20099). In fact, we confirmed such in-group favoritism from
our experimental data: compared to out-group matches, subjects exhibit higher initial trust in
in-group members. Meanwhile, consistent with our theoretical prediction, the asymmetry of
belief updating for in-group matches is stronger than out-group matches: to a greater extent,
subjects overreact to negative signals as well as underreact to positive signals about in-group
members during the feedback stage.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the experimental
design for empirical baseline with anonymous matching in the trust game. Section 3 reports
main findings from the experiment. Section 4 analyzes trust in a theoretical model. Section 5
reports the following-up experiment on social identity. Section 6 concludes.
6Based on social identity theory, in our experiment, we define the matching between subjects at the same
university as the in-group relationship, whereas the matching between subjects from different universities is the
out-group relationship.
7In Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986), the social identity theory is developed to understand the psychological
basis for intergroup discrimination.
8There are numerous studies using natural groups to find effects of social identity on behavior. For instance,
Bernhard et al. (2006) uses a dictator game experiment with third-party punishment in two distinct, native
social groups in Papua New Guinea. The authors find that third parties show stronger altruism toward ingroup
victims. Similar to this finding, in the experiment of Goette et al. (2006), by using natural groups (platoons) in
the Swiss Army, they also find more cooperation when subjects interact with ingroup members in a prisoner’s
dilemma game.
9In comparison with natural group identities, Eckel and Grossman (2005) use induced team identity to study
the effects of varying identity strength on cooperative behavior in a repeated-play public goods game in the
laboratory. Their finding suggests that high degrees of team identification may enhance individual contribution
and team cooperation in environments with a public good. Likewise, in Chen and Li (2009), the authors design
a laboratory experiment that measures the effects of induced group identity on social preferences. As a result,
they show that participants are more altruistic toward an ingroup match.
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5.2 Experiment Design and Methodology
The experiment consists of four stages, and we will explain each stage in detail below. Dur-
ing the first stage, given the trust game tree shown in Figure 1, we applied the strategy method
and elicited each subject’s decisions as both Player A (“trustor”) and Player B (“trustee”)
before being assigned to a specific role in an actual matching. And then, in the end of Stage 1,
we matched subjects into pairs. During the second stage, we applied an incentive-compatible
way to elicit Player A’s initial belief about the trustworthiness of her/his matched partner i.e.
Player B. Thirdly, during the feedback stage we repeated the following procedure four times.
First, each Player A received a binary signal that indicated whether Player B was trustworthy
with a correct probability of 2/3. We then measured each Player A’s updated belief from the
noisy feedback. Overall, Player A received four independent signals, and stated their updated
beliefs after each signal. During the last stage of information purchasing, we allowed Player A
to bid for precise information about the trustworthiness of Player B.
5.2.1 Elicit Player A and B’s Strategy in a Trust Game
In this stage, we explained the two-player sequential game tree in Figure 5.1 to all subjects
by our clear instruction: there are two roles in this game, Player A and Player B. And, the
game is played sequentially, i.e. Player A moves first. If s/he chooses A1, the game ends and
each receives 200 tokens. However, if Player A chooses A2, then the game allows Player B to
make a choice between two options. As a consequence, when Player B chooses B1, each receives
300 tokens; when Player B chooses B2, then Player A receives 100 tokens whereas Player B
receives 500 tokens.
In fact, the problem faced by Player B is very simple: the only thing s/he needs to consider
is the comparison between choosing “B1” to repay the trust and choosing “B2” to betray the
trust on the assumption that Player A decided to trust in the first step. Specifically, Player B
will select “B1” if and only if s/he is a trustworthy type; otherwise, Player B will selfishly grasp
the maximum profits by selecting “B2”. On the contrary, for Player A, the decision-making
problem becomes more complicated. S/he has to do a tradeoff between a safe option “A1”
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which brings a certain outcome for sure and a risky option “A2” which brings either a gain
from a trustworthy Player B or a loss from an unreliable Player B. Nevertheless, as long as
Player A believes that Player B must be a trustworthy type in the second step, s/he is willing
to show her/his trust by selecting “A2” in the first step.
According to our design, during the first stage, each subject was required to elicit not only
her/his strategy as Player A, but also the strategy as Player B. From the strategy as Player B,
each subject was diagnosed whether to be a trustworthy type or not. On the other hand, from
the strategy as Player A, the impersonal trust level could be revealed.
Moreover, at the end of Stage 1, we matched subjects into pairs. Because we primarily
aimed to study Player A’s belief about the trustworthiness of Player B in this trust game, we
then treated all subjects as Player A from the second stage. Meanwhile, all the feedback about
Player B and final payoff received by each Player A were associated with the actual action that
her/his matched partner had chosen as Player B in Stage 1.
5.2.2 Elicit Player A’s Initial Belief about the Trustworthiness of Player B
From this stage, each subject has been already fixed in an assigned matching with someone
else. Thus, as Player A, each subject was required to estimate the probability that her/his
partner – Player B had chosen “B1” in the trust game during the first stage. That is, they
need to estimate the trustworthiness of their partners.
We applied an incentive compatible way10 that encouraged subjects to make good estima-
tions. They were presented with two following options, 1) Receive 100 tokens if his/her partner
– Player B had chosen “B1”; 2) Receive 100 tokens with probability x ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1}.
And we asked subjects for what value of x they would be indifferent between two options.
Then a random number y ∈ {0, 0.01, 0.02, . . . , 1} was drawn to compare with the threshold
value of x. As a result, subjects would be paid 100 tokens with probability y when y > x and
otherwise receive 100 tokens if their partner had chosen “B1” in Stage 1.
In order to present this crossover mechanism in a simple narrative form, we told the story as
follows: Now the computer system generates 100 different robots, and each robot is programmed
10The mechanism was described by Mobius et. al. (2011).
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to choose “B1” with a certain probability. For instance, “Robot 1” chooses strategy “B1” with
1% probability, “Robot 2” chooses “B1” with 2% probability. . . and “Robot 100” chooses “B1”
with 100% probability. One of those robots has been randomly assigned to be the potential
substitute for your actual matched partner.
We will pay you an extra 100 tokens if either your actual partner – Player B or the substitute
“Robot X” chose strategy “B1”. However, you have to tell us when we should use your actual
partner’s strategy and when we should use the substitute Robot’s strategy. As a result, if and
only if “Robot X” has a better chance of choosing “B1”, i.e. the assigned probability X% is
larger than your estimate of the probability that your actual partner has chosen “B1”, we will
use the Robot’s strategy instead of your actual partner’s; Otherwise, we will use your partner
– Player B’s strategy as usual.
5.2.3 Repeated Elicit Player A’s Updated Beliefs with a Sequence of Four Inde-
pendent Noisy Signals about Player B
During the feedback stage, as Player A, each subject received four independent noisy signals
about her/his matched partner – Player B’s strategy one by one. In each period after receiving
a new noisy signal, each Player A needed to submit her/his updated estimate of the probability
that Player B had chosen “B1”.
In fact, the noisy feedback was a binary signal of {B1, B2} with a correct probability of
2/3 to report Player B’s actual strategy during Stage 1. We used a dice rolling mechanism
to explain the signal accuracy in the experiment instruction. Suppose that Player B’s actual
strategy was written on six faces of a dice. But only four of the faces recorded the Player B’s
strategy correctly, whereas the remaining two faces showed the wrong record. For example, if
Player B had chosen “B1” indeed, the dice would have four faces with “B1” and two faces with
“B2”. And then, the computer rolled the dice and produced one result to report. Since each
of those six faces was equally likely to get, the report of Player B’s strategy by such a dice
rolling mechanism should be correct with a probability of 2/3. Hence, after receiving such a
noisy signal about Player B’s strategy, each Player A should update her/his belief and submit
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a better estimation about the trustworthiness of the partner.
Overall, this dice rolling mechanism worked repeatedly for four times, and we tracked
subjects’ belief updating followed by those four independent noisy signals. Furthermore, after
receiving a sequence of four signals, each Player A was allowed to make her/his decision in the
trust game again. According to the last updated belief about the trustworthiness of Player B,
s/he could restate the same strategy or revise the previous decision in the first stage.
5.2.4 Elicit Player A’s Willingness to Pay for Noiseless Feedback about Player B
During the final stage of purchasing perfect information, as Player A, all subjects stated
their willingness to pay for the accurate feedback whether their partners had chosen “B1” or
not. The bid price was bounded between 0 and 100 tokens. And the bidding process was a
standard application of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak method (BDM): The bid was compared
to a price determined by a random number generator. If Player A’s bid was greater than the
price, s/he needed to pay the price and then received the accurate feedback about Player B’s
strategy. If Player A’s bid was lower than (or equal to) the price, s/he paid nothing but also
received nothing.
5.3 Main Results
In May 2012, we conducted the trust experiments at Hong Kong Baptist University, and
Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing. We recruited students to participate
in our study by email, and 168 students completed the experiment online. In order to make
subjects understand the instruction better, we required them to attend the experiment in
the laboratory staffed by our experimenter. The final sample was 168 students, including 88
students from Hong Kong Baptist University, and 80 students from the university in Beijing.
Table 5.1 provides the summary statistics of the subject pool: 94% of participants in Hong
Kong were undergraduate students, but 74% of participants in Beijing were graduate. The
gender ratio of the subject pool was around 0.6, i.e. 103 females and 65 males.
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics of subject pool in the trust experiment
Hong Kong Beijing
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 88 20.95 1.41 18 24 80 23.28 1.73 20 31
Undergraduate 88 0.94 0.23 0 1 80 0.26 0.44 0 1
Female 88 0.63 0.49 0 1 80 0.6 0.49 0 1
Only Child 88 0.33 0.47 0 1 80 0.56 0.5 0 1
5.3.1 Trust and Trustworthiness
During Stage 1 and 2, the heterogeneities of trustworthiness and trust beliefs are observed
in the population. In Figure 5.2, the subjects’ initial trust levels are divided into five intervals
from low to high, and each bar represents the frequency of subjects’ initial belief included in
that divided interval. So from this distribution of initial trust, it is shown that 45% of subjects
elicited their initial belief less than 0.2, while only 13% of subjects have an initial trust belief
higher than 0.6. Moreover, consider the ratio of cooperation strategy(“A2”) and noncooperation
strategy(“A1”) within each interval, the occurrence of choosing cooperation(“A2”) increases
with the initial belief rises. Hence, it indicates that for each individual, there should exist a
cutoff point of trust belief, over which s/he will prefer to cooperate with her/his partner.
Figure 5.2 Distribution of Player A’s initial trust and strategy
The regression result in Table 5.2 verifies a positive relationship between the selection of
92
cooperation strategy and the elicited degree of initial trust. By using a simple Probit model,
the estimates in Table 5.2 confirm that, the higher initial belief is, the more likely Player A
chose “A2” in the trust game.
Table 5.2 Probit model for the occurrence of trust strategy “A2”
Regressor I II
initial belief (µ0) 0.031*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.005)
Beijing -0.669*
(0.378)
Female -0.060
(0.255)
Undergraduate -0.439
(0.378)
Only child 0.136
(0.256)
Constant -1.754*** -1.197**
(0.223) (0.469)
Observations 168 168
Standard errors in parentheses;
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
And, we also find that subjects’ own trustworthiness is correlated to their trust beliefs about
others. From the experimental data in Stage 2, the correlation coefficient between those two
factors was equal to 0.20. As a consequence, untrustworthy individuals generally had quite low
beliefs on other’s trustworthiness (with mean of 27.11, and std.dev. of 26.78), so majority of
them (i.e. 97 over 120) showed their noncooperation in the trust game. By contrast, trustworthy
type was more likely to trust others, and almost half of them (22 over 48) chose to cooperate
with their partners in the game during the first stage. Besides, the mean of their initial trust
levels equaled 39.08 (with std. dev. of 26.75), which was significantly higher than the mean of
the counterpart with low trustworthiness. This result is consistent with the finding presented
in Butler, Giuliano and Guiso (2009).11
Besides, individual trustworthiness as well as trust levels were quite different between two
11In Butler, Giuliano & Guiso (2009), the authors complement the survey evidence with experimental evidence
showing that own trustworthiness and expectations of others’ trustworthiness in a trust game are strongly
correlated.
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universities. For Players B in the trust game during Stage 1, there were 29 out of 88 (i.e.
32.95%) students in Hong Kong Baptist University chose “B1” to show their trustworthiness;
however, in Beijing, the trustworthy type of Player B dropped to 19 out of 80 (i.e. 23.75%).
Meanwhile, when subjects’ roles were switched to Player A, Hong Kong students placed more
trust on strangers than Beijing students did. The mean of elicited initial trust belief was 35.80
(with s.d. of 3.00) in Hong Kong, which was significantly greater than the mean of initial trust
in Beijing, i.e. 24.74 (with s.d. of 2.81). As a consequence, there were 31 out of 88 (i.e. 35.2%)
Players A in Hong Kong Baptist University chose “A2” to cooperate with someone else; but
only 14 out of 80 (i.e. 17.5%) Players A in Beijing chose cooperation with trust.
5.3.2 The Evolution of Trust with Noisy Feedback
During the feedback stage, we focused on how subjects’ trust beliefs evolve subsequently
with four rounds of noisy signals about the trustworthiness of their partners. As our benchmark,
we first analyze a specification model of belief updating under the assumption that Player A is
a “perfect Bayesian” who uses the correct signal distribution when applying Bayes’ rule to form
a posterior. We then compare subjects’ observed belief updating to the Bayesian benchmark.
Secondly, we discuss the information processing of a “biased Bayesian” who also uses Bayes’
rules but can choose at the very beginning how to interpret the informativeness of positive
(“B1”) and negative(“B2”) signals about the trustworthiness of others. And then, a comparison
between these two information processings will be made.
5.3.2.1 Information Processing of a “Perfect Bayesian”
There are T = 4 discrete time periods and in each period t = 1, . . . , 4 Player A receives a
binary signal st ∈ {B1, B2}. The signals are noisy as well as independent identically distributed:
a trustworthy Player B who chose “B1” in the trust game returns a “B1” signal to Player A
with probability p; and an untrustworthy Player B who chose “B2” might also return a “B1”
signal to Player A with probability q < p.12
12In our experiment, p = 2/3 and q = 1/3.
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Suppose in each period of receiving a new noisy signal, t = 1, . . . , 4, Player A has a prior
belief of µt−1 and then receives a signal st ∈ {B1, B2} to update her/his belief about the
trustworthiness of Player B. The perfect Bayesian principal should derive her/his posterior µt
using Bayes’ rule, so when s/he receives a positive signal of “B1”,
Pr(B chose B1|st = B1) = Pr(st=B1|B chose B1)·Pr(B chose B1)Pr(st=B1|B chose B1)·Pr(B chose B1)+Pr(st=B1|B chose B2)·Pr(B chose B2) .
Hence,
(µt|st = B1) = p · µ
t−1
p · µt−1 + q · (1− µt−1) (5.1)
Similarly, if Player A receives a negative signal of “B2” at period t, then the posterior belief
becomes
(µt|st = B2) = (1− p) · µ
t−1
(1− p) · µt−1 + (1− q) · (1− µt−1) (5.2)
And then, we graph Figure 5.3 to compare the actual belief updates of our subjects (in
the restricted sample)13 to perfect Bayesian updates. Categorized by five intervals of Player
A’s prior belief (i.e. µt−1 at each time t = 1, 2, 3, 4), the mean belief revision (µt − µt−1) in
response to a “B1” as well as a “B2” signal is plotted for each of the four observations of the
overall subjects. First of all, except for the case starting with very low prior beliefs, subjects
were more conservative and updated less than the perfect Bayesian when they receive a positive
signal of “B1”. By contrast, when receiving a negative signal of “B2”, subjects over-reacted to
the information than the perfect Bayesian benchmark. We will study these phenomena using
a linear regression approach next and will confirm the pattern revealed by this figure.
First of all, in order to simplify the information processing model into a linear form, we apply
a monotonic transformation on both sides of Equation 5.1 by the logistic function logit(x) =
ln( x1−x), then we have
logit(µt|st = B1) = logit(µt−1) + ln(p
q
) (5.3)
13An important concern in the stage of belief updating is whether subjects understood the description of the
signal accuracy and then submitted their true beliefs correctly. During the experiment, they were free to report
beliefs inconsistent with perfect Bayesian updating, such as updates in the wrong direction and neutral updates
(i.e. reporting the same belief as in the previous round). Except for a high proportion of 17% subjects updated
their beliefs in the wrong direction in the first round, the number of subjects who updated in the wrong direction
declines dramatically and maintains at a low proportion during the following three rounds (6% in Round 2, 7%
in Round 3, 6% in Round 4). Consequently, in order to exclude subjects who misunderstood or ignored the
experimental instructions from the data of belief updating, for most of our analysis we use a restricted sample
of subjects who didn’t update the beliefs in the wrong direction during all four rounds, so this leaves us with 57
Hong Kong students and 61 Beijing students.
95
Figure 5.3 Perfect Bayesian updating vs. actual belief updating
Likewise, after taking the monotonic transformation by the same logistic function logit(x) =
ln( x1−x), Equation 5.2 is rewritten as
logit(µt|st = B2) = logit(µt−1) + ln(1− p
1− q ) (5.4)
Let λP = ln(
p
q ) and λN = ln(
1−p
1−q ) denote the log-likelihood ratios, i.e. informativeness of
positive and negative signals, then the vector
−→
λ = (λP , λN ) summarizes the signal structure.
Therefore, we can use the following equation to express a perfect Bayesian belief updating:
logit(µt) = logit(µt−1) + I(st = B1) · λP + I(st = B2) · λN (5.5)
5.3.2.2 Information Processing of a “Biased Bayesian”
Compared to a perfect Bayesian, a biased Bayesian determined by her/himself how to
interpret the informativeness of positive(“B1”) and negative(“B2”) signals during the feedback
stage. Formally, assume the biased Bayesian chose to believe that the log-likelihood ratio of
a positive signal is λ̂P > 0 and that of a negative signal λ̂N < 0, along with an initial belief
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µ̂0. The vector
−→̂
λ = (λ̂P , λ̂N ) thus summarizes how the biased Bayesian interprets the signal
structure. Hence, as a biased Bayesian, Player A’s posterior belief µ̂t evolves according to
Bayes’ rule but using her/his distinctively chosen interpretations:
logit(µ̂t) = logit(µ̂t−1) + I(st = B1) · λ̂P + I(st = B2) · λ̂N (5.6)
In addition, we also define the parameters βP =
λ̂P
λP
and βN =
λ̂N
λN
as the biased Bayesian’s
relative responsiveness to positive and negative signals, respectively; we will directly estimate
these parameters in our experiment.
Now we can use the following linear empirical specification for a (possibly biased) Bayesian:
logit(µ̂i
t) = δ · logit(µ̂it−1) + βP · λP · I(sit = B1) + βN · λN · I(sit = B2) + it (5.7)
This empirical model allows us to test for the core properties of Bayesian updating as well
as measure the biased responsiveness to positive and negative information. According to our
design, given p = 1 − q = 2/3, we have λP = −λN = ln(2). The coefficient δ captures the
persistence of prior information; and the coefficients βP and βN capture relative responsiveness
to positive and negative information, which also help us to distinguish perfect and biased
Bayesian. A perfect Bayesian is fully responsive to positive and negative information (βP =
βN = 1). In contrast, for example, a biased Bayesian is less responsive to positive information
if βP < 1, and is more responsive to negative information if βN > 1. Thus, it also leads an
asymmetric respond to different types of feedback if βP < 1 < βN .
We present round-by-round and pooled OLS estimates in Table 5.3. First of all, although the
coefficient δ on prior logit-beliefs was presumed to be 1 for both perfect and biased Bayesians,
OLS estimate for δ is close to but significantly less than unity. Secondly, the regression results
provide strong evidence to confirm that subjects respond differently to positive and negative
information as suggested in Figure 5.3. The OLS estimate of βP is 0.652, which is substantially
and significantly less than unity; by contrast, the estimate of βN is 1.425, which is substantially
and significantly greater than unity. Moreover, the difference βP − βN is consistently negative,
and significantly different form zero across all rounds as well as for the pooled specification.
In addition, we have also considered the influence of university, gender, only child, and
undergraduate status on individual belief updating. By applying the similar OLS model but
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Table 5.3 Asymmetric belief updating
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds Unrestricted
δ 0.748*** 0.800*** 0.854*** 0.927*** 0.829*** 0.774***
(0.049) (0.053) (0.042) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022)
βP 0.723*** 0.926*** 0.157 0.588*** 0.652*** 0.358***
(0.251) (0.253) (0.220) (0.167) (0.115) (0.108)
βN 1.534*** 1.318*** 1.436*** 1.272*** 1.425*** 1.148***
(0.237) (0.235) (0.182) (0.147) (0.103) (0.094)
Pr(δ = 1) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.000 0.000
Pr(βP = 1) 0.271 0.770 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.000
Pr(βN = 1) 0.026 0.179 0.018 0.067 0.000 0.117
Pr(βP = βN ) 0.036 0.306 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
Observations 118 118 118 118 472 672
R-squared 0.805 0.798 0.88 0.946 0.859 0.770
Notes:
1. Each column is a separate regression.
2. The outcome in all regressions is the log posterior odds ratio.
δ is the coefficient on the log prior odds ratio;
βP and βN are coefficients for positive and negative signals, respectively.
Perfect Bayesian updating corresponds to βP = βN = 1.
3. Estimation samples are restricted to subjects whose beliefs were always within (0, 1).
4. Columns 1-5 restrict to subjects who never updated their beliefs in the wrong direction;
Column 6 includes subjects violating this condition.
5. Columns 1-4 examine updating in each round separately;
Column 5 and 6 pool the 4 rounds of updating.
6. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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adding the differential estimates for those factors (i.e. βfactorP/N −βP/N ), it turns out none of them
is significantly different from zero. Hence, those factors are not correlated with the asymmetry
pattern of information processing.
5.3.3 The Willingness to Pay for Perfect Information
At the end of Stage 3, each Player A had a chance to rechoose her/his strategy based on
her/his updated belief after receiving the overall four signals. So, this latest belief should be
treated as the prior belief when subjects calculate the expected value of a noiseless signal about
their partners. Based on different levels of this prior belief, we divide subjects into 5 ranges from
low trust to high trust, and Figure 5.4 indicates the average bid price within those five ranges.
Intuitively, the willingness to pay for perfect information should be equal to its expected benefit
for Player A. Therefore, the value of the noiseless signal is quiet small in both extreme cases
that Player A’s belief is either too low or too high. Meanwhile, as Player A’s belief is moving
towards the cutoff point,14 the value of perfect information is increasing. Thus, as illustrated
in Figure 5.4, the mean of willingness to pay increases first, and then decreases with a peak
around the prior belief interval between 40% and 60%. In one word, the willingness to pay
for perfect information is determined by individual last updated belief after noisy information
processing.
Figure 5.4 Distribution of willingness to pay for noiseless signal
14The cutoff point is a threshold of individual trust belief, over which Player A prefers to cooperate with trust.
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Furthermore, according to the tendency of change in willingness to pay, it motivates us to
generate a piecewise form of a empirical specification as follows:
If subject i ultimately decided noncooperation at time T = 4 (i.e. s/he rechose “A1” as the
strategy after updating the belief by four noisy signals), we have
WTP (µ̂i
T ) = α1 + γ1 · µ̂iT + ϕi (5.8)
On the contrary, if subject j decided to cooperate at time T = 4 (i.e. s/he rechose “A2” as
the strategy after updating the belief by noisy feedback), then
WTP (µ̂j
T ) = α2 + γ2 · µ̂jT + ψj (5.9)
Table 5.4 presents the OLS estimates for all coefficients. The regression results are consistent
with our economic intuitions. The coefficient γ̂1 > 0 suggests that the bid price is positively
related to the degree of trust for those players who prefer noncooperation; in contrast, the
coefficient γ̂2 < 0 implies a negative correlation between the willingness to pay and prior belief
when the degree of trust is above the cutoff value. Moreover, everyone would like to pay a
positive amount for the noiseless feedback regardless of her/his prior belief. Even for those
subjects with extremely low or high beliefs, rather than paying nothing, they would like to bid
a positive price for the perfect information. So, this amount can be regarded as their evaluation
for the truth, which is quite irrelevant to the expected loss or gain from the game per se.
5.4 Theoretical Model
In our experiment on trust belief evolving with noisy feedback, we have found that the
subjects updated their beliefs as biased Bayesians and always weighed negative signals much
more than positive ones. In this section we show that such asymmetry arises naturally in a
theoretical model. We first develop a model to organize our experimental findings in a unified
manner and then provide more discussions on optimally biased trust updating as well as some
refutable theoretical predictions.
Consider a trustor-trustee relationship, assume each trustor is paired with a trustee whose
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Table 5.4 Willingness to Pay for a noiseless signal
Chose “A1” Chose “A2”
I II I II
updated belief (µ4) 0.275** 0.345** -0.256* -0.342*
(0.124) (0.166) (0.134) (0.198)
Beijng 0.845 -9.764
(7.119) (16.43)
µ4 ×Beijing -0.184 0.172
(0.255) (0.300)
constant 34.000*** 33.750*** 55.810*** 61.500***
(3.524) (5.212) (7.752) (12.730)
Observations 123 123 45 45
R-squared 0.039 0.045 0.078 0.086
Standard errors in parentheses;∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
trustworthiness type is the private information for the trustee but unknown for the trustor.15
At time t = 0, each trustor has a subjective prior belief µ0 ∈ [0, 1] that s/he is paired with a
“trustworthy” partner.
Next, there are T discrete time periods and in each period t = 1, . . . , T the trustor can
receive a binary signal st ∈ {P,N}.16 The signals are noisy as well as independent identically
distributed: a “trustworthy” trustee returns a positive signal “P” to the trustor with probability
p; and a “untrustworthy” trustee can return a positive signal “P” with probability q < p.
Finally, in the end of last period t = T , the trustor has to make a decision between coop-
eration with the trustee and non-cooperation. Non-cooperation gives payoff 0. On the other
hand, if the trustor chooses cooperation, s/he can gain 1 as the benefit from working with a
“trustworthy” partner but will lose c > 0 if s/he wrongly cooperates with an “untrustworthy”
partner.17 The timeline of this model is described in Figure 5.5.
15In general, assume there are only two types of trustees: “trustworthy” and “untrustworthy”. Take our
experiment as an example, in the trust game, Player B who chose B1 is diagnosed as a “trustworthy” type, and
Player B who chose “B2” is diagnosed as a “untrustworthy” type.
16In our experimental design, a positive signal “P” is denoted by strategy “B1”, and a negative signal “N” is
denoted by strategy “B2”.
17Compared to the the trust game we used in our experiment, here we build a trustor-trustee model in a
more generalized setting. Actually, we can take our experimental game as a specific example for this theoretical
model. Therefore, for the trustor (i.e. Player A), let the non-cooperation payoff i.e. 200 tokens be the reference
point, then the marginal payoff from cooperating with a trustworthy parter equals (300 − 200) = 100 tokens,
whereas the marginal loss of a wrong cooperation is (100−200) = −100 tokens. So, if we normalize the marginal
benefit of 100 tokens to 1, then the cost after normalization also equals 1. That is, we have c = 1 in this case.
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Figure 5.5 Timeline of the trust model
Apparently, the trustor will cooperate if and only if the expected profit of cooperation is
positive, which means µ
T ·1+(1−µT )·(−c) = µT ·(1+c)−c > 0. In other words, the trustor only
cooperates when being sufficiently sure that the trustee is trustworthy (i.e. µ
T
> c1+c = C˜).
As a result, the ultimate success of cooperation crucially depends on how the trustor updates
her/his posterior beliefs from the noisy feedback.
Based on the specification model of belief updating for a possibly biased Bayesian, i.e.
Equation 5.7, we have derived in the previous section of experiment, so here in our theoretical
model, we can formulate the similar equation to summarize the information processing of a
possibly biased Bayesian as follows:
logit(µ
t
) = logit(µt−1) + I(st = P ) · βPλP + I(st = N) · βNλN (5.10)
where λP = ln(
p
q ) and λN = ln(
1−p
1−q ) denote the informativeness of positive and negative
signals by Bayes rule. Meanwhile, βP and βN are individual relative responsiveness to signals
when using Bayesian updating as the benchmark. So, a perfect Bayesian always chooses βP =
βN = 1.
In addition, denote by StP (S
t
N ) the number of P (N) signals the trustor has received by time
t. We can easily deduce that a possibly biased Bayesian posterior belief µt satisfies
logit(µt) = logit(µ0) + StP · βPλP + StN · βNλN (5.11)
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The number of StP (S
t
N ) received by the trustor is a random variable that depends on the
actual trustworthiness type of the trustee. According to the property of noisy signals drawn
from a well-defined distribution, the ex-ante expectation of trustor’s logit-belief µt if s/he was
actually paired with a “trustworthy” partner is:
E[logit(µt)|trustee is trustworthy] = logit(µ0) + t · [p · βPλP + (1− p) · βNλN ] (5.12)
Similarly, the ex-ante expectation of trustor’s logit-belief µt if being paired with a “untrust-
worthy” partner is:
E[logit(µt)|trustee is untrustworthy] = logit(µ0) + t · [q · βPλP + (1− q) · βNλN ] (5.13)
Furthermore, the variances of trustor’s logit-beliefs when encountering two types of trustees
are derived, respectively:
V ar[logit(µt)|trustee is trustworthy] = t · p(1− p) · [βPλP − βNλN ]2 (5.14)
V ar[logit(µt)|trustee is untrustworthy] = t · q(1− q) · [βPλP − βNλN ]2 (5.15)
Figure 5.6(a) and (b) graph the trustors’ information processing with different initial beliefs,
in which the evolutions of logit-beliefs are illustrated as function of time. In particular, we
consider the benchmark of perfect Bayesian updating in two graphs. Equation 5.12 indicates
that the ex-ante expectation of logit(µt) increases over time if the trustor is actually paired
with a “trustworthy” partner, whereas Equation 5.13 implies that the expectation decreases
over time if the trustee is “untrustworthy” type. Hence, no matter where the initial logit-
belief logit(µ0) is located18, the red line show the evolving mean logit-belief when the trustee
type is “trustworthy” and the blue line show the evolving mean logit belief when the trustee
type is “untrustworthy”. In fact, the trustor will decide to cooperate with the trustee at time
T if and only if her/his logit-belief is higher than the cutoff value of logit(C˜).19 As more
and more information received by the trustor, the mean logit-beliefs of “trustworthy” and
18In Figure 5.6(a), the trustor has a relatively high initial logit-belief that is above the cutoff point for
cooperation; In Figure 5.6(b), the trustor has a quite low initial logit-belief that is less than the threshold for
cooperation.
19Note that C˜ = c
1+c
∈ (0, 1) , so logit(C˜) = ln( C˜
1−C˜
) = ln(c)
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“untrustworthy” partners converge to +∞ and −∞ at rate t while the standard deviation
increases only at rate
√
t. Therefore, the trustor will gradually reduce the probability to make
a wrong cooperation decision as T →∞, because the probability that her/his logit-belief is on
the correct side of the cutoff converges to 1 in each state.
On the other hand, in Figure 5.6, we also discuss the effect of initial beliefs on the final
cooperation decision by the comparison between (a) and (b). As shown in subfigure (a), a
trustor with high initial trust level is very likely to always trust and cooperate with her/his
trustee if s/he doesn’t have enough feedback periods to update her/his belief. For example,
given that the trustor has been paired with an “untrustworthy” partner, and if the noisy
signalling process stops at a certain period before τa, then the probable outcome for the trustor
is a loss from trusting and cooperating with that untrustworthy person. By contrast, subfigure
(b) implies that a trustor with low initial belief might always refuse to cooperate with the
trustee if the number of feedback periods is less than τb. As a result, the trustor will miss out
the benefit from cooperating with a “trustworthy” partner. To sum up, a trustor with high
initial trust always needs more time to learn from negative signals about an “untrstworthy”
type while a trustor with low initial trust needs more feedback to identify a “trustworthy”
partner. But the influence of different initial beliefs on trustors’ final cooperation decisions will
diminish as T →∞.
More importantly, rather than assuming the initial belief µ0 can be any real number between
0 and 1, in our model, trustors’ initial beliefs are restricted to be higher than the threshold
for cooperation i.e. C˜. In other words, there is an important assumption for our theory that
everyone starts with cooperation in the absence of feedback. Actually, this assumption comes
from the compelling findings in evolutionary biology research on human cooperation and mu-
tual trust. For example, in Rand et al. (2012), the authors argued that cooperating with trust
is human instinct through natural selection, because cooperative heuristics are developed in
daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. And by providing numerous convinc-
ing evidence, they finally concluded that people’s first intuitive response is always to select
cooperation and that too much thinks encourage selfishness which may undermine their coop-
erative impulses. Besides, consider the simple “trust game” we used in our experiment, while
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Figure 5.6 Evolution of perfect Bayesian logit-beliefs
rational self-interest trustor should not trust and trustee should not be trustworthy in one-shot
anonymous interactions, but we found both trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with
trustworthy actions in our data. Thanks to the study of Manapat et al. (2012), this seemingly
irrational altruistic behavior has been explained to be a reasonable outcome of social learning
in an evolutionary framework. Therefore, it suggests that humans are hard-wired to trust and
cooperate to some extent. As a consequence, the following question we are interested in is: if
Nature pushes us towards trusting others at the beginning, how do we optimally update our
beliefs in the trustworthiness of others by learning from noisy feedback?
The ultimate objective of belief updating is to distinguish the untrustworthy partners from
trustworthy ones. Since people intrinsically tend to more cooperation with trust, an optimal
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information processing must help trustors to overcome defects of “naive” trust in strangers
and especially withdraw their trusts from untrustworthy partners with rational reflection and
prospective reasoning. Hence, if learning from noisy feedbacks efficiently, trustors should only
cooperate with trustworthy partners and also prevent any costly cooperation with untrustwor-
thy type.
Proposition 5.1: Given an initial belief µ
0
> C˜, the optimal belief updating
process should be a biased Bayesian with βP < 1 < βN .
The intuition for this result can be illustrated graphically by the comparison between the
benchmark of a perfect Bayesian and a biased Bayesian belief updating in Figure 5.7. Specifi-
cally, the solid lines denote the evolving mean logit-beliefs for a perfect Bayesian, and the dotted
lines graph the mean logit-beliefs evolve in an asymmetric manner that we have observed in
our trust experiment, i.e. with βP < 1 < βN . Hence, compared with a perfect Bayesian, who
responds to positive and negative signals in a symmetric way20, a biased Bayesian processes
information asymmetrically: s/he overreacts to negative signals but underreacts to positive
signals at the same time. When such a biased Bayesian is actually paired with a “trustworthy”
partner, then her/his logit-belief will stay in a neighborhood around the initial level for quite a
long time regardless of how many positive signals s/he receives. So it’s very hard for a trustee
to gain more trust from this trustor even s/he is a trustworthy type indeed. However, since
the initial belief is high enough to achieve a cooperation unconditionally, the trustor will keep
a relatively high trust belief and maintain the cooperation with a trustworthy partner after
receiving more feedback. On the contrary, if the trustee is “untrustworthy”, the trustor’s belief
will decrease dramatically as the response for negative signals from that trustee. Thus, the
trustor will lose her/his trust in an untrustworthy partner very quickly even though s/he has a
high initial belief as well as a strong tendency to cooperation. Undoubtedly, once the trustor’s
belief falls down to the threshold, s/he will wisely choose non-cooperation as the final decision.
To sum up, the underreaction to positive signals hardly affect the trustor’s successful coop-
eration with a trustworthy partner, but the overreaction to negative feedback can definitely
20In fact, the perfect Bayesian reacts two types of signals symmetrically if and only if the noisy signalling
structure satisfies p + q = 1. For example, in our experimental design, p = 2/3, and q = 1/3.
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improve her/his efficiency of identifying the untrustworthy type to avoid a wrong cooperation.
Although people intuitively tend to trust with high initial beliefs, for the sake of judgment
precision on the trustworthiness of others, the biased Bayesian updating is demonstrated as
a counterbalance to generate relatively reasonable trust levels in the end. Hence, based on
the complementary relationship between the initial trust and the information processing in
the optimally biased belief updating, the increase in initial belief should be offset by the more
asymmetric updating process. So, we have the following prediction.
Figure 5.7 Perfect Bayesian updating vs. optimally biased Bayesian updating with
βP < 1 < βN
Proposition 5.2: Given initial beliefs µ
0
2 > µ
0
1 > C˜, then the optimal belief
updating processes should satisfy βP2 < βP1 < 1 < βN1 < βN2.
Figure 5.8 illustrates how the optimally biased Bayesian adjusts the belief updating in
response to a change in the initial belief µ
0
. First of all, as the baseline, given that individual
trust belief starts with µ
0
1 > C˜, we have verified in Proposition 1, that instead of a perfect
Bayesian, an optimally biased Bayesian should overweigh negative signals relative to positive
ones. This is the best way to counter-balanced the disadvantage of “naive” trust at the very
beginning. Next, suppose the initial belief rises up to a higher level µ
0
2, then we need to
figure out how the optimally biased Bayesian updating changes. According to the comparative
analysis in the graph, there is no doubt that trustors should choose a more asymmetric manner
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to update their beliefs: the degree of overreaction to negative feedback as well as the extent
of underreaction to positive feedback must be strengthened at the same time. Otherwise, if
a trustor still keeps the same information processing, because of a greater initial trust belief,
the possibility of this naive trustor trusting an untrustworthy partner is increased significantly,
and then it is more likely for her/him to suffer a loss from a wrong cooperation in the end.
Figure 5.8 Higher initial belief but more asymmetric updating
5.4.1 Value of Perfect Information
Now we analyze how trustors value noiseless information about the trustworthiness of their
trustees. Suppose in the end, just after receiving the last signal in period T but before making
the final cooperation decision, a trustor with subjective belief µT has an opportunity to purchase
a perfectly informative signal of the trustee’s type. To derive the trustor’s willingness to pay,
WTP (µT , c), the discussion should be divided into two cases:
5.4.1.1 WTP (µ̂T , c) of Trustors with High Trust
In the absence of perfect information, after receiving the last noisy feedback in period T ,
trustor i decides to cooperate if and only if her/his expected profit of cooperation is positive,
i.e. µTi · 1 + (1− µTi ) · (−c) > 0⇒ µTi > c1+c = C˜ ∈ (0, 1)
Next, if trustor i is allowed to purchase a perfect signal before making the final decision,
her/his expected payoff becomes: µTi · 1 + (1 − µTi ) · 0, where the first term represents the
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expected payoff when s/he receives a positive signal and decides to cooperate in the end, while
the second term denotes the expected payoff when s/he receives a negative signal and decides
not to cooperate.
Hence, we can now define trustor i’s willingness to pay for the perfect information as follows:
WTP (µTi , c) = [µ
T
i · 1 + (1− µTi ) · 0]− [µTi · 1 + (1− µTi ) · (−c)] = (1− µTi ) · c (5.16)
Moreover, since
∂WTP (µTi ,c)
∂µTi
= −c < 0, the higher the trustor’s belief is, the less s/he
concerns about the extra information. On the other hand,
∂WTP (µTi ,c)
∂c = 1 − µTi > 0, so the
trustor would like to pay more if the opportunity cost of wrong cooperation is relatively high.
5.4.1.2 WTP (µ̂T , c) of Trustors with Low Trust
Similar to the first case we have discussed above, at the end of period T before purchasing
an extra noiseless signal, trustor j prefers non-cooperation if and only if her/his expected profit
of cooperation is non-positive, i.e. µTj · 1 + (1− µTj ) · (−c) ≤ 0 ⇒ µTj ≤ c1+c = C˜. As a result,
her/his expected profit equals 0 because s/he will not cooperate at all.
Next, if trustor j can purchase a perfect signal before making the final decision, her/his
expected profit becomes: µTj · 1 + (1− µTj ) · 0.
Hence, trustor j’s willingness to pay for the perfect information can be defined as follows:
WTP (µTj , c) = [µ
T
j · 1 + (1− µTj ) · 0]− 0 = µTj (5.17)
Opposite to the first case,
∂WTP (µTj ,c)
∂µTj
= 1−c > 0 indicates that the lower the trustor’s belief
is, the less s/he concerns about the extra information. In addition, we have
∂WTP (µTj ,c)
∂c = 0,
the willingness to pay is not affected by the opportunity cost of cooperation because the trustor
has already preferred non-cooperation to cooperation.
To sum up, the value of willingness to pay can be defined in the piecewise function as
follows:
WTP (µT , c) =

µT if µT ≤ c1+c
(1− µT ) · c if µT > c1+c
(5.18)
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Since the reference point of C˜ is monotonically increasing with cost value c, given C˜ = c1+c ,
then we have c = C˜
1−C˜ . So, the piecewise function above can be rewritten as:
WTP (µT , C˜) =

µT if µT ≤ C˜
(1− µT ) · C˜
1−C˜ if µ
T > C˜
(5.19)
We illustrate this piecewise function in Figure 5.9. As shown in the graph, all trustors with
beliefs between 0 and 1 would like to pay a positive amount for the noiseless information. Then,
given a fixed cost of c > 0, the willingness to pay for a noiseless signal is increasing with the low
belief approaching to the reference point C˜ on left, and then the demand for perfect information
is decreasing with the trust belief rising up continually. Besides, as the opportunity cost of c
rises up, the maximum of willingness to pay (i.e. C˜) does increase correspondingly, because
it’s worthwhile to pay more for avoiding an “expensive” mistake on cooperation decision. Last
but not least, compared with the empirical results in previous section of experiment, subjects’
willingness to pay varied in the same manner as we describe in this theoretical model.
Figure 5.9 Willingness to pay for noiseless feedback
5.5 Follow-up Experiment on Social Identity
In the theoretical model of trust belief updating from noisy feedback, we have claimed
in Proposition 5.2, that greater initial trust must be counter-balanced by more asymmetric
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updating in terms of optimally biased Bayesian information processing. As the supplement
for the graphic interpretation in Figure 5.8, we design a follow-up experiment to examine this
theoretical hypothesis by actual experimental data.
5.5.1 Experimental Design: In-group vs. Out-group
In order to test the effect of an increase in initial belief on the asymmetry of belief updating,
we utilize the influence of social identity information on individual behaviors to artificially sort
trustors’ initial beliefs into two ranges. During the follow-up experiment, all participants were
randomly matched again to play a new trust game. The game structure was still the same,
but different from the previous game with completely anonymous matching, each subject could
know some identity information about her/his partner before playing the new trust game, that
is, everyone was informed of which university her/his partner came from. In fact, we recruited
the students from two universities, i.e. Hong Kong Baptist University and Central University
of Finance and Economics, Beijing. By randomly assigning those students into two different
treatment groups, half of the subjects were informed that they were matched with someone
who came from a different university, while the other half were told that they were paired with
students from the same university as themselves. And then, the whole procedure from Stage 1
to 4 was repeated again.21
According to the social identity theory, the matches between two subjects from the same
university can be defined as the in-group relations, whereas the matches between two subjects
from different universities are regarded as out-group interactions. We first randomly matched
the subjects from two different groups, and then prime them on the social identity of their
counterpart. Hence, according to the theory of in-group favoritism, subjects are expected to
show higher initial trust for an in-group member than an out-group member. Furthermore,
we tracked how subjects’ update their beliefs in response to a sequence of noisy signals about
the trustworthiness of their partners, so the comparison between in-group and out-group belief
updating documents the influence of social identity on the trust evolution in a setting with
21Stage 1. Elicit Player A and B’s strategy in a trust game; 2. Elicit Player A’s initial belief; 3. Elicit Player
A’s belief updating from a sequence of four noisy signals; 4. Elicit Player A’s willingness to pay for noiseless
feedback.
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noisy feedback.
5.5.2 In-group Trust vs. Out-group Trust
First of all, compared with subjects’ strategies in the previous trust game with completely
anonymous matching, most of Player B (i.e. 85%) didn’t change their trustworthiness type after
receiving the social identity information in this new trust game.22 In general, the individual
trustworthiness was not significantly influenced by the social identity information, so Player B
treated the trustor in the same way no matter the trustor was an in-group member or out-group
member.
However, both Player A’s initial belief and the belief updating had remarkable changes
due to the intervention of social identity. Since we randomly assigned the subjects into two
different treatments at the beginning of the new game, then 82 subjects were matched with
an in-group member, while the rest 86 subjects were matched with an out-group partner.
Figure 5.10(a) shows the distribution of initial beliefs in an ingroup member and an outgroup
member, respectively. The initial trust level are substantially different between two treatments.
For instance, there were only 26% of subjects placed an initial belief that is greater than 40(%)
in an outgroup counterpart; but, for an ingroup matching, the percentage was doubled so that
51% of subjects placed an initial trust belief that is greater than 40(%). In addition, if we
consider the observations separately in two universities as shown in Figure 5.10(b) and (c), the
difference between ingroup trust and outgroup trust was still significant. However, the gap
shrank in Beijing. More precisely, the mean of initial belief in an outgroup partner was 31.5
in Hong Kong and 26.1 in Beijing. On the other hand, the mean initial trust in an ingroup
member was 44.2 in Hong Kong and 33.3 in Beijing.
Next, we run a simple OLS regression to measure the effects of social identity information:
the dependent variable is the change in Player A’s initial belief compared to her/his initial
belief in the anonymous matching baseline, then independent variables include the ingroup and
22For those Player B who matched with an in-group member, 9 subjects out of 82 switched their strategy from
“B2” to “B1” to increase their trustworthiness for an in-group trustor. By contrast, for those with an out-group
matching treatment, there were 5 subjects out of 86 switched the strategy from “B1” to “B2”, which reduced
their trustworthiness in the new game.
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outgroup treatment dummies and we also test the effect of university dummy. The results in
Table 5.5 verifies the in-group favoritism by having a significantly positive coefficient for ingroup
treatment dummy. However, although the coefficient for the outgroup treatment dummy is
negative, but it is not significantly different from zero. Moreover, compared to Hong Kong
students, the coefficients of interaction variables indicate that Beijing students would like to
place more trust in an out-group member while slightly reduce the in-group trust, but both
tendencies are not significant.
Table 5.5 In-group trust vs. Out-group trust
Regressor I II
Ingroup 8.098*** 8.238**
(2.666) (3.732)
Outgroup -1.256 -4.13
(2.603) (3.566)
Ingroup×Bejing -0.288
(5.343)
Outgroup×Bejing 6.18
(5.228)
Observations 168 168
R-squared 0.054 0.062
Standard errors in parentheses;
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
Furthermore, when all the subjects updated their trust beliefs from a sequence of noisy
signals, we then found that Players A were more asymmetric in reacting to feedback about
in-group trustees if compared to anonymous matching baseline. In Figure 5.11(a), we make a
comparison between the belief updates of subjects with ingroup treatment in the second trust
game and their previous belief updates in the first trust game. Categorized by five intervals
of individual prior beliefs about the the trustworthiness of Player B, the mean belief revisions
in response to a “B1” and “B2” signal are plotted for each of the four observations of the
overall subjects. It is obvious that the subjects overreact to negative feedback and underreact
to positive feedback about in-group members. On the contrary, also take the belief updating
in the anonymous trust as the baseline, Players A seemed to increase their responsiveness to
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positive signals if they were informed of being matched with an out-group member, which is
illustrated in Figure 5.11(b).
This within-subject comparison motivates the following empirical specification for a biased
Bayesian:
logit(µ̂i
t) = δ · logit(µ̂it−1) + βP · λP I(sit = B1) + βN · λNI(sit = B2)+
(δIngroup − δ) · logit(µ̂it−1) · I(i receives ingroup treatment)+
(βIngroupP − βP ) · λP I(sit = B1) · I(i receives ingroup treatment)+
(βIngroupN − βN ) · λNI(sit = B2) · I(i receives ingroup treatment)+
(δOutgroup − δ) · logit(µ̂it−1) · I(i receives outgroup treatment)+
(βOutgroupP − βP ) · λP I(sit = B1) · I(i receives outgroup treatment)+
(βOutoupN − βN ) · λNI(sit = B2) · I(i receives outgroup treatment) + it
(5.20)
Here, we pool the updating data from both feedback stages of anonymous matching baseline
and matches with social identity information. So (δIn/Outgroup − δ), (βIn/OutgroupP − βP ) and
(β
In/Outgroup
N − βN ) are the differential responses attributable to receiving ingroup treatment
or outgroup treatment. These coefficients tell us whether subjects process information differ-
ently between anonymous matching and treatments with social identity information. Table 5.6
reports the regression results.
Firstly, the baseline coefficients are similar to the estimates in Table 5.3, which restricts to
the belief updating data in the first game only.
Secondly, because we cannot reject δIn/Outgroup − δ = 0 (Column I), it indicates sub-
jects don’t change the way to weigh prior information after receiving social identity informa-
tion. However, their relative responsiveness to signals are influenced by the social identity:
βIngroupP −βP is both negative and significant, which means the subjects become less responsive
to positive feedback when it concerns the trustworthiness of an ingroup member; by con-
trast, when they receive negative signals from the ingroup member, a significantly positive
βIngroupN − βN verifies the overreaction becomes even worse than the asymmetric updating in
the baseline. On the other hand, however, the effects of out-group identity on βP and βN are
not significant. Therefore, in a word, the degree of trust between ingroup members are very
likely to be undermined by negative signals, while this strong effect is hardly to be offset by
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Table 5.6 Ingroup vs. Outgroup belief updating
I II III
δ 0.875*** 0.873*** 0.874***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.020)
βP 0.560*** 0.555*** 0.702***
(0.108) (0.101) (0.125)
βN 1.272*** 1.276*** 1.406***
(0.099) (0.092) (0.114)
δIngroup − δ -0.002
(0.036)
βIngroupP − βP -0.307* -0.303* -0.404*
(0.178) (0.161) (0.211)
βIngroupN − βN 0.311* 0.307** 0.346*
(0.165) (0.149) (0.187)
δOutgroup − δ -0.006
(0.037)
βOutgroupP − βP 0.021 0.032 -0.225
(0.175) (0.158) (0.196)
βOutgroupN − βN -0.06 -0.074 -0.271
(0.179) (0.152) (0.184)
Observations 768 768 496
R-squared 0.902 0.902 0.888
Notes:
1. Each column is a separate regression.
2. Estimation samples are restricted to subjects whose beliefs were always within (0, 1);
and never updated in the wrong directions during the experiment.
3. Columns 3 restricts to subjects who received the same sequence of signals in two games.
4. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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plenty of positive feedback. So compared to the trust between absolute strangers, the trust is
easier to build up with the help of ingroup association, but it’s relatively difficult to maintain
the trust when encountering negative shocks. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, for
in-group matches, subjects choose to process noisy information in a more asymmetric manner
during the feedback stage to counter-balance their greater initial beliefs at the beginning.
Lastly, Figure 5.12 graphs subjects’ demand for perfect information either from ingroup
partner or outgroup partner. Similar to the distribution of willingness to pay in Figure 9, when
we divide subjects’ updated beliefs at last feedback period into five ranges from low to high, for
both treatment groups, the mean of willingness to pay is increasing first and then decreasing,
with a peak around the trust belief interval between 40(%) and 60(%). Hence, the distribution
of willingness to pay is again consistent with our theoretical model.
5.6 Conclusions
This study aims to open the black box of trust updating between strangers in a setting with
noisy feedback about the trustworthiness of others. We first examine how players manage their
trust in others by a laboratory experiment. In a two-player sequential trust game, trustors’
trust levels as well as the trustworthiness of trustees are measured. Then with four rounds of
subsequent noisy feedback about trustworthiness types of trustees, we clearly separate the role
of priors and signals in shaping trustors’ posterior beliefs during the belief updating process.
The experimental findings do not only soundly reject the hypothesis that subjects use perfect
Bayesian updating, but also document that subjects process information in an asymmetric way:
they react more to negative feedback rather than positive.
Next, we build a simple theory of optimally biased information processing to support our
empirical results: given that people intuitively tend to trust others with high initial beliefs, the
biased Bayesian updating acts as a counterbalance to adjust individual beliefs properly and
then improve the efficiency of mutual beneficial cooperation in the end. So, we claim that there
should be a complementary relationship between initial trust and optimal belief updating by
noisy feedback.
Consequently, an important implication for our theory is that greater initial trust must be
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counter-balanced by more asymmetric belief updating. We test this hypothesis by designing a
following-up experiment involved with social identity. We match participants from two different
universities (in Hong Kong and Beijing, respectively) and prime them on the social identity of
their counterpart. As we have expected, compared to anonymous matching baseline, subjects’
average initial trust level and asymmetry of information processing are significantly stronger
for in-group matches, which provides solid empirical evidence to support our theoretical model.
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Figure 5.10 In-group initial trust vs. Out-group initial trust
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Figure 5.11 In-group trust updating vs. Out-group trust updating
Figure 5.12 Distribution of willingness to pay for noiseless feedback: In-group vs. Out-group
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In summary, although our research touches multiple topics in experimental economics, all
of them revolve around individual decision-making under uncertainty, that is, the uncertainty
of payoffs and choices made by others. Hence, we investigate how people make decisions based
on their non-cognitive characteristics as well as their expectations about other’s behavior in
the interacted workplace. Moreover, by introducing the feedback mechanism, we clearly see
the ways that people process the received information to update their beliefs and then change
their actual decisions.
Our first labor market experiment uses various simple but efficient experimental methods
to elicit individual productivity response to various team-based incentives as well as their
preferences for different types of compensation. In order to probe the importance of non-
cognitive characteristics on individual behavior, we also use a rich battery of diagnostic games
to elicit those characteristics including risk attitude, social preference and self-confidence. As
a result, we have a good understanding of the interaction between a worker and a company in
our experimental labor market. It is worth noting that this design is the first one to implement
the “compensating differential” in a laboratory experiment to price the cost of a mismatch
between a worker and a company.
In addition, we obtain a lot of intriguing findings due to the uniqueness of our subject
pool of Chinese university students. In particular, we document that China’s One-Child Policy
has produced significantly more risk-averse, more able, less self-confident, less cooperative, and
more competitive individuals. Thus, we can conclude that the One-Child Policy has important
ramifications for Chinese labor market and the society as a whole.
Our second study explores how impersonal trust ensures cooperation between strangers in
a setting with noisy feedback about the trustworthiness of others. As a consequence, we reject
120
the behavioral predictions based on standard Bayesian rule and verify that individuals follow
an optimally biased information processing rule to update their trust beliefs. Moreover, this
study also contributes to social identity research by highlighting the impact of social identity
on individual initial trust as well as trust updating.
In fact, it still has several potential future extensions on the current work. First of all,
compared with the trust between strangers, the trust between friends might be fundamentally
different. As another crucial trust form of the basis for cooperation, it is worthwhile to apply
the similar experimental approach and investigate how people process the positive as well as
negative feedback about the trustworthiness from a friend instead of a stranger; Secondly,
social identity should be a very promising topic to strengthen in our future work on trust,
and we plan to enlarge our subject pool to make cross-country comparisons such as a US-
China trust investigation. Although there are several papers made comparative analysis on
the social trust within different countries, few of them concerned the impersonal trust between
different societies and cultures. Therefore, we can apply experiments to measure the social trust
between different countries, and then probe the determinants for the creation and development
of multicultural cooperation.
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 2 – 4
Welcome to our experiment!
In this study, you will be asked to perform a sequence of tasks and answer questions. We
expect that your participation in this study will take about 50 minutes. Your participation
in this study is purely voluntary. Your data will be kept completely confidential. When the
research is completed, the anonymous study results will be stored in a computer database.
You will receive 10 Yuan for showing up to this experiment. You will receive this show-up
fee even if you do not complete the experiment. You can increase your earnings by following
the experimental instructions correctly. Your earnings will be paid at the end of the experiment
in an envelope. To protect your privacy, the envelope will only show the numeric ID that we
have given to you.
If you have any questions about the study before indicating your voluntary consent to
participate, please contact Fanzheng Yang (Email: yangfz@iastate.edu). If you would like to
participate in the study, please proceed to the next page.
[New Screen]
You are about to participate in a decision making experiment. This experiment is part of
a research project financed by Iowa State University.
The experiment consists of eight separate tasks. After you complete all eight tasks, one of
them will be randomly selected for your payment.
Your total earnings from the experiment will be the show-up fee of 10 Yuan plus the earnings
from this randomly selected task.
Although some tasks are similar each other, they are in fact all different. Different partici-
pants will perform different tasks in different orders. Therefore, please keep your eyes on your
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screen and do not disturb other participants. Thank you for your cooperation!
[New Screen]
Task 1
Your first task is to choose several times between a fixed payment and a lottery. The fixed
payment on the left will always pay you 20 Yuan while the lottery on the right will pay you
either 40 Yuan with some probability or 0 Yuan. For each binary choice, please select either
the fixed payment or the lottery. One of your choices will be randomly selected for payment.
Table A.1 Ten binary choices between a fixed payoff and a lottery
Choice 1 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 10% probability and
0 Yuan with 90% probability
Choice 2 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 20% probability and
0 Yuan with 80% probability
Choice 3 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 30% probability and
0 Yuan with 70% probability
Choice 4 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 40% probability and
0 Yuan with 60% probability
Choice 5 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 50% probability and
0 Yuan with 50% probability
Choice 6 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 60% probability and
0 Yuan with 40% probability
Choice 7 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 70% probability and
0 Yuan with 30% probability
Choice 8 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 80% probability and
0 Yuan with 20% probability
Choice 9 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 90% probability and
0 Yuan with 10% probability
Choice 10 Get 20 Yuan for sure Get 40 Yuan with 100% probability and
0 Yuan with 0% probability
[New Screen]
Task 2
In this task you are randomly matched with 1 other player in this room. One of you will
play the role of the Player 1 while the other player will be Player 2. You are equally likely to
be player 1 or player 2.
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Player 1 in this game gets 30 Yuan. Player 1 can either keep all the money or send some
amount to player 2. Whatever amount player 1 sends, is doubled.
For example, if player 1 sends 0 Yuan, then player 2 receives 2*0=0 Yuan and player 1
keeps 30 Yuan; If player 1 sends 10 Yuan, then player 2 receives 2*10=20 Yuan and player 1
keeps 20 Yuan; If player 1 sends 30 Yuan, then player 2 receives 2*30=60 Yuan and player 1
keeps 0 Yuan.
If the computer selects you to be player 1, how many Yuan do you want to send to player
2?
The amount of money I want to send to player 2 is [0,1,. . . ,30] Yuan.
[New Screen]
Task 3
Figure A.1 Example of letter puzzle
In this task, you are asked to solve as many puzzles as you can in 3 minutes. Each solved
puzzle will increase your earnings by 1 Yuan. On this page, you have the opportunity to solve
three example puzzles to familiarize yourself with the task. They will not count towards your
earnings.
124
The square with characters on the right differs from the square of characters on the left in
two letters. You have to find those letters and click on them to solve the puzzle. Whenever
you click a letter other than those two, your remaining time is reduced by 1 second: therefore,
you should try to only click letters that differ!
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The game will start immediately!
[New Screen]
Task 4
On this page, we ask you to estimate how well you performed in the previous puzzle-solving
task compared to a randomly selected other player in this room.
What is the probability that some randomly selected other player in this room is worse
than you? You can increase your earnings by submitting a good estimate: the computer will
give you a “helper robot” who has a certain chance of winning against a randomly selected
player. The computer will also compare your performance to the performance of a randomly
selected other player in this room.
If the helper robot is better than how you report your ability, then your helper’s performance
will be used against the other player. If the helper robot is worse than you, your own ability
will be used. If you or your helper’s performance is greater than the performance of the other
player, 10 Yuan will be added to your earnings.
You will maximize the probability of earning an extra 10 Yuan by truthfully reporting your
estimate that some other player is worse than you.
For example, if you think you were the best player, then you should report “I think there
is a 100 percent chance that a randomly selected other player is worse than me”; If you think
that half of all players were better than you, and half of them worse than you, your answer
would be “I think there is a 50 percent chance that a randomly selected other player is worse
than me”; If you think that all player were better than you, your answer would be “I think
there is a 0 percent chance that a randomly selected other player is worse than me”.
I think that the probability that a randomly selected other player is worse than me is: [0%,
dots, 100%].
125
[New Screen]
In the next three tasks, you will be an employee of a company that specializes in solving
puzzles. In each company, you will work together with 3 randomly selected people in this room.
However, each company compensates its workers differently.
[New Screen]
Task 5
You are now joining the first company.
This company pays you through an individual tournament. The company will consist
of two teams of two employees.
You will be a member of one of the teams. You will only be paid if you solve more
puzzles than your team mate in 3 minutes. In this case you will receive 2 Yuan for every
solved puzzle. If you solve in total fewer puzzles than your team mate you will get nothing.
For example, if you solve 15 puzzles and your team mate solves 10 puzzles, then you will
earn 30 Yuan.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. Your company will start work immediately
and all workers including you will work for 3 minutes.
[New Screen]
Task 6
You are now joining the second company.
This company pays you through a team tournament. The company will consist of two
teams of two employees.
You will be a member of one of the teams. You will only be paid if your team solves
more puzzles than the other team. In this case your team will receive 2 Yuan for every
puzzle that you or your team mate solved in 3 minutes. These earning will be divided equally
between yourself and your team mate.
For example, if you and your team mate solve together 30 puzzles and the other team solved
only 20, then your team will receive 60 Yuan which is equally divided into 30 Yuan for yourself
and 30 Yuan for your team mate.
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Only go to the next page when you are ready. Your company will start work immediately
and all workers including you will work for 3 minutes.
[New Screen]
Task 7
You are now joining the third company.
This company pays you through a revenue sharing. The company will consist of two
teams of two employees.
You will be a member of one of the teams. Your team will receive 1 Yuan for every puzzle
that you or your team mate solved in 3 minutes. These earnings will then be equally divided
between you and your team mate.
For example, if you solve 15 puzzles and your team mate solves 10 puzzles, then you solved
25 puzzles together and each of you will get 12.5 Yuan.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. Your company will start work immediately
and all workers including you will work for 3 minutes.
[New Screen]
Task 8
For your final task you solve again puzzles for 3 minutes. You have several options:
If you choose to work for one of the three companies, your co-workers will be randomly
selected among the players in this room. The computer will look up these workers’ perfor-
mance when they worked for the same type of company in a previous round and will use these
performances to determine your wage. If you prefer to work as a single contractor, then you
will be paid by piece rate and receive 1 Yuan for each solved puzzle in this task.
[New Screen]
Please order the 4 employment opportunities from the most preferred to the least preferred.
In each case, tell us how much greater of a signup bonus the less preferred company or customer
would have to pay you to make you switch from your more preferred option.
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For example, you might prefer the individual tournament company the most and working
as a single contractor is your second choice. However, if the customer paid you 2 Yuan more in
signup bonus, you would become a single contractor rather than work for the individual tour-
nament company. For instance, if the individual tournament company pays you 3 Yuan signup
bonus and the customer pays you 6 Yuan, you would become a single contractor. However, if
the customer pays you only 4 Yuan, you would rather work for the tournament company.
Table A.2 Ranking and compensating differentials
First choice [Piece Rate/
Revenue Sharing/
Individual Tournament/
Team Tournament]
Second choice [Piece Rate/ How much larger signup bonus would the
Revenue Sharing/ second choice have to pay over the first
Individual Tournament/ choice for you to choose the second choice:
Team Tournament] [0/ 1 / . . . / 10] Yuan.
Third choice [Piece Rate/ How much larger signup bonus would the
Revenue Sharing/ third choice have to pay over the second
Individual Tournament/ choice for you to choose the third choice:
Team Tournament] [0/ 1 / . . . / 10] Yuan.
Fourth choice [Piece Rate/ How much larger signup bonus would the
Revenue Sharing/ fourth choice have to pay over the third
Individual Tournament/ choice for you to choose the fourth choice:
Team Tournament] [0/ 1 / . . . / 10] Yuan.
[New Screen]
Your work environment in the final task is [piece rate/ revenue sharing/ individual tourna-
ment/ team tournament]. And, your signup bonus is [0 / 1 / . . . / 10] Yuan.
Only go to the next page when you are ready. The game will start immediately.
[New Screen]
Questionnaire
This is the final step to complete the whole experiment! The experiment is now almost
over. You just have to answer a brief questionnaire of a few questions.
1. What is your gender? [Male / Female]
128
2. What is your age? [16 / 17 / . . . / 40]
3. What is your current marital status? [Single / Married]
4. What is your major in the university?
5. What is your college year now? [1st year undergraduate / 2nd year undergraduate / 3rd
year undergraduate / 4th year undergraduate / 1st year master / 2nd year master / 3rd year
master / 1st year PhD / 2nd year PhD]
6. Where was your Hukou before entering the university?
7. Are you the only child in your family? [Yes / No]
8. What was your score in the University Entrance Examination?
9. What was the type of your University Entrance Examination? [Arts / Science]
10. What is your GPA score?
11. It was easy for me to understand the experiment instruction. [Yes / I had some
difficulties / No]
12. I was able to distinguish the differences among the different tasks clearly. [Yes / I had
some difficulties / No]
13. I think the number of the tasks is: [OK / somewhat high / too high]
14. I think the length of the experiment is: [OK / somewhat long / too long]
15. I would consider participating again in the similar experiments if I am invited. [Yes /
No]
[New Screen]
The experiment is over. Thank you very much for your participation! Your earnings in the
experiment will be paid to you within one week. To protect your privacy, your earnings will
be put in a sealed envelope with only your ID on it. Please make sure that you pick up your
earnings with your ID.
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APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHAPTER 5
Welcome to our experiment!
This experiment is part of a research project financed by Iowa State University. The
experiment is by invitation only. All participants in this experiment are students from two
universities, including Hong Kong Baptist University and Central University of Finance and
Economics, Beijing.
In this study, you need to answer questions and make your decisions in different environ-
ment. We expect that your participation in this study will take about 50 minutes.
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your data will be kept completely
confidential. When the research is completed, the anonymous study results will be stored in a
computer database.
You will receive $30 for participating in this experiment. In addition, you can increase
your earnings by following the experiment instructions correctly. This experiment has four
games, the amount of money you earn will depend upon the decisions you make and on
the decisions other people make. Once you complete all games, only one of them will
be randomly selected for your final payment. So, your total earnings from the
experiment will be the participation fee of $30 plus the earnings from the randomly
selected task.
Everyone will be paid in private as soon as the experiment is complete. Your earnings in
the experiment are given in tokens. At the end of the experiment you will be paid IN CASH
based on the exchange rate $1 = 25 tokens. According to your performance, you can earn up
to maximum amount of $60.
If you have any questions about the study before indicating your voluntary consent to
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participate, please contact the experimenter – Fanzheng Yang (Email: yangfz@iastate.edu )
If you would like to participate in the study, please proceed to the next page.
[New Screen]
Now we start the experiment. You will make decisions in four games. Each decision and
outcome is independent of each of your other decisions, so that your decisions and outcomes in
one game will not affect your outcomes in any other game.
In every game, you will be anonymously matched with one other participant. Moreover, for
each new game, you will be randomly matched with a different participant than in the previous
one.
There are two roles in each game, A or B. The decisions will be made sequentially, in
alphabetical order: Player A will make a decision first and, next, Player B will make a decision.
Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, and the decisions of your match may also affect
your payoffs. However, you will not be informed of the results of any previous period or game
prior to making your decision.
Please proceed to the first game if everything is clear to you in this introduction.
[New Screen]
Game 1
Figure B.1 Trust game tree
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In first game, you are Player B.
You will be anonymously matched with one other participant. Player A could be anyone
from the different or the same university as yours.
Suppose that Player A has already made a choice. If s/he has chosen A1, you will each
receive 200. Your decision only affects the outcome if Player A has chosen A2. Thus, you
should choose B1 or B2 on the assumption that Player A has chosen A2 over A1. If Player A
has chosen A2 and you choose B1, you will each receive 300. If Player A has chosen A2 and
you choose B2, then Player A will receive 100, and you will receive 500.
Decision: Assume Player A has chosen A2, as Player B, I choose [B1/ B2].
[New Screen]
Game 2
In this new game, you are Player B again.
The game structure is the same as the previous one, but you will be randomly matched with
a different participant than in the previous decision. At this time, in particular, Player
A will be the student from [Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong / Central
University of Finance and Economics, Beijing ].
Suppose that Player A has already made a choice. If s/he has chosen A1, you will each
receive 200. Your decision only affects the outcome if Player A has chosen A2. Thus, you
should choose B1 or B2 on the assumption that Player A has chosen A2 over A1. If Player A
has chosen A2 and you choose B1, you will each receive 300. If Player A has chosen A2 and
you choose B2, then Player A will receive 100, and you will receive 500.
Decision: Assume Player A has chosen A2, as Player B, I choose [B1/ B2].
[New Screen]
Game 3
In this game, you are Player A.
You will be anonymously matched with one other participant. Player B could be anyone
from the different university or the same university as yours.
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You may choose A1 or A2.
If you choose A1, you will each receive 200. If you choose A2, then Player B’s choice of B1
or B2 will determine the outcome. If you choose A2 and Player B chooses B1, you will each
receive 300. If you choose A2 and Player B chooses B2, you will receive 100, and s/he will
receive 500.
Please note that Player B has made a choice without being informed of your
decision. Player B knew that his or her choice would only affect the outcome if you had chosen
A2, so s/he chose B1 or B2 on the assumption that you had chosen A2 over A1.
Decision: As Player A, which strategy will you choose? [A1/A2]
[New Screen]
Game 3: Please estimate your partner’s strategy
No matter which strategy you just chose in Game 3, in this period, we would like to know
what you think about your matched partner’s strategy. That is, what do you think is the
probability that your partner – Player B has chosen B1 in that game?
To make it worthwhile for you to think a bit about this question, we give you a chance of
winning additional reward by submitting a good estimate.
Now our system has generated 100 different robots, and each robot is programmed to choose
strategy B1 with a certain probability: “Robot 1” chooses strategy B1 with 1% probability,
“Robot 2” chooses B1 with 2% probability. . . and “Robot 100” chooses B1 with 100% proba-
bility. One of those robots has been randomly assigned to be the potential substitute for your
actual matched partner.
We will pay you an extra 100 tokens if either your actual partner – Player B or the substitute
“Robot X” chose strategy B1. However, you have to tell us when we should use your actual
partner’s strategy and when we should use the substitute Robot’s strategy. As a result, if and
only if “Robot X” has a better chance of choosing B1, i.e. the assigned probability X% is larger
than your estimate of the probability that your actual partner has chosen B1, we will use the
Robot’s strategy instead of your actual partner’s; Otherwise, we will use your partner – Player
B’s strategy as usual.
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In one word, you are most likely to earn the additional 100 token if you simply report your
true belief. So, what is your estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B has chosen
B1 in Game 3? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 3: Please update your estimate after feedback 1
You have already made an initial estimation on the probability that your partner – Player
B has chosen B1. In the following periods, we would like to you release more information about
Player B’s strategy to help you update your estimate.
Suppose that Player B’s strategy has been written on six faces of a dice. However, only
four of the faces record the Player B’s strategy correctly, whereas other two faces show a wrong
record. For example, if Player B has chosen B1, the dice would have four faces with B1 and
two faces with B2.
And then, the computer will roll the dice and produce one result to tell you. Since each
of those six faces being equally likely to get, the report of Player B1’s strategy by such a dice
rolling mechanism should be correct with a probability of 2/3.
Now, the dice is rolled once and it turns out to be (B1/B2).
According to this feedback, we ask you to estimate the probability that Player B has chosen
B1; you can restate the same probability or revise your estimate.
Similarly, you can increase your earnings by submitting a good estimate. As before, a
“Robert X” has been randomly assigned to be the potential substitute for your actual matched
partner, and you have to tell us when we should use your actual partner’s strategy and when
we should use the substitute Robot’s strategy. As a result, if and only if “Robot X” has a
better chance of choosing B1, we will use the Robot’s strategy instead of your actual partner’s,
and pay you an additional 100 tokens if the strategy is B1.
Therefore, you are again most likely to earn the additional 100 tokens if your estimate is as
accurate as possible. So, what is your updated estimate of the probability that your partner –
Player B has chosen B1 in Game 3? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
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Game 3: Please update your estimate after feedback 2
In this period, the dice rolling mechanism, which correctly reports Player B1’s with a
probability of 2/3, works for the second time. The dice is rolled again and it turns out to be
(B1/B2).
According to this new feedback as well as the previous one, we ask you to update the
probability that Player B has chosen B1.
As before, you can increase your earnings by submitting a good estimate. Therefore, you
are most likely to earn the additional 100 tokens if your estimate is as accurate as possible. So,
what is your updated estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B has chosen B1
in Game 3? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 3: Please update your estimate after feedback 3
In this period, the dice rolling mechanism, which correctly reports Player B1’s with a
probability of 2/3, works for the third time. The dice is rolled again and it turns out to be
(B1/B2).
According to this new feedback and the previous ones, we ask you to update the probability
that Player B has chosen B1.
As before, you are most likely to earn an additional 100 tokens if your estimate is as accurate
as possible. So, what is your updated estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B
has chosen B1 in Game 3? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 3: Please update your estimate after feedback 4
In this period, the dice rolling mechanism, which correctly reports Player B1’s with a
probability of 2/3, works for the last time. The dice is rolled again and it turns out to be
(B1/B2).
According to this new feedback and the previous ones, we ask you to update the probability
that Player B has chosen B1.
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As before, you are most likely to earn an additional 100 tokens if your estimate is as accurate
as possible. So, what is your updated estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B
has chosen B1 in Game 3? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 3: Please rechoose your strategy as Player A
So far, you have received four feedbacks, and already updated your estimate of the proba-
bility that your matched partner – Player B has chosen B1 in Game 3.
No matter which strategy you chose as Player A in Game 3, in this period, we give you
chance of making your decision again. So, at this time, you can restate the same strategy or
revise your decision in Game 3.
Since your matched partner– Player B’s strategy has been fixed, any changes in outcomes
and payoffs will be only affected by your new strategy as Player A. However, at the end of
the experiment, we will randomly select one strategy from your previous one and
this new one, to calculate your payoff as well as your partner’s payoff in Game 3.
Decision: As Player A, which strategy will you rechoose? [A1 / A2]
[New Screen]
Game 3: Bid for the noiseless feedback on Player B’s strategy
In this period, you have chance to purchase the noiseless feedback. Now we ask you to state
your willingness to pay for the following two bundles:
(1) In order to receive a correct report about your partner Player B’s strategy, how much
is your bid price for this bundle? [0, 1, . . . , 100] tokens
(2) In order to receive a correct report about your partner Player B’s strategy as well as
all other participants’ strategies as Player B in the game, how much is your bid price for this
bundle? [0, 1, . . . , 100] tokens
Once you complete the bids for both bundles, one bundle out of those two will be randomly
selected and you will be able to purchase the corresponding bundle if and only if your bid
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price exceeds the randomly generated price. If so, you can get that bundle by paying for the
generated price.
[New Screen]
Game 4
In this new game, you are Player A again.
The game structure is still the same, but you will be randomly matched with a different
participant than in the previous games. Different from Game 3 in which Player B can
be anyone from either your own university or the other university, at this time,
your partner Player B will be the student from [Hong Kong Baptist University,
Hong Kong / Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing] in particular.
You may choose A1 or A2.
If you choose A1, you will each receive 200.
If you choose A2, then Player B’s choice of B1 or B2 will determine the outcome. If you
choose A2 and Player B chooses B1, you will each receive 300. If you choose A2 and Player B
chooses B2, you will receive 100, and s/he will receive 500.
Please note that Player B has made a choice without being informed of your
decision except for knowing which university you come from. Player B knew that his
or her choice would only affect the outcome if you had chosen A2, so s/he chose B1 or B2 on
the assumption that you had chosen A2 over A1.
Decision: As Player A, which strategy will you choose? [A1 / A2]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Please estimate your partner’s strategy
In this period, similar to the estimation tasks in Game 3, we would like to know what
you think about your matched partner’s strategy in Game 4. That is, what do you think is
the probability that your partner – Player B has chosen B1 in that game? Please note that
different from Game 3 in which Player B can be anyone from either your own university or the
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different university, your partner in Game 4 is a student from [Hong Kong Baptist University,
Hong Kong / Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing] in particular.
Similarly, you can increase your earnings by submitting a good estimate. As before, a
“Robert X” has been randomly assigned to be the potential substitute for your actual matched
partner, and you have to tell us when we should use your actual partner’s strategy and when
we should use the substitute Robot’s strategy. As a result, if and only if “Robot X” has a
better chance of choosing B1, i.e. the assigned probability X% is larger than your estimate of
the probability that your actual partner has chosen B1, then we will use the Robot’s strategy
instead of your actual partner’s, and pay you an additional 100 tokens if the strategy is B1.
Therefore, you are most likely to earn the additional 100 tokens if your estimate is as
accurate as possible. So, what is your estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B
has chosen B1 in Game 4? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Please update your estimate after feedback 1
You have already made an initial estimation on the probability that your partner – Player
B has chosen B1 in Game 4. In the following periods, we would like to you release more
information about Player B’s strategy to help you update your estimate.
Like in Game 3, we will use the same dice rolling mechanism to report Player B’s strategy.
As a result, the feedback we give to you should be correct with a probability of 2/3.
Now, the dice is rolled once and it turns out to be (B1/B2). So, what is your updated
estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B has chosen B1 in Game 4? [0%,
1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Please update your estimate after feedback 2
In this period, the dice rolling mechanism, which correctly reports Player B1’s with a
probability of 2/3, works for the second time. The dice is rolled again and it turns out to be
(B1/B2).
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According to this new feedback as well as the previous one, we ask you to update the
probability that Player B has chosen B1. As before, you are most likely to earn an additional
100 tokens if your estimate is as accurate as possible. So, what is your updated estimate of the
probability that your partner – Player B has chosen B1 in Game 4? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Please update your estimate after feedback 3
In this period, the dice rolling mechanism, which correctly reports Player B1’s with a
probability of 2/3, works for the third time. The dice is rolled again and it turns out to be
(B1/B2).
According to this new feedback and the previous ones, we ask you to update the probability
that Player B has chosen B1. As before, you are most likely to earn an additional 100 tokens if
your estimate is as accurate as possible. So, what is your updated estimate of the probability
that your partner – Player B has chosen B1 in Game 4? [0%, 1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Please update your estimate after feedback 4
In this period, the dice rolling mechanism, which correctly reports Player B1’s with a
probability of 2/3, works for the last time. The dice is rolled again and it turns out to be
(B1/B2).
According to this new feedback and the previous ones, we ask you to update the probability
that Player B has chosen B1.
As before, you are most likely to earn an additional 100 tokens if your estimate is as accurate
as possible. So, what is your updated estimate of the probability that your partner – Player B
has chosen B1 in Game 4? [0%,1%,. . . ,100%]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Please rechoose your strategy as Player A
So far, you have received four feedbacks, and already updated your estimate of the proba-
bility that your matched partner – Player B has chosen B1 in Game 4.
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No matter which strategy you chose as Player A in Game 4, in this period, we give you
chance of making your decision again. So, at this time, you can restate the same strategy or
revise your decision in Game 4.
Since your matched partner– Player B’s strategy has been fixed, any changes in outcomes
and payoffs will be only affected by your new strategy as Player A. However, at the end of
the experiment, we will randomly select one strategy from your previous one and
this new one, to calculate your payoff as well as your partner’s payoff in Game 4.
Decision: As Player A, which strategy will you choose? [A1 / A2]
[New Screen]
Game 4: Bid for the noiseless feedback on Player B’s strategy
In this period, you have chance to purchase the noiseless feedback. Now we ask you to state
your willingness to pay for the following two bundles:
(1) In order to receive a correct report about your partner Player B’s strategy, how much
is your bid price for this bundle? [0, 1, . . . , 100] tokens
(2) In order to receive a correct report about your partner Player B’s strategy as well as
the strategies of all other Player Bs who are from the same university as your partner, how
much is your bid price for this bundle? [0, 1, . . . , 100] tokens
Once you complete the bids for both bundles, one bundle out of those two will be randomly
selected and you will be able to purchase the corresponding bundle if and only if your bid
price exceeds the randomly generated price. If so, you can get that bundle by paying for the
generated price.
[New screen]
Post-experiment Survey
1. What is your age? [16,. . . , 40]
2. What is your major in the university?
3. Are you an undergraduate or graduate student?Undergraduate / Graduate
4. Which year are you in your program?
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5. Where is your citizenship? [Mainland China / Hong Kong / United States / Other,
please specify]
6. How many siblings (i.e. brothers or sisters) do you have? [0, 1, 2,. . . , 10]
7. In general, to what extent would you say that most people can be trusted? [Strongly
Disagree / Disagree / Neutral / Agree / Strongly Agree]
8. To what extend do you think that “every person for themselves” is a good description of
how people act in the community? [Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Neutral / Agree / Strongly
Agree]
9. I always care what other people think of me. How accurately does this statement describe
you? [Completely Untrue / Mostly Untrue / It Depends / Mostly True / Completely True]
10. Have you ever participated in any economics or psychology experimental studies before?
[Yes/ No]
11. Is it easy for you to understand the experiment instruction? [Yes / Somewhat / No]
12. Are you able to distinguish the differences among the different games clearly? [Yes /
Somewhat / No]
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